Jordan's experience since the return of parliamentary and party-based political life has not always succeeded in aligning the outcomes of democracy with the country's national priorities, particularly in the areas of economic development and local governance.
اضافة اعلان
The lengthy debate held under the House of Representatives this week over the draft Local Administration Law highlighted this challenge.
The discussion, while significant and substantive, reflected the broader dilemma facing emerging democracies in societies such as Jordan.
Principles such as direct elections for municipal and local councils, along with the powers granted to elected representatives, are fundamental components of democratic governance.
However, when these principles are considered in isolation from Jordan's specific experience, the institutional realities of municipalities, and citizens' service-related priorities, elections can become more of a burden than a benefit.
Lawmakers and decision-makers should therefore take into account the lessons accumulated over the past four decades, including public perceptions of elected councils, the limitations of their authority, and the current state of municipalities and governorate councils.
Such an assessment requires careful research and constructive dialogue, free from populist rhetoric, to develop legislation that balances citizens' democratic rights with national priorities.
During periods of political transition, democratic practices are often shaped by prevailing social norms. In Jordan's case, elections have at times been driven by tribal, regional, and local interests rather than broader public considerations.
This has, according to the author, contributed to favoritism, patronage, financial mismanagement, mounting debt, bloated municipal workforces, and corruption, as reflected in reports issued by the Audit Bureau.
Under these circumstances, Al-Khitan argues that Jordan should consider a more structured democratic model that preserves citizens' right to vote while strengthening governance, financial discipline, and administrative accountability.
Such a system would limit the ability of elected officials to use municipal institutions for narrow interests while giving voters stronger mechanisms to hold representatives accountable and participate in setting priorities and public policies.
One option, he suggests, is adopting a system of indirect representation, in which elected representatives delegate authority through a secondary process.
This could help reduce conflicts of interest and prevent councils from being used primarily to serve limited constituencies for personal or political gain.
The author believes that most members of parliament fully understand the challenges facing municipalities, as they encounter these issues regularly within their electoral districts.
As a result, they have a direct interest in reforming Jordan's local administration system.
While the government has presented a draft law that offers an opportunity for reform, Al-Khitan does not argue that parliament should approve it unchanged.
Instead, he calls on lawmakers to examine the legislation responsibly and pragmatically, proposing amendments where necessary to reach a broadly acceptable framework capable of achieving its intended objectives.
He concludes that rejecting the draft law outright, although a legitimate parliamentary option, would be the easiest course of action.
Such a decision, he argues, would spare lawmakers the responsibility of engaging with the legislation, proposing meaningful reforms, and addressing the structural shortcomings that continue to affect Jordan's democratic and local governance experience.
