How does Jordan reposition itself geopolitically amid the accelerating transformations in the regional environment, so that it shifts from a state affected by regional transformations into a state capable of influencing their direction? The regional environment on which Jordan built its foreign policy and domestic strategies no longer exists in its previous form.
اضافة اعلان
The changes surrounding Jordan have included the Syrian war that ended with the fall of the Assad regime after more than fifty years in power, the recent Iranian-American war, the events of October 7th and the subsequent shifts in Israeli security strategy, the ongoing transformations in the West Bank.
In addition, the new American policies under President Trump, which suggesting American withdrew from the region in favor of other regions need more attention from the USA. All of this points to a fundamental change in the regional environment that requires not merely refining previous tools for dealing with it, but changing them altogether when necessary. In light of small-state theory, which concerns states seeking survival amid regional and international competition, a distinction is drawn between traditional adaptation — based on managing balances and crises — and strategic adaptation, which seeks to deploy a state's resources, location, and international relations to expand its margin of maneuver and influence. The Kingdom faces a test of its ability to sustain delicate internal balances while simultaneously preserving political stability.
Jordan's repositioning has taken a multidimensional character that includes: strengthening internal resilience capacity, protecting sovereignty and geographic space, redeploying its geopolitical location, and diversifying tools and networks of partnership and external influence. Moreover, the rise in the Jordanian public's perception of external threat — according to the latest survey of Jordanian opinion in 2026, in connection with the ongoing Iranian-American war — did not necessarily translate into declining trust in the state, amid high levels of confidence in security institutions and the government, and satisfaction with crisis management, even as economic pressures persist.
As a matter of fact, Jordan does not have the ability to control the trajectories of regional transformations, but it can reduce its exposure to their repercussions and expand its margin of strategic independence by converting geography, internal stability, diplomacy, and international partnerships into sources of strength and influence. The essence of this repositioning, then, lies in the shift from "adapting to the region" to "adapting in order to influence the region."
The new transformation strategy that emerged during the Syrian war and its aftermath represented a shift from traditional border defense that responds to a crisis once it occurs, to proactive defense that intervenes in hostile operations before they reach Jordanian territory — an unprecedented approach to dealing with threats, indicating that Jordan adopted new strategies based on confronting threats before their arrival. This shift in strategy along the borders involved the use of drones and intervention in smuggling operations, as well as the destruction of infiltration and smuggling networks inside Syrian territory before they crossed into Jordan. This relied on two main factors: first, coordination with Syrian authorities, and second, strategic intelligence — which gave the repositioning process a more pronounced security dimension.
The Palestinian cause is one of the most significant issues shaping Jordan's political shift in its repositioning strategies — not only due to its geographic and political proximity, but because of its direct connection to border security issues, national identity, and the Hashemite custodianship of the holy sites. The two-state solution has been the preferred solution for Jordan, other Arab states, and much of the world, since it grants both Palestinians and Israelis the right to life and coexistence within internationally recognized borders. Jordan's previous strategy consisted of adherence to the two-state solution, rejection of "alternative homeland" proposals, and preservation of the Hashemite custodianship. However, this Jordanian insistence faces resistance from the Israeli far right and from a U.S. administration aligned with Israeli wishes to make Israel free of Palestinians. In this context, Jordan has shifted toward seeking international alternatives that help shed further light on the danger posed by the absence of a Palestinian state, as a form of strategic adaptation.
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan sits at the heart of the Arab region and at the epicenter of these transformations, which compels Jordanian decision-makers to act in ways that safeguard Jordan's vital interests. From this standpoint, one can read the King's remarks in his 2026 speech before the UN General Assembly, in which he spoke with concern about Israeli plans for expansion at the expense of Arab states, as well as annexation and Judaization operations targeting Palestinian lands along the 1967 borders. Amid Israeli arrogance and the corresponding Arab weakness, King Abdullah's speeches in world capitals and at the United Nations are considered one of Jordan's traditional tools and policy instruments for deterring Israel from proceeding with its plans. In reality, these speeches place Western states before a humanitarian situation centered on international law, human rights, and resolutions of international legitimacy — yet they have limited effect on the decisions of the Israeli right-wing government. The European Union possesses no tools of influence over Israel, nor does any other state, with the exception of the United States, which has recently become less interested in the West Bank issue.
The Jordanian state has succeeded to some degree in developing political, economic, and security tools that have enabled it to withstand a shifting region and strategic uncertainty, in a context where it is no longer possible to rely on fixed patterns of alliances or balances. Even with Iran, amid the war, Jordanian policy practiced containment and de-escalation — including not sharply severing relations with Iran despite Iranian missiles falling on Jordanian territory. Jordanian policy toward Iran can be understood from another angle: that the war will end, that American forces will eventually leave the region, and that relations among neighboring states will remain the governing factor — which is why Jordan keeps the door ajar with Iran, wary of future developments beyond its control. This mechanism in Jordanian policy is not new; it has been consistently flexible and has avoided sharp alignments since the founding era.
