As the dust settles from the audacious — and swiftly aborted
— attempted insurrection, the exact whereabouts of its architect is still
unknown. Yevgeny Prigozhin, the brutish figure behind the paramilitary group,
is meant to be somewhere in Belarus.
اضافة اعلان
Still, the life — and, as someone who has so publicly
crossed Vladimir Putin, perhaps eventual death — of Prigozhin is not the most
important topic far from Europe. Almost as soon as the insurrection was halted,
African states began to wonder what effect the mutiny would have on the Wagner
fighters in their midst. The Kremlin moved quickly to quash any talk of change,
thereby demonstrating how valuable Wagner fighters are to Russia’s foreign
policy.
Speaking on the Monday after the brief march on Moscow,
Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said the fighters would
remain in Mali and the Central African Republic as
long as they were needed — the contracts that Wagner fighters sign are, after
all, between them and the government. In other countries on the continent where
Wagner operates, albeit with smaller footprints, the situation will be the
same.
At the murky nexus of private military contractors controlled by the Kremlin and African states looking to quietly bolster their fighting forces, a paramilitary group by any other name would smell just as sweet.
And that is for one simple reason: however angry Putin may
be with the head of Wagner, the group’s activities in Africa are too valuable
for the Kremlin to give up. The name may change, the leadership of the group
may change — but the use of private military companies to provide protection,
training, and raw fighting force to Russian allies is here to stay. The Kremlin
may cut off the head of Wagner, but the group’s tentacles in Africa will
remain.
Wagner has a presence in as many as a
dozen African states, but the exact nature of its work is extremely
murky. In Mali, the group has a contract directly with the government, and is
reportedly paid
millions of dollars per month. In the Central African
Republic, the Russian government works with the CAR, and alongside the Wagner
Group. The Kremlin said last week that the government-to-government
relationship would continue, but the
Wagner contract was for CAR to decide.
Wagner also has — or had, it can be tricky to be sure — a
footprint in Burkina Faso, Libya, and Sudan, as well as other countries.
In addition to fighters, Wagner also appears to operate a
number of other companies, or at least work closely with them. In the CAR, one
company linked to Wagner buys gold and diamonds; in Russia another company buys
gold from the first company, which then appears to fund the paramilitaries.
Similar relationships occur in other countries where Wagner troops are present.
That murkiness is precisely why the group is so valuable to the Kremlin. With
tentacles that stretch across military objectives and business interests,
Moscow gains the ability to influence countries whilst maintaining plausible
deniability, and also benefit from less than transparent business practices,
whilst evading Western attempts to sanction companies and people. In reality,
Wagner is an arm of Moscow’s foreign policy.
Little wonder then that, whatever happened in the brief “
internal affair” in Russia, as the Chinese foreign ministry
referred to the mutiny, the use of private military companies on the African
continent will continue. (Indeed, it may even benefit the Kremlin: after years
of denial, Prigozhin
finally admitted last year that he was behind Wagner.
Whoever replaces him will be more anonymous and offer further deniability.)
Certainly, the mutiny will give countries where Wagner
operates pause for thought. Private contractors can be disbanded easily, or
their assets in Russia frozen. No country needs a group of trained, armed,
stateless men wandering around. For those extremely reliant on Wagner, such as
the CAR’s President Faustin-Archange Touadera, who has placed even his own
personal security detail in the hands of Wagner, having their ties to Moscow
hanging by such a loose thread will be a concern.
However, the benefits of Wagner flow both ways, and African
countries appear to like them as much as the Kremlin.
In Mali, where Wagner fighters stepped in to fill the gap
created by
departing French troops, having hardened fighters without
the necessity of creating new political allegiances is helpful.
However angry Putin may be with the head of Wagner, the group’s activities in Africa are too valuable for the Kremlin to give up.
In Libya and Sudan, where fighters from the group have been
spotted over the past four years, Russian influence and fighting experience can
be purchased and utilized, but without the political blowback that would come
from soldiers in state insignia being involved.
A close adviser to CAR’s president confirmed as much last
week when he
told the Financial Times that Wagner fighters were in
the country with the blessing of Moscow. “If Moscow decides to withdraw them
and send us the Beethovens or the Mozarts rather than Wagners, we will have
them,” he said.
At the murky nexus of private military contractors
controlled by the Kremlin and African states looking to quietly bolster their
fighting forces, a paramilitary group by any other name would smell just as
sweet.
Faisal Al Yafai is currently writing a book on
the Middle East and is a frequent commentator on international
TV news networks. He has worked for news outlets such as The Guardian and the
BBC, and reported on the Middle East, Eastern Europe, Asia
and Africa. Twitter: @FaisalAlYafai
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