Turkey’s efforts to normalize diplomatic relations with
the Syrian regime have fueled unease among Syria’s
armed opposition groups, leading some opponents of President Bashar Al-Assad’s
government to fear the end of their decade-long cause.
اضافة اعلان
Among those most concerned is Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham
(HTS), a Sunni Islamist political and armed organization that
controls most of northwest Syria. While there is no evidence that Turkey
supports HTS directly, Ankara has been a major backer of other opposition
groups during the 12-year-long Syrian conflict. Turkey has mutual interests
with HTS and they have coordinated on specific issues. Turkey and Syria have
begun working to restore ties and if they find common ground, it could upend efforts to
challenge the Assad regime, and effectively mark the end of HTS.
Assad has repeatedly conditioned reconciliation with Ankara on the complete withdrawal of Turkish troops
from northern Syria. Damascus also insists on the termination of Ankara’s
support to armed opposition groups.
Assad has repeatedly conditioned reconciliation with Ankara on the complete withdrawal of Turkish troops from northern Syria. Damascus also insists on the termination of Ankara’s support to armed opposition groups.
While some armed groups might be able to survive the
regime’s territorial expansion, HTS is unlikely to be among them. That is
because the group is designated as a terrorist organization by both Ankara and
Damascus due to its former affiliation with Al Qaeda. In fact, Turkey’s efforts to reconcile with Assad pose an
existential threat to HTS.
The deployment of Turkish forces to Idlib in 2017, designed to prevent the Syrian regime from
seizing the last rebel stronghold, was enabled by HTS, which helped provide a
safer environment for Turkish troops. Today, the group fears that this history
might lead supporters to conclude that HTS favors Turkey’s talks with Assad — a
perception that could threaten the group’s unity and fuel public anger.
HTS leader Abu Mohammad Al-Jolani was quick to denounce
the Syrian-Turkish rapprochement. In a video statement, Jolani said he would
not reconcile with Assad and promised to continue the fight until Damascus is liberated. Al Jolani also pledged not to cede territory to Damascus. HTS is widely viewed as the strongest
and most coherent armed group in northwest Syria. Therefore, it is important
for rebel groups to secure its participation in the fight against the regime to
better defend their territories.
To hammer the point home, HTS has increased its attacks against the Syrian regime in recent weeks. In contrast to
the relative calm during the last year, HTS reportedly carried out 11
operations against regime forces in the last month and targeted pro-government cells operating in Idlib.
But HTS is also pursuing a nuanced strategy, aware
that its survival depends on maintaining good ties with its northern
neighbor.
For instance, rather than engage in direct
confrontations with regime forces, HTS has focused operations on defensive
military sites behind enemy lines.
This is likely because HTS wants to avoid fueling tensions with Turkey,
which maintains a ceasefire brokered with Russia in March 2020.
Moreover, HTS has refrained from directly criticizing
Turkey’s foreign policy and assumed a more conciliatory tone. In a December statement,
HTS blamed the Assad regime for its unwillingness to address Turkey’s concerns
and urged Ankara to “preserve its values and moral gains in supporting the
oppressed.”
HTS is widely viewed as the strongest and most coherent armed group in northwest Syria. Therefore, it is important for rebel groups to secure its participation in the fight against the regime to better defend their territories
It also expressed understanding for the “pressures that
Turkey is facing at the local and international levels.” These include
Turkey’s need to make progress on facilitating the return of Syrian refugees
and countering the “Kurdish threat” before Turkish elections in May.
Privately, HTS has been more direct. Local sources tell
me that HTS held a meeting in December with Turkish officials, during which the
group’s leaders expressed concern about reconciliation with Syria and
reiterated their commitment to honoring agreements with Turkey.
HTS’s calculated response appears to be driven by an
assessment that negotiations between Ankara and Damascus are unlikely to yield
results. The group’s view is shared by many Syria observers who predict
that the talks will stall because Turkey and Syria remain far apart on many issues
(not to mention the regime’s unwillingness to compromise).
This could explain why HTS’s reaction so far has been
designed to assure its domestic audience of its commitment to the fight, rather
than to aggressively persuade Turkey to terminate talks with Assad.
Of course, all bets are off if talks between Ankara and
Damascus produce an unexpected breakthrough. In such a scenario, HTS would
likely first use its diplomatic channels with Ankara to reach a compromise that
would allow it to preserve, to the extent possible, its interests. These could
include, for example, withdrawing from specific areas in Idlib in exchange for
expanding into northern Aleppo.
Failing a mutually accepted compromise with Turkey, the
group would undoubtedly turn to more aggressive means of survival.
No matter how the Turkish-Syrian rapprochement
progresses, these are uneasy times for Syria’s opposition in Idlib — those who
fight, and those who simply long for an end to years of suffering.
Haid Haid is a Syrian columnist and a
consulting associate fellow of Chatham House’s Middle East and North Africa
program.
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