With Russian forces pouring into Ukraine, Moscow’s use of
Belarus to launch its campaign is as much a test for Minsk’s independence as it
is for Kyiv’s. As the Kremlin begins what looks like a large-scale operation
against Ukraine, the former Soviet republic’s role in facilitating Russia’s
attack could have far reaching consequences.
اضافة اعلان
For now, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko is trying
to balance Moscow’s pressure with the interests of his own country. Belarus,
Russia’s only ally in Europe, has not recognized Moscow’s incorporation of
Crimea into the Russian Federation in 2014, and Minsk refuses to launch direct
flights to the peninsula, aware that doing so would amount to de facto
recognition of Crimea as part of Russia.
Belarus is also, for now at least, trying to avoid its own
forces being dragged into the conflict. On Thursday, as smoke rose from the
Ukrainian capital, Belarus’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs tweeted a quote
attributed to Lukashenko: “The Belarusian army is not taking part in the
Russian special operation in the Donbas.”
Lukashenko has not officially recognized the self-proclaimed
Donbas republics in eastern Ukraine, as Russian President Vladimir Putin did
earlier this week. Instead, Lukashenko has only said that the issue of
recognition would be “mutually beneficial”, while Belarus’s foreign ministry
has said it “respects and understands Russia’s decision”.
But Lukashenko’s decision to host thousands of Russian
troops on Belarusian territory makes Belarus a party to Putin’s actions.
Previously, both sides had said the troops would return to Russia once military
drills are over, but Belarusian Defense Minister Viktor Khrenin recently
conceded that the Russian forces will remain in the country indefinitely. It is
now clear why the earlier assurances were rolled back.
Despite the claim that there are no Belarusian troops
currently assisting Russia’s “special operation” in eastern Ukraine, Lukashenko
has not ruled out the possibility. He had said that if Kyiv were to launch a
military offensive against the Russian-backed Donetsk People’s Republic and
Luhansk People’s Republic, the Belarusian armed forces would act in concert
with the Russian army. Such a statement demonstrates Lukashenko’s loyalty to
the Kremlin.
According to open-source intelligence reports, most Russian
troops in Belarus were stationed in the south of the country, not far from the
Ukrainian border – and just 260 kilometers from the Ukrainian capital. Putin’s
decision to send them in poses a political challenge for Lukashenko. Belarus is
expected to hold a constitutional referendum on February 27, and the draft
document “excludes military aggression from Belarus’s territory against other
states”. While that could give Lukashenko reason to resist any future efforts
to use his country’s territory to wage war against Ukraine, it would also give
opposition leaders ammunition.
Prior to Russia’s invasion, Belarus’s exiled opposition
leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya called the presence of Russian troops in her
country a threat to Belarusian independence.
And yet, Lukashenko may have little choice but to play
Putin’s game. Ever since the Kremlin helped Lukashenko stay in power after the
controversial election and mass protests in 2020, Belarus’s president has had
to end his multi-vector foreign policy and increasingly cede to Russia’s
wishes.
In early January, following unrest in Almaty and other
Kazakh cities, the Belarusian leader sent troops to Kazakhstan to help Russia
and other Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) members “stabilize the
situation in the Central Asian country”. Allowing Russian troops to strike
Ukraine from Belarus may have been another non-negotiable decision.
To demonstrate his loyalty further to Moscow, Lukashenko may
even have to deploy a symbolic number of Belarusian troops to Syria, where
Russia’s military foothold is also growing. The Russian government recently
instructed its ministries of defense and foreign affairs to hold talks with
Belarus and to sign a joint declaration on providing “humanitarian aid” to
Syria. Once a new constitution is adopted, and clauses about Belarus’s
neutrality are scrapped, Minsk may have no option but to start playing a more
active role in Moscow’s engagement in Syria.
For Lukashenko, entering the fray in Syria has a certain
appeal. Belarus has already begun to develop close economic ties with Syria and
is assisting in post-war reconstruction. In November 2021, Belarus’s Deputy
Foreign Minister Nikolai Borisevich met with Syria’s ambassador to Belarus,
Mohammad Al Umrani, to discuss political, economic, and humanitarian
cooperation. Belarus is actively exporting medications to Syria, and leaders
have expressed interest in expanding business in the region. Moreover, Minsk is
supporting Syria in international forums, at least rhetorically, by expressing
solidarity for President Bashar Al Assad’s “war on terrorism”. But Belarus,
pressured by Russia, may soon have to move from words to deeds.
Finally, having a Belarusian military contingent in Syria
could be a way for Russia to increase its influence not just in Belarus, but in
other CSTO countries as well. If Minsk agrees to deploy its troops to the
Middle East, Moscow will likely start looking for others to join in protecting
its geopolitical interests in Syria.
For now, the situation in Syria is subordinate to the
Ukraine crisis, but the two are connected. Russia’s regional military presence,
and its hold over its allies, will limit Western-led efforts to bring the Kremlin
back to the negotiating table. The die has been cast, and Belarus’s
sovereignty, like Ukraine’s, hangs in the balance.
The writer is a political analyst in Serbia. His work
focuses mostly on the foreign policies of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine, with special
attention on energy and “pipeline politics”. www.syndicationbureau.com
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