Four major powers from outside the region
have interests in Middle Eastern geopolitics. The most powerful is the US.
Since its early entry into Middle Eastern geopolitics during World War II, US
policy in the region has been driven by two conflicting factors.
اضافة اعلان
The first factor was romanticism. From
the observations of US President Theodore Roosevelt in the early 20th century
to the writings of his grandson Kermit Roosevelt, the CIA’s most interesting
operations manager in the region after World War II, the US looked at the
Arabian Peninsula, the Levant, and North Africa with a combination of
admiration for the region’s history, appreciation of its civilizational
heritage, and respect that the Anglo-Saxon Protestant US elite at the time had
for the traces of knighthood they had seen in Arabian culture.
However, imperial prerogatives clashed
with romanticism. The US entered the Middle East in the late 1940s, when it had
unrivaled military and economic might and saw itself as the culmination of
human achievement. The same US elite from New England’s strict, hardworking,
and often pious culture who had romanticized the Arabs also demanded
acquiescence to the US’s view of itself as destined to rule the world.
Some Arabs played to the romanticism and
situated themselves within the new Pax Americana, exacting benefits for
themselves and their countries in return. Others, however, saw the US’s entry
into the Middle East as a new form of imperialism they were not willing to
succumb to, especially having fought the old European colonialism.
History does not repeat itself, but it
indeed rhymes. Today’s US is vastly different from that of the mid-20th
century. After seven decades of extensive engagement in the Middle East, US
romanticism about the region has been replaced by realism and often cynicism.
Still, the strategic imperatives have not changed much in the past seven
decades. Oil and gas remain of crucial importance to the world economy. The
Suez Canal and the Hormuz strait remain central to world trade. And US
commitment to the security of Israel remains a pillar of its Middle East
policy.
“The same US elite from New England’s strict, hardworking, and often pious culture who had romanticized the Arabs also demanded acquiescence to the US’s view of itself as destined to rule the world.”
As the US begins its strategic
confrontation with China, it expects many of its decades-long partners in the
region to side with it. In the US’s view, those partners would want a future
they know in the world order that the US has sustained in the past seven
decades, as opposed to an uncertain future influenced by an expanding China.
However, as was the case seven decades ago, some Arabs today play along, while
others are bent on challenging the Pax Americana, and some are slowly orienting
themselves to a Sino order they expect to emerge soon.
But China seems hesitant about entering
the fraught landscape of Middle Eastern geopolitics. On one hand, China’s
primary geopolitical priorities are in its direct neighborhood: the East and
South China seas. There, China's resolve as a rising superpower will likely be
tested against US might. China might well calculate that the Middle East is far
from being a priority in the foreseeable future. On the other hand, a majority
of China’s energy comes from the Gulf. China sees Saudi Arabia, the United Arab
Emirates (UAE), and Iran as countries with which it has been developing
intricate interests. And China clearly seeks a political role in the region, as
demonstrated by its heavy involvement in 2023 to help broker a rapprochement
between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
“History does not repeat itself, but it indeed rhymes.”
China sees the world in terms of circles
of receding importance as they get farther from itself. The Middle East is not
in China’s first circle of importance, but it is at the edge of the second
circle, whose perimeter extends from Central Asia to the Indian Ocean. This is
an important circle for China, not only because it is rich in energy China
depends on for its economic growth, but also because India, a country China
observes closely, has for decades been expanding in this circle.
Then there are the glories of history, an
important part of the narrative surrounding the rise of China. In this
narrative, China’s navy during the Ming dynasty had connected the Middle
Kingdom with the entirety of Asia and the eastern coast of Africa. China’s
growing presence in the Gulf and Indian Ocean resonates with echoes of history
within the Chinese psyche. It was no coincidence that China’s first military
base abroad was established in Djibouti, at the intersection between Asia and
Africa.
Yet, China understands that entering the
Middle East entails serious costs. And it has observed how the US had incurred
extensive costs in Middle Eastern entanglements for limited, and often
ephemeral, gains.
Russia’s approach in the Middle East
shares elements with those of the US and China. Like the US, Russia has a long
history in the region. However, unlike the US, Russia has tried to concentrate
its presence in select countries over the past 15 years, where it has seen
opportunities for short-term economic and long-term strategic gains.
Similar to China, Russia has a mixed
calculus, especially when it comes to the states of the Arabian Peninsula. On
one hand, Russia has effectively entrenched itself in the oil cartel OPEC,
becoming an economic partner of Saudi Arabia. Additionally, Russia has built a
strong presence in the glamorous centers of Dubai and Abu Dhabi. Moreover,
Russia has proven that it can be a decisive power in conflicts at the heart of
the Arab world, giving it valuable currency in Middle Eastern geopolitics.
“The Middle East is not in China’s first circle of importance, but it is at the edge of the second circle, whose perimeter extends from Central Asia to the Indian Ocean.”
However, Russia has its hands full. The
war in Ukraine has resulted in acute costs. While China is arguably on the
verge of becoming a peer competitor to the US, Russia understands that it is
far from such a designation. Amidst these circumstances, Russia would think
carefully before further extending its reach in the Middle East.
The last major outside power to consider
is the European Union (EU). Unlike the US, China, and Russia, Europe cannot
realistically project military power in the Middle East. For some observers,
this is a European vulnerability, especially considering that Europe is far
more exposed than any of the other major powers to the consequences of Middle
Eastern geopolitics. Limited means expose the gulf between grand rhetoric and
actual capabilities to materialize it.
Still, Europe commands important forms of
power. It is the biggest export market for most Middle Eastern countries, a
highly affluent investor in the region, and one of the most important
developmental partners across the Levant and North Africa. Importantly, many in
the Middle East view Europe as the epitome of refined human living in modern
society. This positioning in the imagination represents tremendous soft power
if wielded wisely.
"Russia’s approach in the Middle East shares elements with those of the US and China."
The problem is that when it comes to the
Middle East, Europe does not have clear desired ends. For decades after the
tensions of colonialism faded, Europe was drawn to its southern neighborhood by
the weight of centuries of shared history, the necessities of export-oriented
trading nations, and by the understanding prevalent among the fathers of the
EU. They believed that the foundations of Europe as a socio-political project
lie not only in the history of the landmass extending from the Atlantic to the
Urals but also in the history of the Mediterranean basin.
However, things are different now. Major
segments in Europe view the beautiful continent as a garden that should be
walled against the enemies of medieval times, the remnants of recent colonies,
and those they perceive as barbarians at the gates today. Amidst the old wisdom
of the founding fathers of the European project and the current fears of
affluent societies perceiving ominous winds in a world changing at a
disorienting pace, Europe looks at the Mediterranean southern shores with
apprehension.
As this series has tried to demonstrate,
Middle Eastern geopolitics is now a function of interactions among non-state
actors, both Arab and non-Arab states in the region, and powers from outside
the region. They differ not only in their objectives and the challenges they
confront but, perhaps more importantly, in the conclusions they have drawn from
their recent experiences. Amid vastly different perspectives, desired ends, and
conceptions of truth and goodness, Middle Eastern geopolitics might remain devoid
of peace, order, and meaning for a prolonged period.
This article first appeared in Al-Ahram
Disclaimer:
Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not necessarily reflect Jordan News' point of view.
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