Step back for a moment and ponder the delegation
of African leaders that travelled to Kyiv and Moscow on a peace mission. Here were four African
heads of state and representatives from countries on all corners of the
continent making their way to the belligerents of a European war. Nothing could
better demonstrate how Russia’s “special military operation,” a year on, has
had global consequences.
اضافة اعلان
Such consequences have led to two public peace
plans, and perhaps other private efforts. One came from China and the other from
a coalition representing a continent. Neither have been successful, nor come
anywhere close to garnering support among the parties to the conflict.
What is demonstrated by the discussions held by
African leaders, first with Kyiv and then Moscow, is that the two sides remain
very far apart. But it is not merely war that separates them: even what
constitutes peace remains elusive.
What is demonstrated by the discussions held by African leaders, first with Kyiv and then Moscow, is that the two sides remain very far apart. But it is not merely war that separates them: even what constitutes peace remains elusive.
Both the Chinese and African peace plans have
floundered because the very nature of what would constitute “peace” is
contested. As the war continues, Russia has more and more options for a peace
deal; while Ukraine only has one.
The African delegation, led by South African
President Cyril Ramaphosa, was deeply consequential. Ramaphosa was there with
the presidents of three other countries and the prime minister of Egypt. In
terms of Africans seeking to take charge of a conflict beyond their borders
that has nonetheless affected the continent severely, it was politically
powerful. But the actual peace plan, like the Chinese plan before it, was disappointing, and turned primarily
on confidence-building measures by both sides. Both Presidents Volodymyr
Zelensky and Vladimir Putin raised major objections to it.
The first major objection raised by Zelensky is one he has
reiterated before, but which represents a hardening of the position from the
start of the conflict. Zelensky said peace talks would only be possible once
Russia had withdrawn from all of Ukrainian territory. That same formulation has
been used in the past, and is often understood to mean not merely recently
occupied territories in the east of Ukraine, but also Crimea, which Russia
occupied and annexed in 2014.
That position is exactly what one would expect
of a wartime government, especially one that has been pushed into a war not of
its choosing.
But it is also a maximalist position, one which,
followed to its logical conclusion, means not only total Russian withdrawal,
but sufficient guarantees, either from Moscow or from Europe, that no conflict
would happen again. For Kyiv, peace would mean not merely the return of its
territory, but a changed Russia.
But peace for Russia is a much more amorphous
term. Moscow already has frozen conflicts in at least three neighboring
countries, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova. It can stand one more.
And that is the essential gap between the two — the nature of the peace they seek. It is something no peace plan has yet addressed. Ukraine wants — indeed needs — a permanent peace.
Another option is a “forever war.” This is the scenario
Ukraine and the West perhaps fear most. A frozen conflict would keep Kyiv
forever in a state of military readiness, unable to dedicate its resources to
properly rebuilding. But a forever war would constantly sap Ukraine’s more
limited resources, and severely test Western resolve to keep arming the country
– especially as elections swept over Western nations, bringing to power new,
less invested leaders.
Such a scenario is possible, even likely,
because it favors Russia’s military heft. A startling analysis by The Economist last
month suggested Russia was only using around 3 percent of its GDP on the
Ukraine war — less than the US used in the Korean war, which lasted for three
years, and not much more than the US spent in Vietnam — which lasted for 20.
Time is firmly on Russia’s side.
And that is the essential gap between the two —
the nature of the peace they seek. It is something no peace plan has yet
addressed. Ukraine wants — indeed needs — a permanent peace. Nothing less can
be countenanced after the astonishing destruction of the past year of war. It
is politically impossible for Kyiv to have gone through so much pain and loss,
only for the war to pause and resume again in a year or two or five.
But for Russia, a permanent peace is not
necessary. A piecemeal peace will do. Russia can make the grain export deal recurring, or work
out a prisoner swap. It can stop targeting the capital or freeze the conflict
west of the Dnipro river. It could call a truce everywhere but in the occupied
and contested areas. All of these are potential versions of “peace,” and all of
them are up for negotiation.
The Africa delegation won’t be the last of
leaders far from Europe seeking an end to the conflict. Ukraine’s much-vaunted
counteroffensive is stuttering. It is hard to see a clear victory for either
side even at the end of this year. If the war won’t end, then some version of
peace must prevail. But which of the multiple versions of peace will it be —
and will any of them be acceptable to a battered and war-weary Ukraine?
Faisal Al Yafai is currently writing a book on
the Middle East and is a frequent commentator on international
TV news networks. He has worked for news outlets such as The Guardian and the
BBC, and reported on the Middle East, Eastern Europe, Asia
and Africa. Twitter: @FaisalAlYafai
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