Last week, on the eve of NATO’s summit in
Vilnius, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan finally
ended his opposition to Sweden’s membership. After months of
brinkmanship and threats, Erdogan realized that his poker hand was relatively
weak. Save for Hungary, other NATO states had become exasperated with his
theatrics.
اضافة اعلان
Appearing to strongarm the West is a popular
political ployErdogan parlayed his resistance – first to the
membership bids of both Finland and Sweden, and later just to Sweden – to
reelection this spring. Erdogan controls domestic sources of
information in Turkey; appearing to strongarm the West is a popular political
ploy.
But Erdogan is also interested in playing a
larger role in global politics. He has an inflated view of himself and of
Turkey; imagines that he can single-handedly remake the global balance of
power; and believes that forcing others to negotiate with him will enhance his
credentials.
In rationalizing his opposition, Erdogan accused
the Swedes of harboring “terrorists” who sought asylum from his authoritarian
regime. The problem is that for Erdogan, every opponent of his government is a
terrorist. He has eviscerated the notion of the rule of law in Turkey – from
finance and human rights to freedom of the press and day-to-day societal
choices.
To avoid calamity, Turkey will need vast amounts of financial help, aid with its current account deficit, direct foreign investment, and improved market access for its manufacturing sector exports. This is the kind of support only Turkey’s allies can provide.
Without an independent judicial system, it’s
impossible to determine whether Turkey’s extradition requests have legal merit.
At one point, the Turks even demanded that a sitting member of the Swedish
Parliament, who happens to be of Iranian-Kurdish origin,
be handed over.
Most of his requests were those no democratic
country could agree to. Rather than
heed the president’s demands, the Swedes agreed only
to extradite a drug dealer and
tighten rules regarding fundraising for Kurdish groups directly affiliated with counterparts in
Turkey.
Turkey’s position is hypocritical
Erdogan does not understand that Turkey’s
position is hypocritical when it comes to requesting the extradition of
criminals. Swedes had made several requests to Ankara to arrest and start
extradition procedures for fugitives, drug dealers, and suspected murderers who
have sought refuge in Turkey. Turkey refused these entreaties on account that the suspects now were Turkish citizens – having achieved this feat by
literally
buying their residency status.
Turkey was not always the troublemaker of NATO
Turkey was not always the troublemaker of NATO.
Erdogan was influential in the early years of his presidency when he sought to
establish a moderate, liberal order at home and improve relations with allies
and neighbors alike. But as he consolidated power he became a
populist-authoritarian leader with no tolerance for dissent. Surrounded by
sycophants, he’s gotten accustomed to getting his way at home, no matter the
issue.
His real problem, and the reason he had to end his
Swedish opposition, is that he is facing an enormous economic crisis, much of
it his own doing. He espouses unorthodox policies that have sent inflation
through the roof.
To avoid calamity, Turkey will need vast amounts
of financial help, aid with its current account deficit, direct foreign
investment, and improved market access for its manufacturing sector exports.
This is the kind of support only Turkey’s allies can provide.
Before consenting to Sweden’s NATO membership,
Erdogan tried to turn the tables: He set as a precondition that the European
Union agree to reopen accession negotiations of its own with Turkey. This is a
non-starter, and he knows it. But posing the question could prompt the EU to
consider deepening its
customs agreement with Ankara, a move that would
undoubtedly help Turkish exports.
Jens Stoltenberg, the NATO General Secretary,
did express
support for Turkey’s EU accession. Of course, the
endorsement is essentially meaningless, given that Stoltenberg isn’t an EU
official. Yet Erdogan will still seek to spin this as a concession to Turkish
demands.
Erdogan also wants the Biden administration to
approve the sale of F-16 fighter jets to Ankara. The administration, which supports the
idea in principle,
made it clear that as long as Erdogan blocked Sweden’s NATO bid, the sale
wouldn’t fly in the US Congress, where some leaders were already upset at
Turkey’s threatening overflights of Greek islands in the Aegean and other abrasive tactics in
the region.
Without an independent judicial system, it’s impossible to determine whether Turkey’s extradition requests have legal merit. At one point, the Turks even demanded that a sitting member of the Swedish Parliament, who happens to be of Iranian-Kurdish origin, be handed over.
The Turkish Air Force needs F-16s because it
lost its chance at acquiring more advanced F-35s on account of another case of
obstinate Erdogan decision-making: the purchase of Russian S-400 anti-aircraft
missile systems. The president authorized this move despite warnings from
Washington and NATO that
the systems rendered the F-35 susceptible to Russian espionage and are
incompatible with alliance equipment.
The Biden administration managed this crisis
exceptionally well; it was patient and kept its powder dry. It probably bemoans
the many hours it wasted dealing with this issue when other, more pressing ones
got short shrift.
Unfortunately, this is the world of dealing with
populist authoritarians; Erdogan isn’t the only one, and he will be back. He indicated
that he would submit the Swedish accession legislation to the Turkish
parliament in October after the end of the summer recess. In other words, the
Turkish president has plenty of time to try to up the ante, make other demands,
or complain that the rest of Turkey’s allies aren’t living up to the deal’s
conditions.
The debate over Sweden’s accession to NATO may
be over, but Erdogan’s self-serving brinkmanship will only continue.
Henri J. Barkey is the Cohen Professor of
International Relations at Lehigh University and an adjunct senior fellow for
Middle East studies at the Council of Foreign Relations.
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