The Houthi militia’s conduct has exceeded what Saudi Arabia can tolerate. Iran, the principal backer of these militias, failed to take Saudi Arabia’s position—or that of other Arab states into account, both before and after the U.S.-Israeli war.
اضافة اعلان
More troubling still, the Houthis, who are said to enjoy a relatively greater degree of freedom of action than some of Tehran’s other allies, failed to recognize that targeting Saudi Arabia, its vital interests and its security in Yemen would weaken Riyadh to Israel’s benefit.
Throughout the region’s ongoing confrontation, Saudi Arabia has played a central role in containing the situation and sparing Tehran and its proxies devastating blows.
Most Arab commentators, including many considered aligned with Tehran, have praised Saudi Arabia’s restraint and wisdom in responding to calls for escalation against Iran, as well as its pursuit of diplomatic dialogue to resolve the crisis. More importantly, they have commended the Saudi leadership’s refusal to yield to American and Israeli pressure to join the Abraham Accords normalization process, despite the many inducements on offer.
Saudi Arabia could, based purely on its own interests, have taken a different course and tightened the noose around Iran, which is under a severe U.S. blockade. Riyadh chose not to do so, placing Arab and regional security interests above narrow national calculations. Yet this did not spare it the hostility of the Houthi group, which launched a surprise attack in Yemen and advanced to a position close enough to threaten Saudi security.
Such a Houthi attack would not have occurred without direction from Tehran, which appears to believe that pressuring Gulf states and threatening their interests will push the Trump administration to abandon its plans for a major attack on Iran after the midterm elections.
Just two days ago, *The Wall Street Journal* reported, citing sources in Iran, that one possible response to a U.S. attack would be a ground invasion of Gulf states’ territory, alongside strikes on those countries’ strategic interests.
Tehran’s policymakers should understand that such threats have not changed Washington’s plans in the past. If anything, they may prompt its regional allies to urge it to press ahead with plans to eliminate, once and for all, the threat Iran poses to their continued existence.
Arab security and diplomatic circles are convinced that the Houthi militia’s actions were merely a demonstration by Tehran of what it might do across the region in response to any U.S. attack.
For weeks, Riyadh restrained its response and relied on diplomacy to avoid a confrontation with the Houthis, especially at this critical moment. But the group continued its provocative conduct, making a confrontation appear unavoidable.
Saudi Arabia saved the global economy from an energy crisis of unimaginable severity by offering the East–West Pipeline as an alternative route for pumping oil into the arteries of the world economy. The pipeline can carry more than 7 million barrels a day. Without it, prices would have reached astronomical levels, devastating the economies of many countries.
Iran, having turned the Strait of Hormuz into a bargaining chip with Washington, viewed the Saudi alternative as a threat to its negotiating strategy. The Houthi group then moved to seize control of the Bab al-Mandab Strait and threaten shipping in the Red Sea, where Saudi Arabia’s Yanbu port is located. In the wake of the Hormuz crisis, Yanbu had become the world’s most important port. The group also directly threatened the strategically vital oil pipeline.
Saudi Arabia had no choice but to act to confront this threat. The international community must act as well, so that the global economy does not become…
