On the morning of the last day of February, the United States and Israel carried out a high-level strike on Iran that resulted in the killing of several senior Iranian leaders, most notably the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The assassination of the Supreme Leader represents a major turning point in the structure of the regional order. Targeting the head of the regime in a state of Iran’s magnitude is not merely a military strike; it is a strategic event that reshapes the balance of power and raises profound questions about deterrence, intelligence capabilities, and the future of the regime itself.
اضافة اعلان
The attack had been anticipated for weeks, as the United States continued to deploy its fleets in the region in preparation for “zero hour.” Despite ongoing negotiations, the outcome appeared predetermined. The American side, driven by Israeli demands, called on Iran to disarm, halt uranium enrichment, surrender its stockpile of enriched uranium, cease production of long-range ballistic missiles, and cut support to its regional proxies. Tehran viewed these demands as tantamount to capitulation, particularly given that it had not been defeated in the previous war.
The Event and Its Strategic Implications
A striking question is how the Supreme Leader could have been killed in such a manner—especially given that similar operations had targeted Hezbollah leaders in 2024 and during the 12-day war in June 2025. Why did the Iranian leadership fail to take the necessary and expected precautions to protect the head of the regime?
Several Western and Israeli think tanks had previously discussed the “Decapitation Strike” scenario as a less costly alternative to a prolonged war of attrition. The logic was straightforward: the United States sought to avoid a lengthy and draining conflict that could weaken President Trump and his congressional majority, while also giving Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu an advantage in the upcoming November elections.
The plan through which the Supreme Leader and other Iranian officials were killed was clear in design. This tragedy might have been avoided had Iranian intelligence services learned from previous wars and from incidents in Venezuela, and had they developed a robust strategy to safeguard the regime’s leadership.
The most recent war demonstrated that Israel had prepared thoroughly and had drawn lessons from the previous summer’s conflict. Israeli air defenses intercepted missiles with greater efficiency than before, and Israel successfully mobilized allies to help counter Iranian missiles and drones. U.S. forces positioned in the region intercepted most incoming projectiles. Although numerous agents were uncovered in Tehran following the war and amid widespread protests, Israel’s key strength lay in its effective use of intelligence in coordination with the United States.
By contrast, Iran appeared far weaker than portrayed in official rhetoric. It failed to protect its senior leadership and did not take sufficient measures to prevent the assassination of the Supreme Leader, despite direct American threats. Moreover, Iran’s severe economic crisis and international isolation have hindered its access to advanced technologies. Meanwhile, contrary to expectations, allies such as China and Russia did not assist Iran in its war preparations as the United States did for Israel.
Hypotheses Explaining the Failure of Deterrence and Protection
Several analytical hypotheses may explain this intelligence failure.
First, Iran appears to have been deeply penetrated by foreign intelligence services for a considerable time. Numerous commanders and scientists have been assassinated under mysterious circumstances. Even the helicopter crash that killed former President Ebrahim Raisi may be viewed through this lens. Israel’s infiltration of Hezbollah was evident, particularly through the planting of explosives in individual communication devices (notably pagers), resulting in approximately 2,000 casualties. Similarly, Hezbollah leaders were killed in the southern suburbs of Beirut when their meeting location was struck with massive explosives that penetrated all fortifications.
A comparable scenario appears to have occurred with the Iranian leadership. According to The New York Times, senior officials were meeting in the presidential complex when they were targeted with heavy explosives. This suggests that Iran failed to learn from what happened to Hezbollah’s leadership.
A second hypothesis is that Iranian leaders discounted the possibility of assassination during ongoing negotiations—an assumption difficult to justify, as even basic strategic analysis would reject it.
A third possibility is that after the 12-day war last year, Iran arrested suspected collaborators with Israel, restructured its intelligence apparatus, reorganized the National Security Council, and replaced several security officials. These measures may have led security services to believe that the movements of the Supreme Leader and his aides were no longer compromised. This miscalculation regarding the adversary’s penetration capabilities inflicted severe material and moral losses on Iran.
Some analyses even suggest the presence of a high-level mole within or close to the regime, potentially explaining how images of the Supreme Leader’s body reportedly reached Netanyahu before Iranian authorities had officially confirmed the assassination.
From Nuclear Deterrence to Regime Change
Following last summer’s war, Israeli strategic thinking appears to have reached a decisive conclusion: without regime change in Iran, Israel cannot achieve lasting security. During the 12-day war, Israelis experienced the intensity of repeated Iranian missile barrages. Failures of the Iron Dome to intercept numerous drones and missiles, along with civilian casualties, reinforced the belief that negotiations or partial solutions—absent regime change—would not guarantee long-term security.
At the war’s conclusion, President Trump publicly celebrated what he described as the total destruction of Iran’s nuclear program by U.S. strategic bombers, which intervened after Israel failed to destroy heavily fortified facilities at Fordow and Natanz. At that moment, Trump appeared convinced that Iran no longer posed a regional threat.
Prime Minister Netanyahu, however, seemed less persuaded by a strategy of “containment.” His ambition extended beyond disabling Iran’s nuclear program to dismantling the regime entirely or replacing it with one aligned with the U.S.–Israel axis. Israeli strategic assessment evolved from targeting nuclear infrastructure and curbing Iran’s regional influence to the conviction that the regime itself constituted the core threat.
Accordingly, Netanyahu worked intensively with the U.S. administration and pro-Israel lobbying groups to persuade Trump that destroying the nuclear program alone was insufficient and that the Iranian threat must be eliminated in its entirety.
The Logic Behind the Regime-Change Hypothesis
Netanyahu’s support for regime change rests on several key considerations:
First, destroying Iran’s nuclear infrastructure does not preclude Tehran from rebuilding its program clandestinely. Iran retains the scientific expertise and technical capacity to reconstruct what was lost.
Second, as long as the current regime positions itself as the leader of the Shiite world and maintains regional proxy networks, Israel will remain within its threat perimeter.
Third, President Trump is regarded as one of the most pro-Israel U.S. presidents in recent history. Netanyahu may perceive this as a “golden opportunity,” recognising that future administrations may not offer comparable support. Opinion polls have indicated declining support for Israel among younger Americans, partly due to the impact of the Gaza war.
Fourth—and perhaps most importantly—after what Israel perceives as major victories in Gaza and against Hezbollah, eliminating the last overt adversarial power would enable Israel to achieve regional hegemony. From the perspective of offensive realism, as articulated by John Mearsheimer, states do not merely seek security but pursue regional dominance when the opportunity arises. Such hegemony could facilitate normalization with hostile regional states at reduced political cost and reshape the regional environment in ways that mitigate pressures related to the Palestinian issue. For Netanyahu, dismantling the Iranian regime would secure a historic personal legacy and potentially extend his political longevity.
Conclusion
The assassination of the Supreme Leader does not necessarily mark the end of the Iranian regime, but it may signal the beginning of a redefinition of Middle Eastern power balances. The question is no longer whether Iran will respond, but at what level of escalation, at what cost, and what kind of political order will emerge from this pivotal moment.
