How Israel’s little war in Gaza backfired

1. Gaza
(File photo: Jordan News)
1. Gaza

Osama Al Sharif

Osama Al Sharif is a journalist and political commentator based in Amman.

The five-day war between Israel and Islamic Jihad in Gaza ended in a ceasefire Saturday, with both sides claiming to have won the round. The aftermath resulted in 30 Palestinian deaths, including children and two in Israel. This number of casualties is relatively lower, on both sides, than it has been during similar conflagrations in the Strip. And some would describe the aftermath as yet another stalemate.اضافة اعلان

Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu needed this last cycle of violence to restore deterrence and defuse a crisis within his own government. His shaky coalition is mired by internal in-fighting over unleashing more violence against the Palestinians as demanded by racist and ultra-nationalist National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir — who had threatened to pull out of the coalition and bring the government down — as well as by public onslaught over his proposed judicial reform bills.

For weeks tens of thousands of Israelis had taken to the streets of Tel Aviv and other cities, denouncing the “conspiracy” against Israeli democracy. Unable to push forward, Netanyahu ordered a pause while talking with the opposition. Meanwhile, Likud’s support in the polls was dipping fast. Netanyahu needed to appease Ben-Gvir while deflecting attention from the crisis his reform bills had created. And a small war on Gaza would do just that.

Islamic Jihad had earlier avenged the death by hunger and neglect of a senior political leader in Israeli jails. It fired a few rockets against neighboring Israeli settlements. This gave Ben-Gvir the excuse he needed to wage war. Last week Israel decided to retaliate by killing two Islamic Jihad leaders in Gaza with Israeli strikes. Then it waited for a response. It took Islamic Jihad two days to fire volleys of rockets into southern Israel. And Israel had its little war.

Islamic Jihad lost few of its field leaders in this latest war, including the one responsible for its missile program. But that did not affect its ability to launch more than 1,300 rockets, including a few that hit southern Tel Aviv and a settlement not far from West Jerusalem. Islamic Jihad is a small militant group known for its non-compromising positions when it comes to fighting the “Zionist enemy”. It has close ties to Iran, which is believed to have supplied it with the crude technology to build and fire rockets.

Egyptian mediators stepped in to negotiate a ceasefire, which finally happened on day five of the confrontation. But Islamic Jihad rejected earlier offers unless Israel committed to stop targeting its leaders. That did not happen; at least, it was never put on paper. Instead, Israel proposed a quiet-for-quiet deal as soon as Islamic Jihad stopped firing missiles.

Ultimately, both sides licked their wounds and took a step back. For Islamic Jihad, the public perception is that it never faltered and continued to fire rockets challenging Israel’s air supremacy and huge firepower. The small group was not defeated despite suffering serious losses in its military cadre.
The 'mowing of the grass' strategy, adopted by Israel for years, had failed to destroy Islamic Jihad despite superior arms and air defense technology. This was another zero-sum encounter in Israel’s protracted and never-ending conflict with the Palestinian resistance. The loss for Israel, by military, economic, and moral standards, was serious.
For Israel, the cost of this little war was huge. Tens of thousands of Israelis had to be evacuated from towns and villages in southern Israel close to besieged Gaza Strip. Israel’s main airport had to close for days, and tourism was hit hard. The Iron Dome fired hundreds of costly missiles, missing a significant number of Islamic Jihad rockets. At least two million-dollar each, missiles from the sophisticated David Sling anti-ballistic air-defense system were launched to intercept rockets heading to Tel Aviv.

The “mowing of the grass” strategy, adopted by Israel for years, had failed to destroy Islamic Jihad despite superior arms and air defense technology. This was another zero-sum encounter in Israel’s protracted and never-ending conflict with the Palestinian resistance. The loss for Israel, by military, economic, and moral standards, was serious.

By Sunday, it was business as usual; Gaza laborers crossing back into Israel to work and trucks carrying fuel and supplies moving into the besieged Strip. But the fact that Hamas had apparently chosen not to participate directly and Israel being careful not to target its positions shows that a new formula is being clubbed together.

Hamas, the largest militant group in control of the Strip with a much superior armory, had opted not to get involved, even though it issued threats under the so-called joint operations room of the resistance groups. Israeli officials made it clear that Hamas was not the target of this latest operation. Hamas’ political bureau had held back its military wing because it was looking for a role in a much bigger game with higher stakes.

The group had worked out a number of deals with Israel; allowing Gaza laborers to work in Israel, making arrangements for a steady flow of Qatari money and biding its time to see how long can the troubled PA and its ailing leader, Mahmoud Abbas, can cling to power in the West Bank.

For Netanyahu and the military establishment, keeping Hamas out of the fight meant ending the military operation as soon as possible. Israel’s worst scenario is facing rockets fired from Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza in a much bigger confrontation. The real story was not the exchange of rockets and laser-guided missiles but how Israel and Hamas, and Hezbollah and Iran, chose to stay out.

By the end of the day, the only losers from this latest duel were the residents of Gaza. A few more days of war meant that Gaza’s only electric power station would go offline while hospitals would run out of essential medicines. Israel struck down a few residential homes, including one housing dozens of mentally disabled Palestinians. That side of the story is seldom reported.
By the end of the day, the only losers from this latest duel were the residents of Gaza. A few more days of war meant that Gaza’s only electric power station would go offline while hospitals would run out of essential medicines.
The latest round of violence ended two days before Palestinians marked the 75th anniversary of the Nakba. On that occasion, an Arab News/YouGov survey found that 63 percent of Palestinians feel that neither Fatah nor Hamas represents them. In comparison, 75 percent of respondents have no confidence in their own leadership. This lack of trust in traditional leadership is making room for the rise of unorthodox forms of resistance in the West Bank.

Israel has to realize that its decades-long occupation is radicalizing generations of Palestinians and that the cycle of violence and counter-violence is doomed to continue. 


Osama Al Sharif is a journalist and political commentator based in Amman.


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