Winning an election does not mark the end of a syndicate council’s responsibility, nor is electoral legitimacy alone enough to judge the success of a syndicate’s work. An election gives a council a mandate to manage the affairs of the syndicate, but it does not exempt it from providing a clear account of its performance, nor does the confidence granted by the general assembly at the time of election serve as an open-ended guarantee until the end of its term.
Accountability of professional syndicate councils therefore goes beyond electoral competition and the rotation of positions to the core of trade union work: What has been achieved for members? What has changed in their professional and economic circumstances? And to what extent have councils been able to turn their election programs into measurable policies and results?
These questions are becoming increasingly important as syndicate memberships expand and members’ needs become more diverse.
According to data from the Department of Statistics for 2025, the number of engineers registered with the Jordan Engineers Association reached 198,700 in 2024. This large membership, for example, reflects the scale of responsibility placed on the council and makes performance evaluation an urgent institutional necessity rather than an argument renewed with every election.
Measurable Results
Election programs usually include promises to improve services, defend professional interests, expand employment opportunities, develop syndicate funds and strengthen the syndicate’s role in public affairs. However, the value of these programs is not determined by their ability to attract votes, but by the extent to which they are translated into implementation plans, performance indicators and results that members can verify.
Reports issued by the Jordan Medical Association, meanwhile, have highlighted its periodic work programs, which have focused on strengthening professional standards and protecting syndicate activity amid digital developments and professional challenges.
In its annual report, the association reviewed its achievements, implemented programs, and financial and administrative indicators as part of its commitment to transparency with the general assembly. It focused on regulating doctors’ affairs, following up on healthcare-sector issues, and developing syndicate services and its various funds, including the Social Solidarity Fund and the Pension Fund.
The figures were also discussed during consideration of the report, although the reasons behind the council’s decisions were not disclosed.
The Jordan Medical Association has around 47,000 registered members since its establishment.
The gap between election rhetoric and performance evaluation is particularly evident. Syndicate debates may focus heavily on names, alliances and balances of power, while assessing what a council has actually achieved compared with what it promised receives far less attention.
Accountability does not mean assuming in advance that a syndicate council has failed, nor does it mean ignoring economic and legislative circumstances that may prevent some promises from being fulfilled. Rather, it requires the council to explain what it has achieved, what could not be implemented and why, as well as the alternatives it adopted.
Explaining and clarifying these matters to members of the general assembly is part of the council’s responsibility, just as tangible achievements are the basis for renewing confidence.
Syndicate Funds Are More Than Numbers
Financial management is one of the most sensitive areas of syndicate work because it is directly linked to members’ contributions and rights, as well as the syndicate’s obligations toward them.
However, publishing and announcing financial figures, while important, is not sufficient by itself to ensure accountability. Financial statements should be understandable and allow members to connect available resources with spending and the results achieved.
The 2024 annual report of the Jordan Engineers Association provides an example of the importance of properly interpreting financial figures. Actual revenues for the association’s central headquarters fund, excluding branches, amounted to JD3,209,761, compared with budgeted revenues of JD3,750,000.
This difference, by itself, does not prove negligence or mismanagement. However, it raises questions about the clarity of the financial explanation provided to members and whether published reports are capable of answering questions that go beyond presenting figures to explaining what they mean.
Financial accountability also requires distinguishing between the association’s accounts and its various funds rather than treating them as a single pool of money. Each fund has its own resources, obligations and objectives, and any accurate assessment should be based on its independent accounts and approved data rather than partial figures or unequal comparisons.
Accountability Tool or Administrative Duty?
The annual report is one of the main tools through which members can evaluate the performance of their councils. However, it loses some of its value if it is limited to listing meetings, activities, events and implemented programs without explaining their actual impact.
The number of events does not necessarily equal the scale of achievement, and launching initiatives does not mean that their objectives have been achieved. More importantly, members need to know who benefited from these initiatives, how well they responded to members’ needs, and whether they contributed to improving services or addressing existing professional problems.
Syndicate reports should therefore be developed to link every stated objective to a measurable result, show what has been achieved compared with the announced plan, and identify areas of delay or failure and their causes.
Presenting data in clear language and making it available in a timely manner can also broaden participation in syndicate affairs instead of leaving information confined to limited circles.
Equally important is the role of general assemblies and central bodies in discussing financial and administrative reports. Approving accounts and reviewing reports are essential elements of institutional oversight, but their effectiveness also depends on access to information and follow-up on observations and recommendations after meetings.
Members Are Partners in Oversight
Accountability does not rest solely with the syndicate council. Effective oversight also depends on members’ ability to obtain information from their syndicate, discuss priorities and follow up on the implementation of decisions.
Participation, however, cannot be achieved simply by inviting members to meetings or allowing them to submit comments. It requires clear communication channels, proper documentation of proposals and procedures ensuring that comments do not end once they are recorded, but instead become issues for follow-up.
Accountability should also not be limited to election seasons, when lists compete by making promises and seeking to regain voters’ confidence. It should become part of everyday syndicate practice through periodic reports, published performance indicators and institutional mechanisms that allow members to evaluate decisions based on their results.
At the same time, criticism should be based on reliable information and distinguish between differences of opinion and proven failures, as well as between demands that fall within the council’s authority and those beyond its powers or mandate.
Serious accountability is not based on accusations, but on evidence, explanation and objective comparison.
The Real Test of Confidence
Professional syndicates need to avoid reducing the assessment of their councils to election results or the size of their media presence. Syndicate success is measured by the council’s ability to protect members’ interests, improve services, manage resources efficiently and transparently, and provide clear answers about the decisions it makes and the results it achieves.
This does not diminish the importance of elections. Elections are the foundation of syndicate legitimacy and a mechanism for the transfer of responsibility. However, electoral legitimacy is the beginning of accountability, not its end.
The confidence members place in an elected council should be renewed through performance and supported by verifiable reports rather than promises.
The question remains: What governs syndicate activity, and do members have the tools needed to know what their councils have achieved, compare results with commitments, and hold officials accountable for shortcomings when they are proven?
An elected council is not held accountable simply because it was elected. It is held accountable because the election entrusted it with responsibility—and that responsibility is fulfilled only through achievements that can be demonstrated, reviewed and scrutinized.
Source: Al-Ghad
