Iran’s response—targeting Gulf states in addition to Jordan—came as a strategic surprise to Washington, which had largely built its war plan on the assumption that eliminating senior leadership would trigger rapid Iranian capitulation. This assumption overlooked a critical reality: the Iranian regime appears to view this confrontation as existential, and is therefore inclined to expand the scope of conflict and raise its costs for all parties involved.
اضافة اعلان
As the war enters its fourth week, there are no clear signs of an imminent end. Yet this does not necessarily imply an open-ended conflict. Several factors suggest that a prolonged war remains unlikely. Chief among them is the position of Donald Trump and his administration’s perception of what constitutes “victory.” To date, the American definition of victory remains ambiguous, reflecting a broader lack of strategic clarity in dealing with Iran—raising a fundamental question: is this war primarily in the interest of the United States, Israel, or both?
In this context, Rational Choice Theory suggests that when war becomes excessively costly—both materially and in human terms—states may opt to declare victory unilaterally and withdraw in a manner that preserves political credibility, even if only partial objectives have been achieved. Similarly, Game Theory indicates that a total victory—where one side fully achieves its objectives while the other completely fails—is highly unlikely in such conflicts.
Empirical realities support this view. Key U.S. objectives, particularly regime change, have not been realised. On the contrary, the Iranian regime—especially the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—may have consolidated its internal grip following the killing of the Supreme Leader. Consequently, political discourse in both Washington and Tel Aviv has begun shifting toward promoting a form of “marketable victory” for domestic audiences.
Recent statements by Benjamin Netanyahu reflect this shift. He appears to have retreated from earlier rhetoric demanding Iran’s “surrender.” According to reports published on March 13, Netanyahu stated that Iran is “no longer the threat it once was,” even though the same night witnessed a coordinated five-hour Iranian attack, in conjunction with Hezbollah, resulting in multiple casualties.
However, the timing of any declaration of victory will not be driven solely by the rising costs of war. Public opinion—both in Israel and the United States—plays a critical role.
In Israel, recent polling data indicate strong support for the war: 81% of Israelis back military action against Iran, 63% believe the war should continue until the Iranian regime falls, and 62% are willing to endure sustained missile attacks for up to a month. Additionally, 86% report a clear understanding of the war’s objectives, while trust in the Israeli military and security services stands at 85%. Approval ratings for Netanyahu have risen modestly to 38%, and reach as high as 79% among his political base. These figures suggest that Israeli society perceives Iran as the primary national security threat and largely supports the war effort.
This broad public backing grants Netanyahu significant flexibility in defining and declaring victory. The threshold for success, therefore, becomes politically adjustable—expandable or reducible depending on leadership priorities.
In contrast, American public opinion appears far less supportive. Polling indicates that a significant portion of the U.S. public views the war as unnecessary and misaligned with domestic priorities such as economic stability and welfare—key promises made by Donald Trump during his election campaign. A survey conducted by the University of Maryland found that 49% of Americans oppose military action against Iran, while 30% remain uncertain. Even within the Republican Party, consensus is lacking: only 40% support military action, 25% oppose it, and 35% remain undecided.
Several key factors are likely to shape the trajectory and eventual conclusion of the war, even if not all objectives are achieved:
First: Battle Damage Assessment (BDA).
Despite extensive strikes, Iran retains the capacity to launch missiles and drones. While the frequency may fluctuate, the continuity of these attacks suggests that the effectiveness of U.S. and Israeli operations remains uncertain.
Second: Economic Implications—particularly the Strait of Hormuz.
Iran’s ability to disrupt this critical chokepoint gives it substantial leverage. Energy flows through the Strait are vital to global markets, and any sustained disruption would significantly raise global energy prices, increasing both international and domestic pressure on Washington. Even multinational naval protection efforts may prove inefficient, as estimates suggest that each oil tanker would require multiple escort vessels. A ground invasion remains the least desirable option, given its potentially catastrophic consequences.
Third: U.S. Casualties.
Although currently limited, any significant rise in American casualties could rapidly shift public opinion, given the historical sensitivity of U.S. society to wartime losses.
Fourth: Regional and International Pressure.
Gulf states hosting U.S. military bases are increasingly vulnerable to Iranian retaliation. Continued attacks may push these states to exert diplomatic pressure on Washington to de-escalate. Moreover, disruptions to oil exports and food imports—much of which transit through the Strait—pose serious risks to regional stability.
Fifth: Military Sustainability.
The high financial cost of the war—reportedly exceeding $11 billion in the first week alone—combined with the consumption of advanced munitions, raises questions about long-term sustainability. Iran, for its part, has reportedly deployed hundreds of missiles and thousands of drones, suggesting it may be capable of sustaining operations over an extended period.
Finally: Domestic Political Pressure in the United States.
The Make America Great Again movement, which forms a core support base for Donald Trump, has traditionally advocated for reducing foreign military engagements and prioritising domestic issues. A prolonged conflict risks generating internal political pressure on the administration. Iran may seek to exploit this dynamic by extending the duration of the war and maintaining consistent pressure, particularly given the already moderate levels of public support for the conflict.
Conclusion
This war is unlikely to produce a decisive military victory. Instead, it is more likely to end with a politically constructed and carefully communicated version of success for each side. Ultimately, the outcome will be shaped not only by battlefield dynamics but by the interplay of public opinion, economic pressures, and political calculations at both domestic and international levels.
