In the October 2022 unclassified version of the Department of
Defense (DoD) National Defense Strategy (NDS) (the previous one was published
2018), the DoD, while recognizing “the persistence of security threats” from
Iran, North Korea, and terrorist groups like Al Qaeda and daesh, focuses on
China and Russia. For the DoD, China constitute “a longer-term threat” and in
order to face that threat, the Pentagon will continue to coordinate with the
State Department to expand US access in the region, as the NDS stipulates.
اضافة اعلان
Globally, China’s clout is spreading economically
and diplomatically. Russia is an “acute” threat, but a declining power now
struggling to find a dignified solution to the Ukraine mess.
It is reported that for the first time, the number
of Chinese embassies surpasses that of US embassies around the world: 280
Chinese foreign missions compared to 275 American. The US and allies, however,
far outnumber China and (quasi) allies. EU member states have nearly 3,192
foreign missions. France comes third in the number of missions per state,
followed by Turkey with 253, Japan 247, Russia 242, Germany 227, Brazil 222,
Spain 215, Italy and the UK with 205 each. Simple math makes the DoD demand for
Department of State diplomacy to expand access in the region more plausible.
While the US maintains diplomatic, military and
economic supremacy in the Middle East, there are a few challenges to the way
the US handles traditional allies such as Saudi Arabia and Israel, and
adversaries like Iran. Traditional Arab allies, according to veteran American
diplomat Martin Indyk, are making their “small” moves away from the US because
they can no longer count on the US as a “reliable ally” that would defend them
in times of need (terrorist attacks on Saudi Arabia and the UAE by Iran-backed
groups is a case in point). In Israel, the American voice of reason on the
peace process does not resonate. Israel dictates its view rather than
compromise to reach peace.
This state of affairs opens opportunities not only
for the traditional US allies to diversify their allies and alliances, but also
for China to intervene in the region and expand its reach. In China’s case,
there is a strategic limitation and vulnerability. Traditionally, China’s
energy supply from the Gulf depends on maritime security and the security
structure provided by the US in the Middle East generally and in the Gulf
region in particular. Therefore, there is growing realization among Chinese
political and military leaders of the need to rely on Chinese security
architecture. To offset this vulnerability, China invested in 11 ports
(designed and built for dual use) and industrial zones across the region,
including, in 2018, an agreement with Israel — the closest US ally in the
region — to operate the port of Haifa, despite American reservations.
Chinese and Iranian presence and influence in the region, however defined, falls way short of that of the US and its allies. Arab countries will be in a much better position dealing with a predictable and consistent ally, whoever that may be. Logically, a more powerful ally is a better ally.
Visible Chinese military presence in the region
started in 2008 when China sent three military ships to the Gulf of Aden to
counter piracy attacks. This deployment, which China has kept active since
then, is the first deployment of Chinese army outside its immediate maritime
environment. Six years later, this presence took a more serious turn when
Djibouti agreed to grant China physical access to Doraleh port and a year
later, in 2015, to build a Chinese naval facility, the first Chinese base in
the Middle East region, at the southern gate of the increasingly strategic Red
Sea.
The NDS states an objective that is relevant to all
US allies. It says: “The Joint Force will retain the ability to deny Iran a
nuclear weapon; to identify and support action against Iranian and
Iranian-backed threats; and to disrupt top-tier VEO threats that endanger the
homeland and vital US national interests.” This language is music to all US
allies in the region. And Chinese and Iranian presence and influence in the
region, however defined, falls way short of that of the US and its allies. Arab
countries will be in a much better position dealing with a predictable and
consistent ally, whoever that may be. Logically, a more powerful ally is a
better ally.
Fares Braizat is chairman of NAMA Strategic Intelligence
Solutions, former Minister of Youth, Director of Strategic Studies and
Evaluation at the Royal Hashemite Court, moderator of the working group on
tourism as part of Jordan Economic Vision 2033, and member of the Royal Committee
to Modernize the Political System. fares@namasis.com
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