What is happening in northern and eastern Syria is no longer a mere detail in the course of the Syrian conflict; it has become a pivotal moment in its history, perhaps no less significant or consequential than the moment of Bashar al-Assad’s regime being toppled. The issue of the “Syrian Democratic Forces” (SDF) was not just an armed group outside state control—it was a deferred sovereign and political knot that had to be unraveled if Syria truly wanted to enter the phase of a unified state. From this perspective, the recent agreement was not merely a settlement; it was the announcement of the end of an entire project, placing the organization’s leader, Mazlum Abdi, before a reality that allowed no evasion.
اضافة اعلان
The terms of the agreement—which include handing over Deir Ezzor and Raqqa, merging civil institutions in Hasakah, transferring control of crossings and oil and gas fields, integrating fighters individually after security vetting, and expelling non-Syrian PKK members—practically mean the dissolution of the SDF as a unified entity and the end of the “autonomous administration” with all its structures. This makes the agreement closer to dismantling a system than reorganizing it.
This shift revealed the other side of President Ahmad Al-Shar’. The man who seemed conciliatory and politically accommodating in other files appeared here firm to the point of severance, fully aware of the sensitivity of this issue and its dangers to Syrian unity. Laxity on the SDF file was not an option, as the continuation of this entity would have effectively meant continued division, no matter how it was wrapped in rhetoric about partnership or autonomy.
On the ground and socially, the agreement came after the SDF’s failure to build a stable popular base became evident. In Raqqa and Deir Ezzor, what had claimed to be a protective force turned into a power imposed by coercion, carrying out forced recruitment and looting resources. Even within Kurdish communities, the imported ideological discourse from the PKK did not convert into widespread conviction but remained enforced by compulsion, depriving the organization of any claim to represent Syrian Kurds.
Politically, Presidential Decree No. 13 struck directly at the narrative of “victimhood” by recognizing Kurdish cultural and linguistic rights, addressing the effects of the 1962 census, and granting citizenship to the stateless, without external pressure or internal threat. This shifted the conflict from a question of control to a question of legitimacy, removing the pretexts from the SDF’s hands.
The U.S. shift was, in my view, the decisive factor. Washington abandoned its policy of open protection and pushed toward integration and territorial unity, undermining Mazlum Abdi’s reliance on external support.
Today, Abdi does not face a military battle for survival but a historical moment of choice: either integrate and exit the scene quietly or procrastinate and confront, which will not change the outcome but will only determine the shape of his political end, after the project he led has come to an end.
