It is hard to believe that a prime minister like Benjamin Netanyahu could decide to wage war and occupy new territories against the recommendations of the army. Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir—credited with the idea of occupying Gaza, who approved its most minute details and presented the plan ready-made to Netanyahu—told him that after reviewing the plan, studying its details, and assessing the risks, he believed it should be replaced with something else. He warned that such an occupation could endanger Israeli hostages held by Hamas and lead to the deaths of many Israeli soldiers. Yet Netanyahu insisted on inserting the word “occupation” into the plan (at the last moment replacing it with “control”).
اضافة اعلان
Of course, there are many distortions, deceptions, and tricks in this decision. The Israeli cabinet gave the army two full months to prepare for the occupation, during which it allowed the army to try the “siege, fighting, and displacement” plan without occupation. This prompted far-right minister Bezalel Smotrich to say that nothing had changed in the prime minister’s policy—that Netanyahu was still maneuvering within the scope of traditional policy, which does not decisively end the battle against Hamas and leaves the door open for negotiations.
Some do not rule out that this timetable is itself deceptive. Israel still believes in military deception as the core of its policy, as seen in its management of the war since the beginning—particularly with Hezbollah, Iran, and Syria. It is not inconceivable that Netanyahu is still luring Hamas into traps.
At its core, the decision serves Netanyahu’s political, partisan, and personal goals. He needs the flames of war to keep his government intact because he knows that ending the war would trigger the “real” war he fears most: an internal political battle to topple his government.
This has been his approach since he first learned about the Gaza occupation plan. Brigadier General Erez Weiner, who drew up the plan when he was head of operations for the army’s southern command, revealed that he devised it a year ago, when Herzi Halevi was chief of staff. Netanyahu became enthusiastic about it, saw it as a tool to achieve his goals, and clung to it, demanding its approval and implementation. But Halevi rejected it, seeing it as a trap for the army and a threat to the Israeli hostages held by Hamas. This rejection was one of the main reasons for Halevi’s resignation and for appointing Eyal Zamir as his replacement.
According to Weiner, Zamir studied the plan thoroughly, intervened in its details, and approved it in coordination with Netanyahu. But he encountered a different reality on the ground. Field officers warned him of its dangers and conveyed the soldiers’ frustration with a war that lacked a clear strategic goal and seemed endless. He also heard warnings about the high cost of such an occupation—economically, in human lives, and in public, international, and regional reaction.
Zamir then backed down and proposed an alternative plan: impose a siege on Palestinians in three areas, push them southward to encourage displacement, and carry out limited strikes on Hamas forces—gradually eroding their territory without a full-scale occupation.
This was when Netanyahu pushed back, insisting on “occupation”—even if only rhetorically—through combative statements and official decisions, thus projecting the image of a “strong, decisive leader.”
By openly clashing with the army’s leadership, he appeals to the far-right, which wants to show that the political leadership is the true authority to which the army must answer. This helps him advance his broader plan to overhaul the system of governance and the judiciary, effectively cornering and restraining the liberal “deep state.”
Moreover, he secures his main aim: staying in power.
According to the cabinet’s timetable for occupying Gaza (two months of preparation, three months of combat operations, and two years to establish control), he could not only remain in office but also work to delay the elections scheduled for October 2026.
These are the hidden goals behind the Gaza occupation decision. But whether they are achieved depends on the reactions from the Israeli public, as well as from the U.S. and the world. If such reactions influence the White House, the equation could change.
For now, Netanyahu has received a green light from Washington, as U.S. President Donald Trump—angry at Hamas—told him plainly: “Do whatever you want to strike them (Hamas), but make sure the Gazans do not starve.” But that green light could turn yellow—or even red—if Israeli, Arab, and international pressure succeeds. It is no coincidence that on Friday, families of the hostages staged their protests in front of the U.S. embassy in Tel Aviv.
—(Agencies)
