The
war in Ukraine has laid bare Russia’s military weaknesses, and a key area of
concern for the Kremlin is the health
of its navy.
With the Russian Black Sea Fleet an easy target for Ukrainian anti-ship
missiles, Moscow is eyeing alternatives, including a long-planned naval
base in Sudan.
اضافة اعلان
Whether
Russia has the money, or the means, to get what it wants in the Red Sea is
another matter.
The
Kremlin’s idea of strengthening its influence
in Northeast Africa dates to November 2017, when Sudan’s then-President Omar
Al-Bashir discussed the possibility of a Russian
military base in his country with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Defense Minister
Sergei Shoigu.
Three
years later, Moscow and Khartoum signed
a draft agreement, good for 25 years. While the deal was just approved
by the ruling military earlier this month, it hasn’t been ratified by Sudan’s
yet-to-be-formed legislative body.
But
that has not kept Moscow from moving full steam ahead. Increasingly isolated in
Europe, Russia is keen to establish a presence in the Red Sea to project
power and expand its trade potential.
For
instance, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has visited the region twice
this year to advocate for the base. In his view, a deal to establish Russia’s
naval presence on the Sudanese coast is moving
in the right direction.
Increasingly isolated in Europe, Russia is keen to establish a presence in the Red Sea to project power and expand its trade potential.
In
reality, though, Khartoum looks to be strong-arming
Moscow by
asking for economic aid in exchange for access
to its maritime waters. Sudan has also amended the original agreement; it now
only allows Russian naval vessels to stay for five years, with the
“possibility” of extending the total lease to 25.
Sudan
has plenty of reasons to stall — not least of which is its desire to improve
relations with the West, as
well as with Israel. Additionally, Sudan’s leaders may want to use Washington’s
opposition to the base as leverage, aware that for Russia, meeting Sudan’s price
tag would require vast sums of political and economic capital that Moscow
doesn’t possess. Western powers, led by the US, could easily offer Sudan more
money in exchange for giving Russia the cold shoulder.
Of
course, as the only military superpower in the region, the US can disrupt
Russia’s port project. Washington has warned Sudan to end
its ties to the Wagner Group, a paramilitary organization linked
to the Kremlin. With naval bases in Djibouti and Diego Garcia in the Indian
Ocean, not to mention the Fifth Fleet in Bahrain, the US maintains a military
shadow over any Russian naval expansion.
Even
without direct Western intervention, Russia’s Red Sea ambitions face several
hurdles.
For now, the Kremlin’s goals in Northeast Africa seem like a long shot. Bogged down in Ukraine and short on military bargaining chips, Moscow’s ability to buy its naval dominance is greatly diminished.
For
starters, countries could follow Bangladesh’s lead and bar
entry of Russian ships to their maritime waters. It’s possible that Russian vessels
en route to Sudan might be blocked from passing through the Suez Canal —
similar to how Turkey closed
the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits to Russian naval vessels in March 2022 — which is
controlled by Egypt. Cairo, one of the biggest importers of Russian
grain, strongly
opposes the
Kremlin’s plans to establish a military presence in Sudan.
Second,
while Moscow appears willing to provide weapons and military equipment
to the Sudanese Armed Forces in exchange for access to the strategically
important region, it is not clear that it could deliver. Russia’s military
faces its
own weapons shortages in Ukraine, and has been forced to import drones, ballistic missiles, and
ammunition from Iran and North Korea.
A
third obstacle for Russian strategic planners is Sudan’s political instability.
With a history of coups – there have been 17 coup attempts, six of them successful,
since 1950 – there’s no guarantee that even if parliament eventually ratified
the deal that it would survive the next political drama in the country.
For
now, the Kremlin’s goals in Northeast Africa seem like a long shot. Bogged down
in Ukraine and short on military bargaining chips, Moscow’s ability to buy its
naval dominance is greatly diminished.
What
is more, if the Russian military couldn’t seize the strategically important
Ukrainian ports of Odessa and Mykolaiv in the Black Sea — not far from
Sevastopol, home to Moscow’s Black Sea Fleet in annexed Crimea — the chances
for Russian control of the Red Sea are, for now, fantasy.
Then
again, if Russia were ever able to sail into Sudan, it could rewrite the
balance of power in one of the world’s most strategic waterways.
Nikola Mikovic is a political analyst in Serbia. His work focuses
mostly on the foreign policies of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine, with
special attention on energy and pipeline politics. Twitter: @nikola_mikovic
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