Daesh has never been shy on bravado. Claiming attacks and an
ability to storm capitals has been used to strike fear in enemies since it rose
to prominence.
اضافة اعلان
But a recent report that the terror group intentionally holds back
from publicizing its own attacks reveals internal tensions and a dynamic that
policymakers leading the fight against Daesh need to consider.
Military operations in Syria
On June 25, Daesh released
a report on Telegram showcasing its military operations in Syria,
particularly in Deir Ezzor and Daraa. What set this report apart from others
was that several of the attacks had not been previously claimed by the
group.
While the notion that Daesh underreports for security reasons the
attacks it carries out is not new, another set of Daesh documents,
allegedly leaked and published by an anti-Daesh outlet, further support this
claim, indicating that it is not merely a self-serving narrative.
Insights into the decision-making
The leaked documents provide valuable insights into the
decision-making behind claiming certain attacks and not others, as well as the
resulting internal tensions within the group. It also shows that analysts
solely relying on the number of claimed attacks will not get an accurate
measure of a militant group’s strength. Therefore, policymakers should exercise
caution and take a comprehensive approach when assessing the group’s
capabilities and the threat it poses.
It is important to acknowledge that Daesh narrative about media silence could be used to justify the notable decrease in the group’s reported attack figures.
The leaked documents were published by Fadh Ubbad Al
Baghdadi and Al Hashimi on June 20 and June 21. The
outlet – whose name means, “Exposing the worshippers” of the slain Daesh
leaders Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi and Abu Ibrahim Al Hashimi Al Qurashi – is a pro-Al Qaeda, anti-Daesh account that posts
comments and allegedly leaked internal communications from the group.
Responsible for publicizing attacks
According to the documents, the Daesh media department is
typically responsible for publicizing attacks. They receive local documentation
and forward it to the central division for publication. However, the decision
of whether to publicize an attack rest with both senior media and military
commanders, and local military leadership has the authority to veto publication
if they believe it is against their interests.
The leaked documents also reveal contrasting perspectives between
media and military commanders in Syria regarding which attacks should be
publicized. While some branches, like Deir Ezzor, cooperate with media
personnel, others, such as the Badia and Daraa branches, reject the idea of
publishing attack claims. The military leadership, particularly in those
regions, reportedly enforces a media silence policy due to security concerns.
Internal tensions and disputes
This divergence in views has resulted in internal tensions and disputes.
Media officials critical of the de facto gag order argue that it is
counterproductive, benefiting the group’s enemies and impeding propaganda
efforts. They contend that aside from failing to deter counter-offensives by
enemies, publicizing Daesh activity would instill fear among “apostates” and
potentially inspire similar attacks in Syria.
To bolster their argument, the media officials allegedly asked how
the situation in Syria was any different from areas in Iraq where its fighters,
despite facing intense military pressure, still issued attack claims.
Daesh has previously acknowledged the silence policy in its weekly
newspaper, Al Naba. In a March 16 article, the group claimed that it intentionally
withholds some attack claims for operational reasons.
In a rare interview in July last year with
the head of Daesh operations in Syria’s Badia – a vast desert region
connecting Homs, Hama, Raqqa, and Deir Ezzor – a similar claim was made. The
official said Daesh conducted a significantly higher number of attacks than it
publicly acknowledged, indicating a strategy of selectively sharing, delaying
or withholding information about attacks for operational reasons.
Interestingly, the commander cautioned supporters who may be excited about
sharing news of the group’s attacks to refrain from doing so and strictly
adhere to Daesh’s official claims.
It is important to acknowledge that Daesh narrative about media
silence could be used to justify the notable decrease in the group’s reported
attack figures.
According to the documents, the Daesh media department is typically responsible for publicizing attacks. They receive local documentation and forward it to the central division for publication. However, the decision of whether to publicize an attack rest with both senior media and military commanders, and local military leadership has the authority to veto publication if they believe it is against their interests.
However, Daesh is not the
only entity that has highlighted a strategy of underreporting. The Rojava
center, which monitors Daesh attacks in areas held by the Syrian Democratic
Forces (SDF), said the group is known to carry out unclaimed
attacks in northeast Syria. The center also said that out of the 285
attacks attributed to the group in 2022 by outside media, Daesh only claimed
responsibility for 185.
Furthermore, on June 23, Daesh said it had carried out attacks
targeting Syrian regime forces and the SDF in northeastern Syria, resulting in
the killing and injury of 19 fighters in seven operations.
The attack
on Hasakah’s Sina’a prison in January last year is another reminder of the manpower and
organizational acumen that Daesh still holds. These offensives, among
many others in the recent past, strongly suggest that despite a drop in
claimed attacks, Daesh cells still maintain a position of advantage in many
areas, enabling them to carry out attacks at their discretion.
This highlights the importance of adopting a more nuanced approach
to the danger Daesh poses in Syria and the wider region. Policymakers and
analysts, therefore, should move beyond relying solely on official claims and
adopt an evidence-based approach that takes into account the group’s military
attacks and capabilities, as well as its media policies, financial resources,
and influence over local communities.
Dr Haid Haid is a Syrian columnist and a consulting
associate fellow of Chatham House’s Middle East and North Africa program.
Twitter: @HaidHaid22
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