The Financial Times published a report prepared by its correspondent Najmeh Bozorgmehr from the Iranian city of Mashhad, analyzing the situation in Iran following the burial of its former Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
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The report noted that in 2024, Khamenei spoke of an "ideal life," describing it as one where a person receives an education, becomes "useful to Islam," lives into their 80s or 90s, and then achieves martyrdom. Over a year later, the 86-year-old Khamenei met that exact fate, having been killed last February at the beginning of the US-Israeli war on Iran—an end his supporters described as the culmination of his revolutionary narrative.
Khamenei will be buried this Thursday in the holy city of Mashhad, his birthplace, in a ceremony that will extend far beyond just the conclusion of his days-long funeral.
Bozorgmehr states that this symbolic end will also mark the conclusion of an era lasting nearly 37 years, during which Khamenei was the pivotal figure who shaped the Islamic Republic and maintained its unity. He reshaped institutions, ranging from Shiite religious groups to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), backed armed groups across the region, and suppressed waves of popular domestic dissent—acts that made him an increasing target of public anger against the regime in his final years.
His son and successor, Mojtaba Khamenei, will now take the reins in a country exhausted by war and burdened by an economic crisis.
However, little is known about the plans of Mojtaba, who has not been seen since his appointment as Supreme Leader in March. Given his lack of his father's revolutionary track record and decades of authority, analysts and officials expect a system in which institutions like the IRGC play a larger role, even as Mojtaba remains the ultimate decision-maker.
The report questioned whether this model would be enough for the regime's survival. An insider believes that the system reached a point where even Khamenei could no longer solve the country's problems, as internal and external challenges became too complex. The source added: "Now, his son is in a better position to turn a new page, backed by powerful institutions."
The report stated that the IRGC, led by its new commander Ahmad Vahidi, wields influence over security, foreign policy, and vast sectors of the economy—an influence that expanded during the war. Mojtaba is also expected to rely on religious organizations that mobilize supporters during crises, wealthy patronage networks, and regional proxies like Hezbollah in Lebanon, despite these groups being weakened as well.
The report quoted Saeed Laylaz, an Iranian analyst, saying: "The networks built during Ali Khamenei's era helped the state survive during the war. Now, Mojtaba Khamenei will have the final say on all major decisions, but institutions will play a larger role than before."
Even before the conflict broke out, the regime was suffering from a crisis; mass protests erupted in January, marking the culmination of years of sanctions, international isolation, and economic stagnation. They ended with a brutal crackdown that killed thousands. The violence further eroded the republic's dwindling legitimacy in the months leading up to Khamenei's death.
Nevertheless, the Islamic Republic sought to turn the six-day funeral procession—during which Khamenei's coffin was transported across Iran and into Iraq—into a show of defiance, presenting the large public turnout as proof that it had not only survived the war but retained a loyal base. The ceremonies also presented an opportunity for the regime's new leadership to appear in public after months of hiding.
Vahidi, whose predecessor as IRGC commander was killed during the conflict, was seen publicly for the first time since the war last week alongside Khamenei's coffin.
Parliament Speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, who emerged as one of Iran's most powerful wartime leaders, also appeared alongside President Masoud Pezeshkian, Judiciary Chief Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei, and others.
Even former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad—who had fallen out with the regime and whose neighborhood was bombed in an incident that killed several of his bodyguards—reappeared after months of speculation about his fate.
However, Mojtaba Khamenei was nowhere to be seen, and he has not published any audio or video messages since taking power.
Even before becoming Supreme Leader, his public appearances were rare. Regime politicians, officials, and some foreign diplomats insist that his four-month absence is due to security reasons and that he remains in control. They say he has recovered from wounds sustained in the strikes that claimed the lives of his father, wife, sister, brother-in-law, and 14-month-old niece, all of whom will be buried in Mashhad.
Nonetheless, Mojtaba's absence has sparked speculation about his whereabouts among some Iranians accustomed to the elder Khamenei's regular speeches, through which public communication was a central pillar of his rule.
Mojtaba's first major decision reveals a cautious approach. Last month, he authorized Pezeshkian to sign a memorandum of understanding to reopen the Strait of Hormuz—Iran's new source of leverage—and begin negotiations with the United States on an agreement to end the war, while distancing himself from the deal. Although Mojtaba stated in a written brief his opposition to the agreement "in principle," the Supreme Leader said he allowed it to proceed because it had the approval of the Supreme National Security Council, which includes senior Iranian military commanders and is chaired by the president.
His statement also clarified that the responsibility for achieving the economic benefits of the deal, including securing the release of frozen Iranian assets, falls on Pezeshkian. This incident indicated that Mojtaba was attempting to maintain his father's long-standing balancing policy to manage competing factions within the regime. On one hand, he granted space to pragmatists like Qalibaf, who view a deal with the US as the only way to secure sanctions relief and ease economic pressure.
A source familiar with regime affairs said: "Qalibaf is now the right-hand man of the new leader, and he realizes that his top priority is the country's development; he will prove to be a pragmatist." However, this approach faces fierce resistance from within the regime's core base, which views negotiations with Washington as a stark contradiction to their ideology and Khamenei's legacy.
Many in the massive crowds attending the funeral held banners calling for revenge and chanted "Death to America," directing their anger at the officials leading the talks. Mahnaz, a 35-year-old elementary school teacher who attended the funeral procession in Tehran, said: "It is unacceptable for negotiators to trample on our leader's blood and negotiate with the United States."
Yet, over-reliance on this hardline base risks further alienating broad segments of Iranian society, including the urban middle class and the increasingly secular youth, who demand an end to the religious restrictions imposed by the regime and greater openness to the world. Some within the regime believe that making too many concessions could embolden many Iranians who despise the system, reminiscent of the protests that shook the country in January.
The report quoted Hamid-Reza Taraghi, a hardline politician in Mashhad, saying: "In this new chapter, the Supreme Leader will show less tolerance toward anti-regime forces domestically. The institutions, led by the Revolutionary Guard, will help the new leader exert greater control over state affairs. He will bring younger generations into the regime who are ready to take risks."
A prominent reformist official expressed his belief that Iran "will become more closed politically, while becoming more open on social issues. It is difficult to imagine a radical change in the Islamic Republic."
Mojtaba has signaled continuity in approach, reappointing the hardline Judiciary Chief Mohseni-Ejei to another five-year term. However, many observers believe the crucial test will be Tehran's ability to reach a lasting agreement with Washington in the coming months, which would require Iran to make significant concessions regarding its nuclear program.
This would provide an opportunity for the new Supreme Leader to begin forging his father's legacy. However, achieving such an agreement faces formidable obstacles.
Mohammad-Sadegh Javadi-Hesar, a reformist politician in Mashhad, said that while he believes Mojtaba might introduce some changes in domestic policy, the regime will become bolder internationally. He added: "Some policies, particularly those related to the region and the Arabian Gulf, may become stricter, and Iran is no longer afraid of war." — (Agencies)
