The Middle East after a war with Iran may look nothing like it did before. What began as a confrontation over Iranian influence and capabilities has opened the door to a broader realignment of power, alliances, and security arrangements across the region - while Arab states scramble to protect their sovereignty and interests from a conflict that extends well beyond its direct parties.
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Political and strategic analysts who spoke to Al Ghad said the Iranian file sits at the heart of the anticipated shifts. They pointed to the possibility of a significant reduction in Tehran's regional influence and a restructuring of deterrence frameworks, alongside the emergence of new alliances and partnerships. The ultimate shape of the region, they cautioned, will depend on how the war ends and how far escalation is allowed to go.
Against that, analysts flagged the risk that a prolonged confrontation could widen the arc of conflict and turn Arab countries into arenas of proxy warfare - threatening their security and stability, and reproducing the patterns of fragmentation and disorder that have marked the region in recent years.
In this environment, the experts pointed to growing discussion of a new security arrangement built not on a single umbrella framework but on a network of overlapping partnerships. The United States would remain the principal actor, they said, while the roles of regional and international powers would expand and Gulf states would develop stronger independent defence capabilities.
Their assessments converged on one point: the most consequential outcome of the war will not be determined solely by what happens to Iran, but by who sets the security rules afterwards - and whether the resulting arrangements can protect Arab sovereignty and contain conflict, or will instead open the door to a new cycle of escalation and chaos.
Military and strategic expert Dr. Nidal Abu Zeid said the region stands at the threshold of a sweeping geostrategic shift whose signs have been visible for some time. In his assessment, the Iranian file has been the principal obstacle to completing the new regional arrangements now under construction.
Abu Zeid said there are multiple indicators - some intangible and some concrete - pointing to preparations for a political decision that could lead to military action against Iran. He added that this scenario remains contingent on how far Tehran is willing to make concessions on the regional issues at stake.
From the American perspective, he said, Iran appears to be 'the main obstacle to the arrangements taking shape in the region.' He suggested the file could be addressed either through military action or through a diplomatic track that pressures Tehran into concessions and forces it to redefine its regional role.
In his reading, the American objective is not to occupy or destroy Iran, but to create 'an Iran weaker than Israel yet stronger than the other states of the region' - an outcome that would allow its behaviour and role to be recalibrated in line with new American arrangements for the Middle East.
Looking ahead, Abu Zeid said these shifts are likely to produce new alliances and a wide strategic change in the balance of power. He pointed to signs of rapprochement among Turkey, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, and to expected changes in how the Houthi file is handled in the period ahead.
Taken together, he said, these indicators suggest that 'the Iran card will be closed - or at minimum reshaped and recycled to American specifications' - consistent with the new regional order now being constructed.
Abu Zeid also said the coming arrangements are likely to target a reduction in the instruments of Iranian regional influence: Tehran would be left neither with its current proxy network in the region nor with a nuclear capability or missile power giving it significant leverage over regional balances. This, he said, would lead to a restructuring of the regional deterrence framework, altering the nature of the balance between Iran and other regional powers including Israel, and producing a new regional configuration shaped by the power balances and alliances that crystallise after the conflict ends.
Dr. Khaled Shnekat, president of the Jordanian Association for Political Science, said Arab states are the party most harmed by any regional escalation. Past experience has shown, he said, that wars and international and Israeli interventions impose heavy security, economic, and humanitarian costs on the Arab world - from state fragmentation and rising refugee numbers to widening poverty and instability.
Shnekat said the American-Israeli war on Iran and Iran's subsequent response have drawn the region into 'a long cycle of action and reaction' whose repercussions have spread to several Arab countries. He said the priority for those countries has become protecting their sovereignty, security, and interests, and preventing their territory from being used as battlegrounds.
He argued that any new regional security arrangements must draw on the lessons of past wars - pointing in particular to the 2003 American military intervention in Iraq, which in his assessment produced wide regional consequences and gave rise to waves of violence and extremist organisations. He warned that the current escalation, if sustained, risks reproducing similar outcomes, including 'the fragmentation of new Arab states' and a widening of regional chaos.
Shnekat said the scenarios ahead remain open: economic pressure on Iran may continue, or military strikes against Iranian targets may be renewed, while Tehran could respond by targeting American interests and bases in the region - potentially making some Arab countries direct arenas of conflict. He also noted that any Israeli expansion in southern Lebanon or Syria could add a further dimension to the regional picture.
He said the coming period may bring fresh waves of escalation, including limited strikes targeting specific Iranian capabilities or attempts to weaken state structures - developments that, if the conflict broadens, could open the door to further regional chaos. Shnekat summarised the outlook by saying that 'the most prominent feature of all the scenarios is a state of chaos and destruction striking the region,' warning that continued conflict without clear political and security arrangements could threaten the stability of other Arab states.
Security and strategic expert Dr. Bashir Al-Da'jah said the war with Iran extends beyond its immediate military results, opening the door to a reshaping of the region's security and political rules. The most important question after the conflict, he said, is what kind of security order can emerge in the region.
Al-Da'jah cited King Abdullah II's call with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio on 2 October - in which the King stressed the need for a comprehensive ceasefire that guarantees Arab security and sovereignty - as reflecting a view that regional stability cannot rest on force alone, but requires arrangements that protect state sovereignty and prevent territory from being turned into conflict zones.
He said the region is likely to move toward a multi-partnership security system in which the United States remains the principal player, while the roles of regional powers such as Turkey and Pakistan grow, and Gulf states develop stronger independent defence capabilities. This need not mean the formation of an 'Arab NATO,' he said, but rather the building of a security network integrating defence systems, early-warning mechanisms, intelligence sharing, protection of critical infrastructure, maritime corridor security, and cybersecurity.
Al-Da'jah outlined three possible tracks. The first is a return to a more organised American security umbrella combined with greater reliance on the region's own capabilities. The second is the development of a more independent Gulf and regional security framework. The third - which he described as 'the most realistic' - is a multi-partnership system in which Washington is the principal but not the sole actor, alongside growing roles for Turkey, Pakistan, and European states, and the development of Arab and Gulf-specific mechanisms.
He said Iran will remain the most complex element in any new security arrangement. Excluding Tehran entirely from the equation is unrealistic, he argued, while integrating it into any future framework requires clear rules built on respect for sovereignty, non-aggression, and the prohibition of using other states' territory as arenas of conflict.
Al-Da'jah also warned that the end of military operations does not necessarily mean the end of the conflict. The region may instead enter a phase of 'grey war' combining cyberattacks, drones, economic pressure, energy security, and maritime security - making the conflict less about direct military confrontation and more reliant on non-conventional tools.
He reiterated that the outcome of the war will be determined not by military operations alone but by 'who sets the security rules after the war.' The region, he said, may move from a system controlled by a single power to an environment of multiple power centres and partnerships, with the shape of the post-conflict arrangements proving decisive in determining the level of regional stability in the period ahead.
Al-Da'jah said Jordan is not insulated from these shifts, given its geographic position and its direct exposure to any regional escalation. Its interest, he said, lies in a regional order that protects state sovereignty, prevents conflicts from crossing its borders, strengthens border and airspace security, supports the stability of neighbouring countries - particularly Syria and Lebanon - and prevents new crises from erupting in the West Bank and Jerusalem.
This article was originally written in Arabic for Al Ghad.
