By: Iman Al-Fares
US sanctions and mounting pressure on Iran are becoming an increasingly difficult test of Tehran’s ability to withstand economic strain and preserve its regional influence, as Washington moves to expand its policy of “economic isolation” beyond the Iranian economy itself to target the channels and countries helping Tehran circumvent restrictions.
اضافة اعلان
While indicators show that sanctions are draining the Iranian economy and increasing the cost of trade, energy and financial transfers, their ability to change Tehran’s political and strategic behavior remains more complicated. Iran has developed tools to adapt to and circumvent sanctions, while continuing to receive support from international powers.
According to political and strategic experts who spoke to Al-Ghad, the equation goes beyond the economic damage inflicted by sanctions on Iran.
It also depends on their ability to influence the regime’s calculations and regional policies. They warned that continued pressure without a clear political path could push Tehran toward greater intransigence or encourage it to use retaliatory measures that could increase the risk of escalation across the region.
At the same time, they noted that if Washington succeeds in closing channels for sanctions evasion, particularly through neighboring countries and financial networks, it could raise the cost of Iran’s current policies and gradually push Tehran to reconsider its calculations.
This would make sanctions more of a negotiating tool than a sufficient means on their own to bring about comprehensive strategic change.
Options Fraught With Risks
Professor of Political Science at the German Jordanian University, Dr. Badr Al-Madhi, said US economic sanctions have demonstrated a significant ability to affect the Iranian economy, noting that the United States has extensive experience in using sanctions when military options are fraught with risks or incapable of achieving the desired political outcomes.
Al-Madhi said that following the military confrontation with Iran in recent weeks and the failure of expectations that the Iranian public would take to the streets against the regime, the United States moved to tighten economic pressure, but in a different way from previous sanctions, by adopting a policy of “economic isolation.” The policy targets not only Iran and its economy, but also countries and institutions that have helped Tehran circumvent sanctions.
He pointed out that increased pressure on Iran’s neighboring countries has begun to produce clear effects, with growing economic burdens on the regime and mounting domestic discontent.
This could lead to greater instability or place Tehran before the choice of negotiations and changing its behavior.
Al-Madhi said Iran is heading into a difficult phase as Washington seeks to maintain economic pressure in the coming period, including by restricting its economic channels with neighboring countries, particularly Iraq, Türkiye, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Armenia.
Some of these countries have served in recent years as economic lifelines that helped Tehran mitigate the impact of sanctions.
He stressed that the ability of sanctions to change Iranian behavior will remain linked to Washington’s ability to close channels used to circumvent them.
The continued accumulation of economic and social pressures could increase the cost of maintaining Iran’s current policies and eventually push the regime to reconsider its calculations, with potential consequences for regional security and stability.
Weakening the Iranian Economy
Against the backdrop of the limited ability of military options to achieve the desired outcome, security and strategic expert Dr. Bashir Al-Daaja said the US policy of “economic isolation” has clearly succeeded in weakening the Iranian economy, but has so far failed to translate that economic pressure into a fundamental change in Tehran’s political and strategic decision-making.
Al-Daaja said successive sanctions, along with restrictions on oil exports and banking activities, the depreciation of the currency, rising prices and shrinking trade, have placed significant pressure on both the Iranian state and society.
However, Tehran’s ability to adapt to sanctions and circumvent them through informal economic and financial networks, while maintaining channels for oil exports, has limited their ability to become a catalyst for political collapse.
He added that the intensity of sanctions has pushed Iran in recent years to develop a parallel economy, networks of intermediary companies and alternative routes for transportation and financial transfers.
China, meanwhile, has become a key outlet for Iranian oil exports, allowing Tehran to preserve an important portion of its revenues despite US pressure.
Al-Daaja said the current phase appears more difficult for Iran, as US pressure has shifted from directly targeting Iranian entities to pursuing the networks, companies and financial channels that help Tehran access markets and financing.
This raises the cost of sanctions evasion and narrows the room for maneuver available to the Iranian economy.
He stressed that the real impact of sanctions does not necessarily lie in bringing the Iranian economy to a complete halt, but rather in increasing the cost of operating it by raising transportation, insurance, intermediary and financial-transfer costs, while reducing oil revenues, investment and trade.
This weakens the government’s ability to finance imports and the budget and maintain currency stability.
However, Al-Daaja warned that weakening the economy does not automatically mean changing Iran’s strategic behavior, He explained that Iran views its regional influence and network of allies as part of its national security system and deterrence strategy, rather than simply as spending that can easily be abandoned.
Tehran may therefore be forced to reduce funding or redistribute resources, but it is not necessarily likely to relinquish its regional influence solely because of sanctions.
He noted that sanctions could become more effective when combined with military pressure and a decline in trade and energy channels.
However, this would also increase the risks of escalation, as Iran could resort to other means of retaliation, including exerting pressure on maritime and energy routes, launching cyberattacks, escalating indirect military activities or activating its regional networks.
Al-Daaja cautioned that continued economic pressure without a clear political pathway could produce the opposite effect by strengthening nationalist rhetoric in Iran and turning sanctions into a mobilizing factor against the United States.
He also warned that the middle class, private sector and ordinary citizens could bear the largest share of the costs, while state-linked institutions and security agencies may prove more capable of adapting to a shadow economy.
He said Iran’s ability to change its behavior under sanctions will depend on four key factors: Washington’s ability to close sanctions-evasion channels; whether China continues to purchase Iranian oil; Tehran’s ability to maintain domestic cohesion; and the existence of a diplomatic pathway offering genuine incentives in exchange for verifiable concessions on nuclear, missile and regional issues.
He stressed that the regional interest, including that of Jordan, is not served by Iran’s economic collapse at any cost, but rather by encouraging Tehran to adopt more stable behavior and pose fewer threats to its neighbors.
He warned that any broad escalation between Washington and Tehran would affect energy prices, shipping, trade, investment and regional security, with direct repercussions for Arab economies.
Al-Daaja added that “the strategic objective should not be to starve Iran, but to change its calculations,” arguing that sanctions are a powerful economic weapon, but cannot by themselves change a national security doctrine that has developed over decades.
US Sanctions
In an assessment of this shift, Dr. Khaled Shneikat, president of the Jordanian Political Science Association, said the policy of “economic isolation” is having a devastating impact on the Iranian economy, explaining that its ability to achieve its objectives depends on several factors, foremost among them the Iranian government’s efficiency in adapting to the economic stranglehold resulting from US sanctions.
Shneikat said the level of cooperation from China and Russia, along with any other countries that may refuse to participate in the economic blockade of Iran, is an important factor in determining the effectiveness of sanctions and their ability to exert genuine pressure on the Iranian economy.
He noted that Tehran’s ability to find alternatives and establish economic partnerships outside the sanctions system will influence the outcome of Washington’s pressure campaign.
He added that the Strait of Hormuz is a pivotal factor in this equation, with its importance depending on Iran’s ability to influence the movement of oil supplies through the strait, He noted that, according to US statements, large numbers of ships continue to pass through the strait, carrying millions of tons of cargo each week.
If these figures are accurate, this would suggest that Iran’s ability to disrupt maritime traffic through the strait may have a limited impact.
On the other hand, Shneikat explained that if Iran succeeds in asserting control over the Strait of Hormuz and disrupting maritime traffic, the consequences for the global economy, including the US economy, would be significant due to rising oil prices, This could prompt Washington to reconsider some aspects of its economic policies toward Tehran.
He described the Strait of Hormuz as the “central pivot” in the economic confrontation between the United States and Iran, given its importance to global energy supplies and the far-reaching consequences that any disruption to maritime traffic could have beyond the two countries.
Shneikat said the United States has shifted its priorities from the direct use of military force toward greater reliance on economic tools, noting that Washington previously employed this policy against Iraq between 1991 and 2003, as well as in dealing with Venezuela and Cuba.
