Over the past two years, the steady expansion of terrorist and
fundamentalist threats in the Sahel has not got the attention it deserves,
given the region’s repeated military coups and political turmoil. Due to the
apparent contagion effect of military coups, the political instability in the
Sahel has resulted in a regional and international focus on electoral
timetables and constitutional rule while overlooking the rise of terrorist
groups, which continue to gain ground and menace the very existence of Sahel
countries.
اضافة اعلان
As the region’s closest neighbor and a country whose
security depends on that of the Sahel, Algeria has been missing in action. Long
hailed as a critical actor for peace and stability in the region, Algeria has
been noticeably much less engaged across the Sahel, especially under its new
military leadership, in the post-coup period. As a result, its visibility and
influence as an essential player have slowly faded. Yet Algeria’s regional
diplomatic clout, military might, and experience in fighting terrorism could
help Sahelian states ward off an imminent political and security collapse. Here
are four reasons why.
1. Algeria has a
successful track record in defeating terrorism.
During Algeria’s civil war
(1992–2002), the Algerian government successfully defeated militant Islamist
groups, including the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), which was
later revived in Mali as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Algeria’s more
recent counterterrorism activities and initiatives at domestic level aimed at
countering extremist ideology and narratives in the media, schools, and mosques
were also highly successful. As such, Algeria’s long history of fighting
domestic terrorism could prove useful in the Sahel, where actors are similar to
the ones Algeria combatted in the 2000s. Since that time the context has
changed, however: in addition to AQIM’s exponential growth in size,
geographical reach, and operational capacity, terrorist groups have multiplied
as nebulous entities, making the Sahel a very different battleground from what
Algeria was.
2. France’s
departure from the Sahel could create a window of opportunity for Algeria.
On Nov. 9, 2022, President
Emmanuel Macron announced the official end of Operation Barkhane, an
eight-year-old regional military operation based out of Ndjamena, Chad, whose
objective was to combat terrorism at regional level. Since the creation of
Barkhane, anti-French sentiment has consolidated throughout the Sahel because
of the former colonial power’s inability to defeat the terrorist threat and its
perceived interference in local politics. The vacuum created by France’s
military drawdown could easily be filled by Algeria, which has been reticent to
implement a joint strategy alongside other international actors. Algeria could
turn France’s departure to its advantage and thus solidify its role as a widely
respected regional power.
3. Without Algeria’s
buy in, security initiatives in the Sahel remain incomplete.
The multiple military and
intelligence cooperation initiatives that were undertaken between the Sahel and
the Maghreb in the face of the growing terrorist threat in the former are a
testament to the intertwined and interconnected security concerns both regions
face. Unfortunately, leadership rivalries and strategic differences have
consistently undermined such efforts. It is high time to restructure regional
security initiatives in the Sahel and make space for Algeria, an immediate
neighbor whose security interests overlap with those of regional states.
In October 2022, Algiers hosted an ad-hoc meeting of
the Joint Military Staff Committee (CEMOC) just a month after Algerian Foreign
Minister Ramtane Lamamra visited Mali to appeal for its revival. An Algerian
initiative established in 2010, CEMOC includes Algeria’s Sahel neighbors Niger,
Mauritania, and Mali. CEMOC never really took off and slowly died after the
creation in 2014 of the G5 Sahel, a regional security grouping — strongly
encouraged by France — to combat terrorism in border areas of the Sahel region.
Although the G5 excluded Algeria, it included CEMOC member states Niger,
Mauritania, and Mali, along with Burkina Faso and Chad. Once again, France’s
leadership of the G5 trumped Algeria’s leadership of CEMOC, in much the same
way French military leadership in Mali reduced Algeria’s strategic space
post-2012.
During its eight years, the G5 Sahel struggled to
find a sustainable mechanism to fund its operations. Notwithstanding a holistic
vision of complementing its military intervention with large-scale development
projects to reach the most vulnerable populations, it had limited success on
the ground. The membership of the G5 Sahel made perfect sense, yet Algeria’s
absence may have weakened it considerably. The G5’s call for sustainable
funding through the United Nations was ineffective, and Algeria’s military and
diplomatic savoir-faire might have helped.
Leveraging and consolidating the voices of both the
Sahel and the Maghreb on the international scene could generate the type of
broader global response that Sahelian states have been waiting for. CEMOC’s
unique advantage had always been institutionalized security cooperation between
Algeria and the Sahel. This integrated security cooperation now has to become a
reality.
4. Algeria wants to
play a stronger diplomatic role. It can begin in the Sahel.
Lamamra’s recent visits to
Mali and the UN-mandated High-Level Panel for Peace and Development in the
Sahel may signal Algeria’s willingness to resume engaging in the region in a
more significant way. Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune has paved the way
for this through a constitutional amendment allowing Algeria’s military to
deploy outside the country’s borders. While it is unlikely that Algeria will
immediately put boots on the ground in the event of an existential attack
against a Sahel neighbor, that is now a possibility.
Algeria’s relationship with the countries of the
Sahel has evolved significantly over the years. Since the 2015 signature of the
Peace Accords between Mali and former armed rebels, Algiers has deepened its
involvement in the implementation of the agreement. Its more recent efforts
have focused on diversifying its partnerships in the region beyond security to
include trade, professional training, energy, mining, and telecommunications.
Algeria’s most significant investment in the Sahel may be the Trans-Saharan
Highway Project, which aims to link Algiers to Lagos via Tunis, Bamako, Niamey,
and Ndjamena. Algiers’ $3 billion investment in the project provides the
country with solid regional leverage. But power is nothing without influence.
These additional economic tools that reinforce the mutual dependency between
Algeria and Sahel states, together with its strategic and military
capabilities, will facilitate Algeria’s rise as an indispensable actor in the fight
against terrorism in the Sahel.
Kamissa Camara is a non-resident scholar at the Middle East Institute and a senior
visiting expert for the Sahel at the United States Institute of Peace. She is
currently pursuing a Ph.D. in political science at the University of Oxford.
She tweets @kamissacamara. A longer version of this article first appeared in
the December 6 edition of the Middle East Institute (MEI).
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