The
18th BRICS Summit, held a few days ago in New Delhi, underscored a reality that
is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore: the global economic order, long
shaped under the leadership of the United States and its Western allies, no
longer fully reflects the changing balance of economic power.
اضافة اعلان
At
the same time, the summit also showed that the transition toward a more
multipolar global order will be neither quick nor smooth. Despite its growing
weight, BRICS remains a grouping of countries with widely differing political
and strategic interests.
BRICS
is not an integrated economic federation, a common market, or a unified
political alliance. It is better understood as a broad forum bringing together
emerging economic powers and influential countries from the Global South.
What
largely unites them is dissatisfaction with the continued dominance of Western
countries over the institutions and rules governing the international economy,
along with a shared desire for a greater role in shaping global governance.
This
diversity is both a source of strength and a source of weakness. China and
Russia view BRICS as an instrument for building a global order that is less
dependent on the United States and the West, and they seek to give the grouping
a more prominent political and economic role. India, by contrast, moves more
cautiously. It supports reforming the international system and strengthening
the voice of the Global South, but it does not want BRICS to become an
explicitly anti-Western political alliance, particularly given its extensive
economic, technological and security ties with the United States.
Similar
differences, though in varying forms, can be seen among the other member
states, each of which maintains its own alliances, interests and strategic
calculations. BRICS’ expansion therefore increases its global weight, but it
also makes it more difficult to reach unified political and economic positions.
So far, this has limited its ability to evolve into a coherent and effective
economic and political bloc.
This
dilemma is particularly evident in the debate over the US dollar. Despite
growing rhetoric about reducing dependence on the dollar, BRICS has not moved
toward creating a single currency to compete with it. Instead, it has chosen a
more pragmatic path: expanding the use of national currencies in trade and
investment, connecting payment systems, and promoting financing in local
currencies.
In
the long run, this approach may prove more significant than the idea of
launching a common BRICS currency. The real challenge to the dollar does not
necessarily begin with the emergence of a single alternative currency. It may
instead come from gradually reducing the need to use the dollar in an
increasing share of international trade and financial transactions.
If
China, India, Russia, Brazil, Gulf countries and others are able to settle a
larger proportion of their trade in national currencies, the structural
dependence on the dollar could gradually decline.
This
does not mean, however, that the dollar’s dominance is about to disappear. The
dollar continues to benefit from the depth and liquidity of US financial
markets, strong international confidence, and its central role in global
reserves, trade and debt. Predictions of a rapid collapse of the dollar
therefore appear exaggerated. A more realistic scenario is a gradual erosion of
its near monopoly over some functions of the international financial system.
The
paradox is that the greatest obstacle facing BRICS may not be the United
States, but the differences within BRICS itself.
China
and India are strategic competitors, and India has little interest in
supporting a new financial system that could make it more dependent on China.
Other BRICS members, meanwhile, continue to maintain close economic and
security relationships with Washington and Europe.
Even
so, the broader direction of change is becoming increasingly clear. BRICS is
unlikely to become a unified bloc confronting the West anytime soon, but it is
well positioned to play a larger economic and political role in the years
ahead, alongside a gradual decline in the relative dominance of the United
States and other Western powers.
This
may ultimately mark the end of an era in which the US dollar was effectively
the only major option available to the global economy.
