Iran's failure to respond widely to US strikes on areas of southern Iran and around the Strait of Hormuz looks striking to some observers. But the lack of a broad response has its reasons. It did not come from nothing or without military and political causes.
اضافة اعلان
In principle, Tehran wants to push the timing towards a later stage, roughly two months from now, by which point the US Congress will have formed and the Israeli government will be fully in place. In this context, it is natural for Iran not to respond while it waits for the political map and what follows from it, in terms of how the war with Iran is managed and which forces take control.
At the same time, Tehran does not want to be drawn into a war that Israel in particular might try to lure it into. Nor does it rule out a military response altogether. Instead, it is pursuing a strategy of prolonging a long-term war of attrition, rather than a direct, open confrontation with the US carrier groups and main fleet. That kind of war is costly for Washington and other countries.
There are additional reasons why Iran has so far refrained from a wide-scale response. The first is Tehran's recognition that targeting major US naval vessels, or entering a direct conventional confrontation, could push the United States to assemble a broad international coalition against it. That escalation could lead to a full-scale war that threatens the survival of the Iranian regime itself. Tehran is therefore keen to keep the conflict under control, relying on drones and missiles to exhaust US and allied air defences and drain their economic and military resources through imprecise, spaced-out strikes.
Iran sometimes prefers to aim its responses at regional targets or land bases, to raise the political and economic cost for Washington. It does this by pressing US regional allies, targeting oil tankers, or imposing tolls and partial blockades in the Strait of Hormuz. Tehran hopes these parties will press Washington to accept a political settlement and avoid setting the whole region alight. This is already happening, but at a low level at present, because US air operations are limited, and Tehran does not want to spoil the chance of reaching a political settlement.
Iran's calculations also rest on the belief that US administrations do not favour getting drawn into long, drawn-out battles, given their popular and economic costs. Iran's strategic patience therefore aims to convince the US that continuing operations will not achieve its political goals or ensure long-term stability. Tehran may also believe that, after the Congressional results, there is general American resistance within Washington to the administration's handling of the Iran file.
The final reason is significant and linked to Tehran's fears of internal divisions. It is trying to send carefully calculated responses designed to rally the Iranian street and give it momentum to rally around the regime, without slipping into a devastating war that could backfire on the country's internal stability. This is especially true given the current blockade, and the economic hardship and sanctions Iranians have endured for decades, which have recently intensified.
However, these reasons that prevent Iran from responding more widely to US strikes are temporary. If, at some point, the US or Israel raises the level of operations and turns them into a major war or a sweeping strike, these considerations will fall away, and Iran will respond broadly and indiscriminately, affecting several parties.
This means that Iran's current failure to respond does not reflect an inability to do so. It reflects objective reasons, as well as a reluctance to close the negotiating file. But at some point, this entire picture could collapse if American and Israeli calculations against Iran change. At that point, Iran's strategy of patience would collapse, and Tehran would have no option but to respond, with all the danger that carries for the security of the region and its states, and the economic and security threat it poses to the world.
We are facing costs in every scenario, whether in war, peace, or the state of neither war nor peace. The question remains: when will the political coexistence between Tehran and Washington break down?
