Amman – Jordan’s 20th House of Representatives has entered its third ordinary session facing questions that go beyond the election of its speaker, permanent bureau and committees. These questions concern the future of the parliamentary party experiment and the ability of blocs to evolve from temporary electoral understandings into political forces with coherent programmes and positions, capable of influencing legislative and oversight decisions and shaping relations with the government.
The elections for the House’s permanent bureau at the beginning of the session revealed more than competition for five positions. They represented an early test of the cohesion of party-based parliamentary blocs and their ability to ensure that members honour previously reached agreements.
The agreement bringing together several parliamentary blocs – the Mithaq, Mubadara and Azm blocs, the centrist parties and the Reform bloc – held up only in the race for the speakership, which was won by House Speaker Ibrahim Tarawneh. The results of the elections for the two deputy speakers and their assistants, however, differed from the arrangements agreed upon beforehand.
Disagreements became more apparent when Ahmad Al-Hmeisat, the Mubadara bloc’s candidate, lost the position of First Deputy Speaker to MP Ayatollah Freihat. The contest was accompanied by objections, withdrawals and a loss of quorum before the elections were completed the following day.
Competition for the Second Deputy Speaker position and the assistant speaker posts also exposed divisions within the blocs themselves, as well as the presence of MPs who did not consider political agreements binding when making their electoral choices. Meanwhile, the Umma Party bloc secured a place on the permanent bureau, with Malek Al-Tahrawi winning one of the assistant speaker positions.
These results raise a fundamental question about the parliamentary party-bloc experiment: what is the value of a parliamentary bloc if it cannot manage internal disagreements or establish a collective position on the political contests in which it participates?
Can parliamentary governments and an effective party-based political life be discussed while blocs struggle at their first test involving the distribution of positions?
Perhaps the most significant implication of this experience is the need to reopen the issue of amending the House’s internal regulations, as an essential step towards developing parliamentary work.
The current regulations continue to treat blocs as general parliamentary groupings. They do not adequately reflect the transformation brought about by the Election Law and the development of party life, nor do they clearly distinguish between a party-based bloc founded on a political party and programme, and a parliamentary grouping formed through agreements among MPs.
Article 25 allows a group of MPs representing no less than 10% of the House’s membership to establish a parliamentary bloc. It also permits two or more blocs to form a parliamentary coalition.
Article 26 requires blocs and coalitions to submit their internal bylaws to the General Secretariat within 14 days of the start of the ordinary session. However, the regulations do not provide a comprehensive framework ensuring that party affiliation is reflected in the mechanisms for forming blocs, nor do they adequately define their responsibilities in parliamentary decision-making or establish political accountability for members over collective positions.
This highlights the need to amend the internal regulations, not merely to update certain provisions, but to bring them into line with the new party landscape, strengthen the institutional structure of parliamentary blocs, define their relationship with their respective parties, establish internal decision-making mechanisms, and clarify their role in distributing committee memberships, chairmanships and rapporteur positions.
It is also necessary to introduce safeguards against blocs remaining little more than names that can be changed according to each electoral contest.
Earlier this year, the House’s Executive Bureau discussed the possibility of forming a committee to propose amendments to the internal regulations, making the completion of this process a priority that should not be postponed.
The immediate challenge facing the blocs, meanwhile, is the formation of the permanent parliamentary committees, a process that will once again reveal the actual balance of power within the House.
Article 54 of the internal regulations stipulates that each committee must have between five and 11 members. It also states that committees are to be formed according to the proportional representation of parliamentary blocs through a decision by the Executive Bureau.
If agreement cannot be reached within 14 days of the beginning of the session, a secret ballot is held if the number of candidates exceeds the available seats.
Since the session began on November 2, the deadline for reaching an agreement runs until November 16, leaving the blocs with a few crucial days to negotiate committee memberships, chairmanships and rapporteur positions.
This process is expected to provide another test of political alliances, particularly as disagreements over the permanent bureau did not end with the announcement of the results. The distribution of committee positions could reproduce the same divisions or open the way for new understandings.
The importance of parliamentary committees, however, extends beyond the allocation of positions. They will be responsible for examining legislation with a direct impact on the lives of Jordanians.
At the forefront is the draft amendment to the Social Security Law, which the House referred during the previous session to the Labour, Social Development and Population Committee. The proposed amendments have prompted widespread objections and comments, particularly regarding retirement, contributions and acquired rights.
The 2027 state budget, referred by the government to the House, is another major priority. The Finance Committee will be tasked with examining expenditure and revenue estimates, the budget deficit and public debt, as well as assessing how allocations will affect services, employment opportunities and investment projects.
Other pending legislation includes the amended Labour Law, currently before the Senate; the draft Execution Law; expected amendments to the law governing the Independent Election Commission; and amendments to the Universities Law, among others.
This makes the current session particularly demanding, requiring strong and cohesive committees rather than merely distributing seats.
Regarding relations with the government, the third session could mark an opportunity to redefine the boundaries of cooperation and oversight between the two branches of authority.
The government, headed by Dr. Jafar Hassan, needs a House capable of debating its proposals and passing necessary legislation. At the same time, it is expected to provide clear answers on economic and service-related issues and address parliamentary observations, which are an essential part of constitutional oversight rather than an obstacle to its work.
MPs, for their part, cannot reduce their role to either opposing the government or simply going along with it. What is required is responsible oversight, cooperation on national issues and serious accountability concerning policies and decisions that affect citizens.
Party-based parliamentary blocs are also expected to adopt collective positions on the budget, social security and labour legislation, rather than leaving MPs to rely on individual judgments that may change from one issue to another.
Overall, this session places the House before a dual test: modernizing its internal tools to make them more compatible with the evolving party system, and demonstrating its ability to turn parliamentary pluralism into productive institutional work.
The permanent bureau elections showed that agreements alone are not enough to create cohesive blocs, and that the ballot box can expose the gap between political understandings and actual commitment.
Ultimately, the strength of parliamentary blocs will not be measured by the number of their members or the positions they secure, but by their ability to formulate collective positions, defend political programmes, influence legislation and exercise oversight.
A House seeking a more advanced role for political parties cannot continue operating with organizational tools that no longer keep pace with the political transformations they were intended to accommodate.
Source: Al Ghad Newspaper
