Of all the dramatic events to occur during Russia’s
year-plus war on Ukraine, few approach the sensationalism of what has happened
recently.
After months of increasingly vitriolic complaints and
threats against Russia’s military leadership, Yevgeny Prigozhin, the head
of the Wagner mercenary group, acted. His men first took over the
southwestern Russian city of Rostov-on-Don before marching on
Moscow, shooting down multiple Russian helicopters that tried
desperately to halt their progress.
اضافة اعلان
Finally, just 200 kilometers from the capital, Prigozhin
agreed to end his march and go into exile in Belarus, in an outcome whose
ultimate contours are still very much unclear.
One of the groups that rallied around Russian President
Vladimir Putin was led by Ramzan Kadyrov, the mercurial Kremlin-appointed
warlord of Chechnya, whose men headed to both Rostov and Moscow to
confront Wagner. In this instance and future such mutinies, Kadyrov’s
troops could play a crucial role in defending the Kremlin – but only to a
point.
But this was a marriage of convenience, something thoroughly illustrated by a June 1 threat from Dmitry Utkin, Wagner’s top military commander, to Kadyrov’s top deputy, urging the latter to face him “man to man.”
Perhaps none of the many politicians and security chiefs in
Russia who owe their positions solely to the backing of Putin have benefited
from this personal relationship more than Kadyrov.
Kadyrov came to power following the 2004 death of his
father, Akhmad Kadyrov, with whom Putin had forged a deal to lead Chechnya as a
loyal satrap after Russian forces reconquered the rebellious province in the
Second Chechen War.
Widely despised by the Russian military and other
siloviki (those in charge of Russian security services), the younger Kadyrov
nevertheless received the full backing of Putin to run Chechnya nearly
autonomously. The only caveat was that he needed to crush the region’s
separatist movement.
Massive state subsidies, forming nearly
nine-tenths of the Chechen government budget, were provided as
both reward and incentive.
Unparalleled autonomy
While Kadyrov and his cronies in Grozny enjoyed unparalleled
autonomy, the Chechen leader was never without powerful
enemies. Wagner was destined to become one of these almost from the
start. Many of Wagner’s professional soldiers were veterans of
the Chechen wars, where they fought against Chechen rebel
forces that, at one time, included Kadyrov himself. Ethnic Chechens are even
explicitly banned from joining Wagner.
There was a degree of mutual support over the past year
between Kadyrov and Prigozhin in public messaging on the Ukraine war, with both
men casting aspersions on the Russian Defense Ministry and verbally attacking
top Russian generals to cast the army leadership as hapless and only their own
semi-privatized forces as effective.
“Man to man”But this was a marriage of convenience, something thoroughly
illustrated by a June 1 threat from Dmitry Utkin, Wagner’s top military
commander, to Kadyrov’s top deputy, urging the latter to face him “man to man.”
Kadyrov had significant motivation to challenge Prigozhin’s
mutiny and prevent any possibility of Putin being toppled. Not only is his
position dependent on Putin’s continued financial and political support,
Kadyrov also holds long-running acrimony toward the Wagner Group.
While Kadyrov and his cronies in Grozny enjoyed unparalleled autonomy, the Chechen leader was never without powerful enemies. Wagner was destined to become one of these almost from the start.
Driven by this calculus, he duly deployed his men to both of
Saturday’s hotspots, sending one armored column to Rostov while directing
another to the outskirts of Moscow, where Russian forces and other loyalist
troops were setting up hasty defensive positions. In Rostov, Kadyrov’s Chechens
nearly came face-to-face with Wagner forces, entering the city amid a
tense standoff.
Crucially, however, the Kadyrovtsy did not engage. They
never fired on Prigozhin’s men, while in Moscow, they arrived after the abrupt
truce between Wagner and the Kremlin had been agreed. Kadyrov
demonstrated his loyalty to Putin by immediately deploying his men,
but stopped short of anything resembling combat, choosing instead to wage a war
of words and loudly proclaiming Prigozhin a traitor.
In many ways, Kadyrov’s response to Prigozhin’s march was
like his role in the Russian invasion of Ukraine –
demonstrating loyalty but stopping short of risking any more of his
own men than necessary. In the early stages of the war, the Kadyrovtsy took part
in the initial drive on Kyiv, while also playing a role in storming the Donbas
city of Severodonetsk and (to a lesser extent) Mariupol. But that was it.
Following losses, Kadyrov largely withdrew his men to rear positions, if not
back to Chechnya itself. Since last summer, they’ve rarely fought in Ukraine at
all.
Beyond Chechnya’s borders
Today, this is the essence of Kadyrov’s role beyond
Chechnya’s borders. Even in quieter times – the eight years or so between the
final crushing of the insurgency in Chechnya and the Russian invasion of
Ukraine – Kadyrov has always been paranoid, worried about any potential
uprising against him and any possible challenge from Moscow and the Russian
security services that so despise him.
With the remnants of Chechnya’s extirpated rebel
movement reconstituted in Ukraine and openly planning to return and
overthrow him, Kadyrov is even more loath to risk his brutal, personally loyal
security apparatus. Despite his dependence on Putin’s continued rule, it’s
difficult to imagine the Chechen leader ever deploying more than a
token amount of his own troops to safeguard the Russian president.
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