Since al-Qaeda launched its attacks against the United States in September 2001, followed by the U.S.-led Global War on Terror, Washington entered a phase of what the Copenhagen School of security studies calls the “securitisation of the terrorist threat.” Terrorism was framed as an existential threat that justified extraordinary measures outside the traditional framework of politics. This securitised mindset manifested in mobilising and financing allies to wage a global war against terrorism.
اضافة اعلان
In recent years, the most prominent threat has been the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which lost vast territories it once controlled. However, its importance has not disappeared from regional and international calculations. A careful reading of the organisation’s trajectory shows that ISIS’s significance does not lie in the territory it controls, but in the role, it can play within a turbulent geopolitical environment.
The central question remains: Are we witnessing the return of an organisation, or merely its repositioning for a new function?
American Attempts to Reduce the Burden of the War on Terror
Successive U.S. administrations attempted to withdraw from operational theaters in Iraq and Syria. President Obama adopted this approach in 2011, reducing American troop presence due to high costs and limited tangible results on the ground. However, this strategy repeatedly faltered because of the absence of a reliable local partner.
When most U.S. forces withdrew in early 2011, a security vacuum emerged. In 2014, ISIS capitalized on this vacuum and seized vast areas of Iraq and Syria. Consequently, Obama was compelled to redeploy a significant number of U.S. forces to confront what was considered the most serious regional threat in the Middle East, through the formation of the international coalition.
Although ISIS lost its territorial battles between 2016 and 2017, it remains present as an ideology and network. This presence is evident in sporadic attacks in the Levant and Iraq, as well as in its significant expansion across Africa and the Sahel region. While ISIS has lost most of its territory and now operates primarily in the depths of the Syrian desert, it has not been completely eliminated—possibly because it may still serve a strategic function at a later stage.
For this reason, Washington has refrained from a full withdrawal from Iraq and Syria, fearing the resurgence of the organization.
ISIS as a Card in the SDF Equation in Syria
In 2015, Washington supported the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) under the model of “counterterrorism by proxy,” whereby local actors are delegated to manage the threat in exchange for political and military support. The SDF’s primary mission was to fight ISIS and manage detention facilities holding ISIS members on behalf of the international coalition, which largely overlooked reports of harsh practices against Syrian civilians.
At the same time, ISIS’s existence provided the SDF with a functional framework. The threat was leveraged to enhance international legitimacy and secure continuous military support, enabling the SDF to control vast areas of Syria well beyond predominantly Kurdish regions.
However, reliance on non-state actors has not always proven strategically successful in the long term. At best, it achieved tactical success in managing military operations and containing the threat without resolving it. Even in Iraq, despite the presence of a central state, counterterrorism efforts were not entirely successful due to the overlap between state institutions and internal components operating with external backing—costing Iraq significant losses in development and international standing.
After the Fall of the Syrian Regime: ISIS Repositioning
During the Syrian war, ISIS did not consistently fight the regime as other opposition factions did. Instead, it focused on combating rival factions and repositioning itself in the Syrian desert.
Following the fall of the Assad regime and the collapse of the so-called Axis of Resistance, ISIS resurfaced with qualitative operations, including the Palmyra attack that resulted in the deaths of three Americans. The group also released new videos calling for fighting the Syrian state and directly threatening the Syrian president, accusing him of betrayal and collaboration with the West.
These developments reinforced the conviction within the U.S. administration that ISIS cannot be easily defeated. This accelerated plans to evacuate American bases to reduce potential exposure to renewed ISIS expansion. Reports in Foreign Policy, citing U.S. officials, confirmed discussions regarding a withdrawal from Syria, with Washington assessing that its presence was no longer necessary and that intensive deliberations were underway concerning the timing and mechanism of troop withdrawal from northern Syria.
Following the weakening of the SDF and the Syrian government’s assumption of responsibility for the ISIS file, the new U.S. administration appeared more inclined to rely on the Syrian state as a local partner capable of combating ISIS in the desert—without requiring direct American presence. This aligns with the U.S. national security strategy announced at the end of 2025, which places less emphasis on the Middle East and greater focus on other global regions.
Leveraging the Threat and Managing Instability
From a pragmatic perspective, a resurgence in ISIS operations could paradoxically benefit the new Syrian state if it skillfully leverages the threat to reproduce legitimacy. In certain contexts, the objective is not to eliminate instability entirely, but to manage it—a concept known as “managing instability.”
Such a dynamic could strengthen Syria’s growing security and political partnership with Washington and enhance Damascus’s regional importance as a reliable counterterrorism partner. However, the key question remains: To what extent can the new iteration of ISIS conduct high-impact operations within Syrian territory that genuinely threaten national stability?
Determining Factors: Between Calculated Containment and Chaos
Several factors may help Syria contain ISIS:
The new Syrian forces possess significant combat experience against ISIS. Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the backbone of the current Syrian military structure, has previously confronted ISIS multiple times and has familiarity with its tactics and intelligence networks.
Syria will not stand alone in combating ISIS. Regional states such as Jordan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar are wary of ISIS’s return and may provide security support.
U.S. interests require the presence of a capable local partner able to control the Syrian desert.
Conversely, several countervailing factors could complicate containment:
Potential external support for ISIS aimed at destabilizing the Syrian scene. Some states may perceive the new Syrian government as a threat to their regional influence. Certain analysts argue that Iran, Israel, and Russia—each to varying degrees—may benefit from a weakened Syrian government.
Remnants of the former regime and segments of society resistant to political transformation.
Fragile economic and social conditions that could provide fertile ground for renewed extremism.
Conclusion
ISIS is not an entity that can be eliminated according to the zero-sum logic of conventional warfare. It is an idea, and ideas are inherently transnational. Each time it is contained, it reemerges in a new form. Shifting regional and international balances compel the organization to adjust alliances and reposition itself in pursuit of survival.
Moreover, certain international and non-state actors may have an interest in maintaining the organization at a controlled level of threat—manageable and usable—rather than completely eradicating it.
