When the death of Ayman Al-Zawahiri was announced last week, the government
of India, a country singled out as a target by the Al-Qaeda leader, remained
quiet. Many analysts read the fact that he was able to base himself in the
Afghan capital as the Taliban’s failure to keep their promise that the group had
cut ties with extremist groups threatening other countries. Theories swirled
that Pakistan had given up his location to the Americans in a great betrayal.
Either way, Zawahiri’s death on a Kabul balcony from a US drone strike was an
awkward moment for India because it highlighted what was once considered
unthinkable — New Delhi’s attempts to build ties with the Taliban.
اضافة اعلان
In June, India announced the reopening of its
embassy in Kabul after shutting it down when the Taliban swept to power a year
ago. Historically, India and the Taliban have been enemies. The Indian national
security establishment viewed the group as a Pakistani proxy; the Taliban, in
their previous incarnation as a government between 1996 and 2001, ensured that
Afghanistan gave Pakistan and anti-India terror groups strategic depth. From
the Taliban’s perspective, India supported Afghanistan’s previous republican
government, as well as anti-Taliban forces in the 1990s. Given this, it is
surprising that both sides now seem to want to engage with each other. Yet, it
seems that realpolitik has brought both sides to this moment.
The Taliban are desperate for developmental and
humanitarian assistance. Afghanistan’s economy has collapsed, a situation
worsened by one of the worst droughts to hit the country in living memory. In
June, a devastating earthquake killed 1,000 people. India sent 30,000 tonnes of
wheat and 500,000 doses of COVID-19 vaccines to Afghanistan in February.
Pakistan, long viewed as the Taliban’s benefactor, will in the long term be unable
to match Indian assistance given that its economy is in shambles, and the level
of political instability.
Moreover, Pakistan-Taliban relations have become
increasingly tense in recent months. Just like previous Afghan governments, the
Taliban refuse to recognize the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, viewing it as a
colonial imposition. Taliban border guards have repeatedly blocked Pakistani
attempts at fencing the border. Islamabad is also unhappy with the Taliban’s
unwillingness or inability to rein in the anti-Pakistan Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP)
militant group, which maintains bases in Afghanistan.
In April, Pakistan launched air raids against what
it believed were TTP bases in eastern Afghanistan, which killed dozens of
Afghan civilians. A Taliban spokesman said the airstrikes would pave the “way
for enmity between Afghanistan and Pakistan”. A souring Taliban-Pakistan
relationship may have created an opportunity for New Delhi.
Cooperation could begin with India providing
developmental and humanitarian assistance in return for Taliban assurances that
they will not allow Afghanistan to be used by anti-India terror groups.
New Delhi has
still not officially commented on the Zawahiri killing. He had threatened India
as recently as May, yet despite this, and perhaps to avoid embarrassing the
Taliban further, New Delhi has chosen to stay silent. Instead, TV channels seen
as friendly to the government have speculated feverishly on Pakistan stabbing
the Taliban in the back by disclosing to the US Zawahiri’s location in a villa
linked to the Haqqani faction of the Taliban, long considered close to
Pakistan.
Due to its strategic location and considerable mineral deposits, a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan will become the site of great power competition yet again.
Both New Delhi and the Taliban, despite their
history, have given signs over the last few months that they need not view each
other as enemies. Even in 2019, when India enraged Pakistan by stripping
Kashmir of its autonomy, the Taliban refused to comment on the issue, saying it
was India’s internal affairs. New Delhi, for its part, has avoided antagonizing
the Taliban. In November last year when India hosted the Afghanistan Conference
with regional states, it made it clear that its aim in Afghanistan was not to
support an anti-Taliban military alliance, but to prevent Afghan territory from
being used by transnational terror groups. In May, India’s national security advisor
went a step further by calling for enhancing Afghanistan’s counter-terrorism
capabilities. What was left unsaid was how this could be done when the Taliban
have not been recognized by any government thus far.
Clues as to the direction of the current limited
detente may be gleaned from the red-carpet welcome given by the Taliban to 25
India-trained Afghan soldiers affiliated with the previous regime who returned
to Kabul this month. After assurances from the Afghan interior ministry that no
harm would come to them, it was further announced that they would be used for
the country’s national defense. The Taliban’s defense minister, Mullah Yaqoob,
has also called for Taliban soldiers to receive training in India. This has to
be seen in the context of the Taliban’s inability to defeat the Daesh in
Khorasan Province militant group. This may be a bridge too far for New Delhi
for now, but it is significant given that Afghanistan’s interior minister,
Sirajuddin Haqqani, belongs to the Haqqani faction, which was blamed for the
2008 Indian embassy bombing in Kabul.
Due to its strategic location and considerable
mineral deposits, a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan will become the site of
great power competition yet again. Soon after coming to power, the Taliban asked
a state-backed Chinese company to return to a mining project to extract copper.
Neither the US nor India would like to see a Taliban-ruled Afghanistan fall
under Beijing’s sway. As odious as the Taliban regime is, particularly in its
treatment of women and minorities, it seems that realpolitik will increasingly
determine not just India’s but the world’s engagement with the new regime in
Kabul.
Dnyanesh Kamat is a political analyst who focuses on the
Middle East and South Asia. He also consults on socio-economic development for
government and private-sector entities. Twitter: @sybaritico. Syndication
Bureau.
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