Since the outbreak of the latest military confrontation between the United States and Iran, Saudi Arabia has pursued what can best be described as a policy of positive neutrality. This strategy is based on avoiding direct involvement in the conflict while accepting a certain degree of security risk in order to prevent a wider regional war that would impose far greater costs on all states in the Middle East.
اضافة اعلان
Although several Arab states came under attacks by drones and missiles targeting military bases hosting U.S. forces and other security facilities—attacks that, in some cases, were more extensive than those experienced by Israel—most Arab governments deliberately chose not to respond militarily to Iran. This restraint was not a sign of weakness; rather, it reflected a strategic calculation that expanding the conflict would lead to severe economic and security consequences that would be difficult to contain. Ironically, such a regional escalation is precisely what Israel has sought, namely, broadening the confrontation to include the Gulf states and Jordan.
For its part, Tehran justified these attacks by claiming that it was targeting U.S. military forces stationed in the region rather than the Arab states themselves, arguing that those forces were participating in military operations against Iran. However, this justification does not alter the fact that the attacks occurred on the sovereign territory of independent states, raising serious questions about Iran's respect for the principle of state sovereignty enshrined in the United Nations Charter, particularly Article 2, which prohibits the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of states. This raises an important question: how can Iran justify launching attacks against Saudi Arabia from Iraqi territory through armed groups allied with Tehran—an act that clearly violates Iraqi sovereignty—while simultaneously rejecting the right of Arab states to protect their own airspace and territorial sovereignty?
Understanding Iranian behaviour in the region requires placing it within a broader historical context. Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran has pursued a strategy of expanding its regional influence through networks of allied political movements and armed groups across several Arab countries. This approach, which many Arab governments regard as an infringement of state sovereignty, has been extensively documented by international research institutions, including the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
During the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), the Iranian leadership relied heavily on religious rhetoric and ideological mobilisation to recruit fighters, a phenomenon documented in numerous historical studies, including Pierre Razoux's The Iran-Iraq War.
Following the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime, Iran found a strategic opportunity to expand its influence inside Iraq. Numerous studies indicate that Tehran strengthened its political and military presence by supporting Iraqi political parties and armed factions, many of which later became influential actors within Iraq's political and security landscape. This development has been analysed by institutions such as the RAND Corporation and the Washington Institute for Near East Policy as one of the principal instruments of Iranian regional influence. Iran also discouraged Shiite groups willing to fight American forces and supported religious rulings (fatwas) that prohibited armed resistance against the U.S. military presence.
Over the past two decades, the expansion of Iran-backed armed groups has significantly affected the Iraqi state's monopoly over the use of force and its ability to exercise full sovereignty. Reports by the World Bank and Transparency International have linked Iraq's reconstruction challenges to weak state institutions and widespread corruption, although they do not attribute these problems to any single factor. Nevertheless, many Iraqis remain acutely aware of the extent of Iranian influence over Iraq's political institutions and its significant role in the country's economic sphere.
In Syria, Iran played a central role in supporting the government of former President Bashar al-Assad from the outset of the conflict in 2011 by providing military and economic assistance and facilitating the deployment of allied armed groups, including Hezbollah and several multinational Shiite militias. The United Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, together with Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, has documented numerous violations committed during the Syrian conflict, including sieges, forced displacement, and demographic changes in certain areas, although responsibility for some of these incidents remains disputed. Within this context, General Qassem Soleimani played a pivotal role in coordinating the deployment of these factions into Syria and supporting military operations that ultimately led the United States to designate him as a major security threat and kill him in a drone strike near Baghdad in January 2020, alongside senior Iraqi militia leaders.
Against this background, Saudi Arabia's recent response to attacks launched from Iraqi territory should be understood as a political and strategic message extending beyond the immediate targeting of the armed groups responsible for those attacks. The first message is directed at Iran: the use of proxy armed groups to attack neighbouring states will no longer go unanswered. The second message is directed at the Iraqi government, reaffirming that the responsibility for preventing Iraqi territory from being used as a platform for attacks against neighbouring countries rests first and foremost with the Iraqi state.
Today, Baghdad faces a highly complex challenge. It must balance its relationship with Iran against its regional and international commitments while simultaneously re-establishing the state's monopoly over the use of force and preventing non-state actors from using Iraqi territory to conduct military operations beyond the authority of the Iraqi government.
In conclusion, Saudi Arabia's policy of strategic restraint appears to be approaching its practical limits. Should attacks originating from Iraqi territory continue, Riyadh is likely to adopt a more explicit deterrence strategy while continuing to avoid a broader regional war. Balancing deterrence with regional stability will remain one of the Middle East's most significant security challenges in the years ahead.
Dr. Emad Al-Hammadin
Professor of Strategic Studies
The University of Jordan
