Trump's announcement that direct military aid to Israel will end, alongside moves to expand defence cooperation within the Pentagon and the rise of the Democrats in Congress, does not necessarily reflect an American retreat from support for Tel Aviv. On the contrary, it reveals a reshaping of the military relationship between the two sides, at a time when the future of the Gaza Strip remains unclear.
اضافة اعلان
What appears at first glance to be an American decision to reduce financial support for Israel may in reality be a shift from the traditional model of aid to a model with more intertwined military, industrial and technological interests.
Annual aid of about $3.8 billion is based on a $38 billion memorandum of understanding covering 2019 to 2028. But recent American legislative moves reveal a parallel track that goes beyond direct funding.
Article 219 of the 2027 Defence Authorisation Bill stands out, as it proposes creating an executive official within the Pentagon to coordinate defence cooperation with Israel, and to expand partnerships in artificial intelligence, drones, electronic warfare, missile defence and joint military manufacturing.
This shift carries an important strategic meaning: reducing grants does not necessarily mean reducing Israel's military capabilities. It may instead move the relationship to a level where shared industrial and technological interests become part of the American national security system itself.
At the same time, the Democrats' rise to a majority in the Senate, and the House results trending in their favour, impose a new political equation on the Trump administration. The new Congress, which begins its work in January 2027, has legislative, oversight and financial tools that could open the door to reviewing arms sales and the conditions of military cooperation with Israel, despite divisions within the Democratic Party over this issue.
The important shift, however, concerns timing. The reengineering of American support is taking place at a time when the ceasefire in Gaza has not evolved into a settlement that ends Israel's military presence, guarantees reconstruction, or establishes a stable Palestinian administration.
Here, the danger of separating the military and political tracks becomes clear. Israel's funding mechanism may change and its defence industry may expand, while the reality of military control on the ground continues. The truce may become a long-term arrangement that does not necessarily mean an end to the occupation.
Reducing reliance on direct aid may also give the Israeli government more room to deal with criticism of American funding, but it will not end its dependence on American technology, licences, spare parts and defence cooperation.
The paradox is that Washington may be reshaping its military relationship with Israel at the very time the balance of power in Congress is changing, without this automatically affecting the reality of the Palestinians.
The true test of the coming phase will not be the disappearance of aid from the American budget, but whether Washington is prepared to use its military and economic influence to tie the continuation of cooperation to respect for international law, an end to military control over Gaza, and guarantees for its reconstruction.
What is taking shape in Washington today is not necessarily the end of American support for Israel, but a possible shift to a more complex form of military partnership. At the same time, the new Congress may offer an opportunity to reopen the question of the conditions attached to that support, after years of debate about its political and humanitarian cost.
Between the reengineering of the American-Israeli alliance and the reshaping of the political scene in Washington, Gaza remains the real test that will reveal whether the American change will create a shift on the ground, or remain merely a change in the mechanisms of funding and the tools of influence.
