The Syrian president has repeatedly stated that his country will not intervene militarily against Hezbollah in Lebanon, while Türkiye has also voiced its opposition to any Syrian military intervention there, citing the high strategic costs such a move would entail.
اضافة اعلان
Meanwhile, the U.S. president continues to speak about the possibility of Syrian involvement in Lebanon, leading many observers to assume that this would mean the deployment of the Syrian army.
Such an intervention, however, would carry significant security, military, political, and financial risks.
According to emerging analyses, what may actually be intended is a different form of Syrian involvement one that does not involve sending the official Syrian military into Lebanon.
According to the information presented, safe corridors have allegedly been established along the border to facilitate the movement of tens of thousands of African and Asian fighters currently in Syria who fought alongside the country's new government and hold either their original nationalities or foreign citizenships.
The reported plan would involve these fighters infiltrating eastern Lebanon in armed groups, confronting Hezbollah forces in central and southern Lebanon, and establishing militant strongholds in different parts of the country in cooperation with armed groups in Tripoli and other areas.
The article further claims that extremist Lebanese Sunni groups have already emerged and are moving toward a specific agenda.
This alternative scenario is intended to avoid the political embarrassment of deploying official military forces while achieving several objectives.
First, it would create an alliance between fighters arriving from Syria and Lebanese Sunni militant groups against Hezbollah.
Second, it would allegedly serve a U.S.-Israeli strategy of eliminating these foreign fighters by drawing them into a war in another country and involving them in internal conflict.
Third, it could pull Palestinian and Syrian Sunni refugee communities in Lebanon into a sectarian civil war under emotional and religious slogans, despite not being original parties to the conflict.
The article argues that additional objectives include: placing Hezbollah under internal military pressure while consolidating the occupation of southern Lebanon instead of relying solely on Israeli military operations; creating security instability that would eventually spill back into Syria itself by igniting conflict on its borders; using this pool of fighters in the future against western Iraq and Iranian military influence there; and ultimately paving the way for regional partition as a consequence of internal wars among the region's ethnically, religiously, and sectarianly diverse populations.
The author also contends that this situation represents one of the consequences of Iran's regional expansion.
In his view, blaming only Israel and the United States is insufficient, arguing that many of these dangers could have been avoided had there not been projects aimed at expanding influence along sectarian lines.
He maintains that several Arab states are now paying the price through internal fragmentation and collapse driven by both natural and engineered factors.
The author concludes that it is not in the region's interest to ignite internal wars under any pretext, arguing that the Middle East has reached a dangerous level of instability that ultimately benefits Israel.
He expresses skepticism that the region's major powers are still capable of preventing these outcomes, believing that events may have reached a point of no return.
He ends by posing a final question:
Is there any guarantee that the "foreign fighters" issue will not explode in directions beyond what is currently envisioned including inside Syria, Jordan, Iraq, and potentially other countries as well?
