Predicting the overseas travel plans of Chinese President Xi
Jinping has become something of a parlor game for journalists and foreign
policy observers. Xi has not left China since the COVID-19 pandemic began, and
the destination of his first post-pandemic trip — and who he meets — will speak
volumes about China’s strategic priorities.
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In the Middle East, anticipation was high after The
Guardian reported on August 11 that Xi was going to visit Saudi Arabia during
the week of August 15. The week came and went, and no trip happened. And while
close observers of China’s political cycle were skeptical of the Saudi visit
claim, the Middle East remains high on Xi’s overseas agenda.
For people who understand China’s political cycle, a
foreign trip by the Chinese leader in the middle of August was usually
unthinkable. The rumored Saudi visit would have collided with the annual August
retreat to Beidaihe, where major party policy decisions and key appointments
are made. Missing that would not have been politically viable.
And this year is particularly special. The 20th
Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party is scheduled for October 16,
where Xi is expected to break from tradition and secure a third five-year-term
in office. In China, domestic politics trumps all, and securing political
support at home remains Xi’s top priority.
None of this suggests that Xi is not planning to
board the plane soon and rejoin the in-person summit circuit. At least two
trips are apparently in the works. First, Xi will likely visit Central Asia in
mid-September for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit. Second,
Xi is almost certain to travel to Indonesia in mid-November for the G-20, where
he could meet with US President Joe Biden (details are currently being
negotiated).
Assuming these two trips do happen, each will carry
strategic significance for China. The SCO summit, and an expected sit-down with
Russian President Vladimir Putin, would signal stronger alignment with and
greater support from Russia for the upcoming Party Congress. Meanwhile, the
G-20 summit, and a face-to-face meeting with Biden, would be used by Beijing to
underline Washington’s acceptance of Xi’s third term.
The Middle East, and Saudi Arabia in particular,
remain important to China in terms of energy security and for furthering the
displacement of American influence in the region. But at this moment in China’s
domestic political cycle, the Middle East does not carry the same weight as
Russia or the US. That is why most of the Xi travel speculation is centered on
potential talks with Biden and Putin.
China requires oil and gas from the Middle East to buttress its green-energy ambitions, and the Middle East needs China as a stable and reliable customer amid market contraction.
So, when will the Middle East roll out the red
carpet for Xi? The most likely occasion will be the planned Arab-China summit,
scheduled to be held in Saudi Arabia late this year or early next. Officials
have been foreshadowing this trip for months, and given the buildup, it is
unlikely Xi would change course and cancel the event. Beijing could still make
the summit virtual, but that would not be satisfying for the region, or for
China. As such, a physical visit to the Middle East by Xi can be expected in
late 2022 or early 2023.
The bottom line is that while the Middle East is not
likely to be Xi’s first port of call after his self-imposed travel quarantine,
it would be inconceivable for the Chinese president to give the region a pass
entirely. After all, China’s other top leaders have been keeping the summit
couches warm in recent months.
In 2021, the Middle East received more visits from
Chinese leaders than any other region in the world, including three trips to 11
countries by politburo member Yang Jiechi and Foreign Minister Wang Yi.
Xi also hosted the Egyptian president, the emir of
Qatar, and the crown prince of Abu Dhabi during the Beijing Winter Olympics.
There are two main reasons why China wants to keep
the Middle East close. The first is a shared interest in transitioning from
fossil fuels. As addressing climate change and achieving carbon neutrality
become increasingly pressing concerns, both sides need each other to achieve
their energy goals. China requires oil and gas from the Middle East to buttress
its green-energy ambitions, and the Middle East needs China as a stable and
reliable customer amid market contraction. China is also an important supplier
of wind and solar technology to the region.
Second, and perhaps to the dismay of the West, China
and many Middle Eastern countries are aligning on political values and domestic
politics. The alignment has become so strong that the Uyghur issue, a
human-rights imperative for the West, no longer poses an obstacle to the
development of China’s ties with Islamic countries.
Although Xi did not visit Saudi Arabia in August,
the Middle East still matters to China; its strategic interests in the region
will only accelerate in 2023. As an emergent superpower, China has a growing
list of overseas goals, and achieving them will require many conversations
around the table.
Yun Sun is director of the China program and co-director of the East Asia
program at the Stimson Center in Washington, DC. Syndication Bureau.
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