The rapid evolution of the war in Ukraine and its horrendous
humanitarian consequences caught many of us by surprise. The Middle East and
North Africa (MENA) region is unfortunately accustomed to such senseless
violence.
اضافة اعلان
The region only appears to be a distant neighbor, with
roughly 1,000 km if we trace an imaginary straight line from Ukraine to
countries in the Middle East. Economically, some MENA countries are very close
to Ukraine and Russia as trade partners. As such, the effects of the crisis
will materially — although heterogeneously — impact the MENA economies, and,
sadly, can have a compounding negative effect on food security and welfare
across the region. This, on top of COVID-19, supply chain disruption, and
country-specific domestic issues.
Schematically, we can split the main channels of impact into
five categories: 1) food price shocks (especially wheat), 2) oil and gas price
hikes, 3) global risk aversion/flight to safety (which could impact private
capital flows to emerging markets as a whole), 4) remittances, and 5) tourism.
There can be no winners in a war as devastating as
Ukraine’s, but hydrocarbon exporting countries like Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, Libya, and Algeria might see improvements in both fiscal and external
balances, and higher growth. Those exporting gas are particularly likely to see
a structural increase in demand from Europe, as EU authorities announced
interest in diversifying their sources of energy supplies.
Non-oil producers, however, will experience negative
outcomes leading to additional social stress. Remittances — especially those
from expatriates based in the GCC — will only partially offset some of the
hydrocarbon shock (e.g., for Jordan and Egypt), while countries that are more
exposed on tourism, for example, Egypt (where Russians and Ukrainians used to
make up at least one-third of tourist arrivals), are projected to experience
sluggishness in the sector, with some negative repercussions on employment and
the balance of payments.
Finally, several MENA economies will be materially and
negatively impacted by the conflict in Ukraine (e.g., Lebanon, Syria, Tunisia,
and Yemen). These are countries that rely primarily on Ukraine and/or Russia
for their food imports, and particularly for wheat and cereals.
The crisis is set to disrupt grain and oilseed supply
chains, increase food prices, and shoot up domestic production costs in
agriculture. Reduced yields and incomes, especially for small-scale farmers,
will have adverse implications for livelihoods and likely disproportionately
affect those among the poor and vulnerable who are dependent on farming for
their income.
At the top of our concerns are MENA’s already fragile
countries — like Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen — where the Ukrainian crisis risks
to dramatically jeopardize access to food.
The compounding shock of the war in Ukraine can cause tragic outcomes in some MENA countries if humanitarian and development assistance is not scaled up in 2022.
Syria imports roughly two-thirds of its food and oil
consumption, and most of its wheat is from Russia. Lebanon imports from Ukraine
and Russia over 90 percent of its grain and only has about a month of grain
reserves. Yemen imports about 40 percent of its wheat from the two countries at
war. People experiencing crisis or, even worse, acute food insecurity in Yemen
climbed from 15 million to over 16 million in just three months, at the end of
2021. The war in Ukraine will only worsen this already bleak situation in
Yemen.
The compounding shock of the war in Ukraine can cause tragic
outcomes in some MENA countries if humanitarian and development assistance is
not scaled up in 2022.
To give a sense of the magnitude, at regional level,
consider that last year the MENA region accounted for only 6 percent of the
world’s total population, but over 20 percent of the world’s acutely food insecure
people.
At the World Bank, we are prepared to respond with all
available instruments relevant to the nature of vulnerabilities at country
level. In Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt, our budget support operations can prove
particularly effective, as the crisis is expected to be felt mostly at the
level of national macro fiscal constraints.
We are also ready to step up our support for domestic
agri-food production and commercialization, agricultural risk, and food
reserves management in countries experiencing shocks at that level, whether
through increased energy and fertilizer costs or other factors, such as
drought/climate-related stresses (e.g., Iraq, Yemen, Tunisia, Lebanon, Egypt).
In the immediate term, we also stand ready to expand nutrition-sensitive social
protection programs in selected countries, by building on the work done since
2020 in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic response.
Finally, we will stay committed to continuing to provide
close and targeted technical and analytical assistance, especially to the
countries that will be more heavily hit on issues ranging from fiscal
sustainability, subsidy reforms, food security, trade monitoring, to
agricultural risk management. As was the case when other crises emerged in the
region, we at the bank are ready again to step up to the plate and affirm our
unwavering support for the people of MENA.
The writer is the World Bank vice president for the Middle East and North Africa region. This article first appeared on the Middle East Institute website.
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