Amman — From targeting nuclear and missile facilities to striking critical economic infrastructure, and from reshaping deterrence equations to potentially influencing the future of Iran’s political system, a possible confrontation with Iran appears likely to go beyond the boundaries of conventional military operations.
Recent developments, however, have opened another avenue for analysis: could calculations surrounding a war become intertwined with the future of political leadership in Israel, particularly as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has intensified his rhetoric toward Tehran ahead of Israel’s elections?
The question, therefore, is not simply whether Israel is preparing for another confrontation with Iran, but also what objectives it seeks to achieve and whether security and strategic considerations are intersecting with Netanyahu’s political calculations at a sensitive stage of his political future.
Reports have pointed to possible disagreements between Netanyahu and military leadership over launching a military operation before the elections. Netanyahu, meanwhile, has said Israel has intelligence indications that Iran or groups allied with it could launch an attack aimed at influencing the vote, warning of a broad military response. However, these statements do not establish that Tehran is actually preparing for an imminent attack, nor do they mean that a decision to launch a new Israeli strike has been finalized.
According to a report published yesterday by The Herald Business, Netanyahu said in a video message that Israel had intelligence indications of a possible Iranian or Iran-linked attack aimed at influencing its elections. He warned of a broad military response and said Israeli forces were prepared to carry out defensive and offensive operations. However, he did not specify a date for any potential strike against Iran, identify specific targets or present public evidence that an imminent Iranian attack was being prepared.
His remarks came ahead of elections scheduled for October 27, amid reports in Israeli media of a dispute between Netanyahu and Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir over a possible military move that could trigger another confrontation.
Netanyahu denied any disagreement with the military leadership, while his office rejected reports of efforts to launch an attack before the elections.
At the same time, media reports have cited concerns within the military establishment that any action at this stage could trigger an escalation that would be difficult to contain or that its consequences could overlap with the electoral process.
Political and strategic experts, speaking separately to Al-Ghad, said the issue goes beyond the decision to launch another strike against Iran. It also involves the political purpose of such an operation, the ability of Israel and the United States to control its course, and the consequences it could produce in Iran, Israel and the wider region.
The experts noted that if the confrontation is intended to weaken Iran’s capabilities, this would not necessarily guarantee a change in Tehran’s policies. If the objective goes further and seeks to topple the Iranian regime, achieving that goal would be a fundamentally different and more complex undertaking than simply destroying facilities.
If the military decision is intertwined with calculations concerning Israel’s leadership and Netanyahu’s political future, this would add another dimension to assessments of the timing and motives of escalation. However, they said, it would not by itself explain the confrontation.
Amid military threats and political tensions, the key question remains whether a war would serve as a tool to impose new strategic realities or whether expanding its objectives could turn it into a confrontation whose consequences become increasingly difficult to control.
Military superiority may alter the balance on the battlefield, but it does not by itself guarantee political victory. Likewise, using threats in electoral rhetoric does not prove that war has been finally decided, but it makes the relationship between security and politics an unavoidable factor in understanding the potential course of the confrontation.
Potential Military Action
As questions grow over the timing of a possible strike on Iran and whether it is driven by security and strategic calculations or also intersects with Israel’s political leadership considerations, military expert Dr. Nidal Abu Zeid said battlefield indicators suggest preparations for possible military action in the coming period if diplomatic efforts fail to achieve a breakthrough that prevents escalation.
Abu Zeid raised the possibility of an operation coordinated between the United States and Israel, or an Israeli move conducted independently. He said the target list could include energy facilities and nuclear sites, alongside intelligence efforts aimed at Iranian leaders.
He described these possibilities as part of what he called a “decisive phase” in the conflict with Iran if a political settlement cannot be reached.
However, this assessment is based on readings of military and political indicators and does not constitute evidence that a final decision to go to war has been made.
This view overlaps with an assessment by Dr. Khaled Shneikat, president of the Jordanian Association of Political Science, who said a future confrontation could target nuclear facilities that have been repaired or newly established, as well as missile launchers, missile production plants and drone facilities.
Shneikat said the main difference from previous confrontations could be the duration of operations and the expansion of the target list, potentially allowing military, economic and intelligence pressure to continue for a longer period.
However, expanding the scope of strikes does not necessarily mean achieving the desired political results. Weakening a targeted state’s military capabilities may limit its ability to carry out certain operations, but it does not guarantee a change in its behavior or force it to accept the attacker’s conditions.
Dr. Bader Al-Madi, a professor of political science at the German Jordanian University, goes beyond the question of weakening military capabilities to the possibility of targeting the Iranian regime itself.
He said the United States and Israel may conclude that previous strikes failed to achieve the desired political results, prompting them to adopt a broader approach than simply targeting Iran’s nuclear program or missile capabilities.
Al-Madi suggested that toppling the Iranian regime could be a primary Israeli objective as part of an effort to change Iran’s regional role and its relationship with the international community. This possibility has gained attention following Netanyahu’s statements about directing the Israeli military and Mossad to work toward bringing down the Iranian regime.
However, announcing a strategic objective does not mean that achieving it has become possible or that a decision to launch a new military operation has already been made.
Shneikat also said that targeting as many strategic and vital facilities as possible could be intended to pressure Iran’s leadership into accepting US demands or increase internal economic and social pressure. The objective could therefore go beyond inflicting military losses to raising the cost of continued confrontation for the Iranian state and regime.
Security and strategic expert Dr. Bashir Al-Daajeh, however, warned against confusing immediate military outcomes with long-term political results, stressing that “military superiority does not necessarily mean political victory.”
Even if strikes succeed in destroying facilities or weakening strategic capabilities, this does not mean the targeted side will abandon its objectives or accept imposed conditions.
This highlights the importance of distinguishing between three possible objectives: weakening Iran’s military capabilities, forcing Tehran to make strategic concessions, and changing the political system. These objectives are not identical, and achieving one does not necessarily lead to achieving the others.
Netanyahu Between Security and Elections
The timing of Israel’s escalation raises questions about the relationship between managing the Iranian threat and the political calculations of its leadership. Warning of an external threat, emphasizing military readiness and linking the elections to the leadership’s ability to confront security threats are all elements of political messaging directed at voters.
However, the existence of such an overlap alone is not enough to prove that Netanyahu is seeking war for electoral reasons.
Al-Madi said political and electoral calculations in both the United States and Israel could influence the timing of military operations. However, he questioned whether these calculations alone would be enough to rule out war if the parties involved conclude that political means have failed to produce the desired results.
Reports of a possible disagreement between Netanyahu and the chief of staff are particularly significant in this context. Israeli media have reported military reservations about an unspecified operation that could lead to confrontation with Iran before the elections, as well as calls from the military leadership for broader consultations and clear authorization before any action is taken.
Netanyahu, meanwhile, denied any confrontation with the chief of staff, while his government rejected reports that it was attempting to exploit the Iranian front for electoral gains.
These competing narratives cannot be treated as conclusive evidence of a plan to ignite a war in order to delay elections or improve Netanyahu’s political prospects.
They do, however, raise a fundamental question about the limits of the relationship between political decision-making and military assessments, and the ability of security institutions to prevent external threats from turning into hasty decisions.
At the same time, strategic considerations may take precedence over electoral calculations, particularly if Israel’s leadership believes that Iran’s nuclear program or reconstruction of its missile capabilities represents a threat requiring action.
Understanding the escalation therefore requires examining both tracks simultaneously, without reducing the military decision to electoral motives or ignoring the influence of domestic politics.
Expanding the Scope of the War
Dr. Munther Al-Hawarat said the most sensitive shift could involve moving from targeting combat capabilities to striking what he calls Iran’s “resilience factors,” including vital and economic infrastructure, communications networks, ports, energy facilities and desalination plants.
Such a shift would mean that the war could target the state’s ability to keep its facilities operating and provide basic services, rather than focusing solely on the ability of its armed forces to fight.
This aligns with Abu Zeid’s and Shneikat’s assessments regarding an expanded target list, but places greater emphasis on the ability of the state and society to bear the economic and service-related burdens resulting from prolonged operations.
Al-Daajeh warned that the confrontation could combine air and missile strikes with naval operations, electronic warfare, cyberattacks and economic pressure.
The interaction of these tools could broaden the scale of damage, extending beyond military facilities to communications and energy systems, financial services and civilian infrastructure.
The repercussions could also extend to the Arabian Gulf, the Red Sea and the eastern Mediterranean, particularly if shipping is disrupted or energy facilities are hit.
The Strait of Hormuz would be especially critical in this context, as it is a vital passage for global oil trade. Any major disruption could push up energy prices and shipping and insurance costs, affecting economies across the region and beyond.
This means that an expanding war would not be measured only by the number of targets being struck, but also by the number of parties affected and the ability of states to contain its economic and security consequences.
Targeting vital infrastructure could increase pressure on Iran, but it could also raise the cost of the confrontation for the entire region and give Tehran additional incentives to broaden its response.
Between Settlement and Open War
Despite the escalation in political and military rhetoric, the possibility of a settlement remains, although it depends on the parties’ ability to address fundamental disputes over Iran’s nuclear program, sanctions, security guarantees and freedom of navigation.
Abu Zeid noted that the absence of a diplomatic breakthrough could push the situation toward escalation, while Shneikat pointed to continued contacts and mediation despite the parties maintaining their positions.
Al-Daajeh warned that the crisis of trust could lead each side to interpret the other’s actions as preparations for an attack, triggering a chain of countermeasures that increases the risk of miscalculation.
A military operation could begin with limited objectives and then expand through reciprocal responses, even if none of the parties initially wants to engage in a prolonged war.
Possible scenarios range from a political and security settlement that limits escalation, to a military campaign targeting nuclear, missile and strategic facilities, or a multi-front regional confrontation affecting military bases, vital interests and maritime routes.
Describing an operation as limited does not guarantee that it will remain so. An Iranian response could expand the scope of strikes and lead to additional interests being targeted, while the duration and ultimate consequences of the confrontation would remain difficult to predict.
Source: Al-Ghad
