The developments of the escalating war between the United States and Israel on one side and Iran on the other show that overwhelming airpower has not achieved a decisive victory that can be relied upon to declare a convincing win. The American Secretary of Defence and the American President have repeatedly used the term Obliterated, which means destruction or erasure without any trace, to describe the strength of the air campaign against Iran. According to this term, all Iranian capabilities, missiles, and drones should have become a thing of the past. However, the reality of operations on the ground indicates otherwise, as missiles are still falling in all directions and striking with intensity. According to recent statistics, 36 missiles have managed to penetrate layered air defence systems deployed across the entire geography of the Middle East and maritime domains. Despite the decrease in the rate of falling missiles compared to the beginning of the war, this does not mean that Iran’s stockpile will run out soon, as Iran coordinates with Hezbollah from time to time in large attacks involving a greater number of missiles. Here, the fundamental question arises: did the attacking side miscalculate Iran’s ability to continue responding?
اضافة اعلان
Most foreign analyses explain Iranian resilience through early strategic planning, anticipation of worst-case scenarios, and building an appropriate response based on studying the opponent’s way of operating in previous battles, as well as a good understanding of the American President’s mindset. This is not necessarily praise for Iran, as its previous mistakes contributed to pushing it into a stage of struggle for survival. What we are witnessing today is a composite resilience strategy operating on two levels: operational–tactical and strategic.
The operational level first looks at how to employ geography as a defensive tool. How can the battle be sustained without falling into the trap of air dominance and limited mobility? In this context, the exceptional capability of the attacking forces’ airpower is a strength for the attacker and an inevitable threat to the defender. Preventing the attacking forces from benefiting from this advantage through air defences is not possible, as demonstrated by the 12-day war last year. To solve the problem of enemy air superiority in a practical way, Iranian geography has been used effectively, represented by the vast size of Iranian territory, which extends over 1.7 million square kilometres. It has been used to reduce the effectiveness of the attacker’s airpower in deciding the battle, based on the principle: let the land fight with you and defend you.
The second factor is sustaining the missile and drone battle at any cost, because this continuity makes declaring victory and even achieving air control by the attacking forces impossible. The solution lies in distributing forces across Iranian geography, delegating decision-making to lower levels, concealing the state’s missile stockpiles, and activating the continuous production of this strategic weapon. For the success of this system, Iranian forces used the mosaic defence strategy, so that each unit becomes capable of launching missiles and drones based on its own assessment of the situation, rather than waiting for central orders, especially if command and control systems are disrupted.
Third: relying on what is underground more than what is above ground. In wars that are unequal in power and military superiority, the underground becomes the main theatre of operations. The Gaza war has proven the success of this principle, as it reduced the effect of technology and deprived the enemy of making optimal use of its technological superiority. Iran has invested heavily in the depths of the mountains, knowing that missile systems would be easy targets if they were on the surface. Therefore, launch time had to be minimised so that crews could withdraw to safe areas. This strategy has forced the attacker to use large bombs and advanced logistical means, increasing costs and reducing the effectiveness of air strikes.
At the strategic level, Iran has managed its battle using a horizontal escalation strategy (Horizontal Escalation).
First: by expanding the scope of confrontation with American and Israeli forces, dispersing enemy air defence efforts, and reducing interception rates of missiles and drones. This included targeting all Arab countries allied with Washington in the region to increase pressure on the American government and raise costs for الجميع.
Second: global economic pressure, by threatening to close the Strait of Hormuz, attacking several commercial ships, and placing the global economy and especially the energy sector, within the Iranian deterrence equation.
Third: Iran also used its external proxies in an escalatory manner proportional to the increasing intensity of confrontation, such as Hezbollah and Shiite resistance groups in Iraq, as a calculated escalation to distribute pressure and disperse American and Israeli efforts. In this context, we note that Ansar Allah forces have not entered the war so far. The analysis of the Houthi position revolves around three scenarios:
The first scenario: the Houthis do not enter the battle at all. The explanation is that Houthi forces are less connected to Iran than Hezbollah and other Shiite factions, and that their focus is on the Yemeni الداخل rather than external adventures, which previously came at a high cost.
The second scenario: monitoring developments and waiting for orders. Houthi entry is linked to how the battle develops. As long as Iran is not exposed to a ground invasion and is managing the battle relatively successfully, using the Houthi card at this stage will not have an effective impact.
The final scenario: major transformation and open war. Houthi entry into the battle is linked to the entry of Arab and Gulf countries into the war against Iran, especially Saudi Arabia and Egypt. If these two countries decide to enter the war against Iran, the Houthis will enter strongly. They will work to close the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, affect navigation and maritime supply lines, and also attack Saudi Arabia from the south, leading to the re-ignition of the southern front. As for Egypt and Jordan, the Houthis will work to disrupt maritime navigation and cut supply lines.
In conclusion, the gap between the discourse of “destruction” and the field reality confirms an important strategic fact: air superiority alone is not enough to achieve decisive victory against a prepared, flexible, and decentralised adversary. Iran’s strategy is not based on achieving a traditional victory, but on preventing defeat, prolonging the conflict, and raising the cost of resolution to a level that makes victory politically and strategically unbearable.
Dr Emad Al-Hammadin
Centre for Strategic Studies (CSS)
Jordan University
