Al-Wehdat Club’s General Assembly: Between the Responsibility of Choosing and Holding the Administration Accountable

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Several General Assembly members at a previous Al-Wehdat club election
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Before Al-Wehdat club's General Assembly asks: why did the management fail? Perhaps it should first pause at a more important question: why did we elect them?اضافة اعلان

The question may seem harsh, but it frames the discussion correctly, moving away from placing the responsibility for the club's administrative, financial, sporting, cultural, and social shortcomings solely on the board of directors, given that the General Assembly holds the electoral mandate, grants the president and board members its trust, and holds, in every election cycle, the keys to their success or failure.

From this standpoint, the General Assembly's responsibility does not end the moment the ballot boxes close and results are announced, it begins there. A member who casts his vote based on conviction in an electoral program and a vision for advancing the club is different from another who votes according to personal inclinations, social relationships, kinship ties, or in favor of whoever covers the cost of his membership fee to the club's fund.

The paradox lies in the fact that some General Assembly members may choose the management based on these considerations, then later, as mistakes and poor results accumulate, place the blame solely on that management, perhaps even demanding its departure, forgetting that its members did not reach their positions on their own, but through the votes of that very same General Assembly.

This issue takes on particular importance at Al-Wehdat club, which has one of the largest general assemblies among youth and sports clubs in the Kingdom, after the Greater Amman Municipality Employees Club, with membership approaching 8,000, while the number of General Assembly members in the last elections reached 5,304.

The General Assembly's base has expanded as a number of supporting members moved to active membership, and new members joined after membership was opened under the current board's tenure, alongside the club's large fan base, which includes a considerable number of General Assembly members.

All of this makes the General Assembly a major electoral force, but at the same time places it before a greater responsibility: ensuring that the electoral vote is a decision serving Al-Wehdat's interest, not a response to a relationship, a favor, or a fleeting benefit.

Al-Wehdat activist Maher Al-Hasanat believes the General Assembly bears responsibility for its decision at the ballot box, as it holds the decision-making power in choosing the president and board members in every election cycle.
Al-Hasanat affirms that the General Assembly is a fundamental partner in the success or failure of whoever manages the club's affairs administratively, financially, athletically, culturally, and socially, stressing that a member's responsibility does not end with electing the board, but continues through follow-up, accountability, and evaluation.

Al-Hasanat places the phenomenon of "carried votes" (bloc voting brought in from outside) at the forefront of the problems facing the club's General Assembly, considering it to play an influential role in shaping election outcomes, given voting based on personal inclinations, social relationships, kinship ties, or in favor of whoever covers a member's club fund fee.

He believes this phenomenon, alongside electoral favors, largely explains the continued presence of the same faces on boards of directors and the scarcity of new faces, noting that only a limited proportion of General Assembly members put the club's interest above their own inclinations, leanings, and electoral affiliations.

Al-Hasanat points out that the circle of "carried votes" widens from one cycle to the next, depending on the electoral contest over the presidency and board membership, at a time when, in some cases, genuine and realistic electoral programs, ones meant to offer clear solutions to the club's crises are absent, leading to an accumulation of mistakes, failures, and debts from one cycle to the next.

This discussion comes as Al-Wehdat faces clear financial and sporting challenges, with the club's debt approaching $1.7 million, noting the efforts led by honorary chairman and new backer, businessman Imad Al-Dumaisi, to reduce the debt through settlements reached with companies, administrators, coaches, and players, which are expected to be reflected in the club's financial obligations.

On the sporting front, the picture is not much brighter, particularly for the football team, which has been absent from the Professional League title podium since the 2020 season, while its Jordan Cup and Super Cup titles have come at widely spaced intervals. Last season was described by Al-Wehdat supporters as disappointing, ending with a forced absence from Asian competition this season, alongside a decline in other sporting, cultural, and social activities.

Here specifically, the question returns to the General Assembly: did the management alone fail, or was part of that failure a product of the way it was chosen?

Al-Hasanat calls on the majority of General Assembly members to stand firmly in the trench of the club's higher interest, to engage in self-review, and to look at Al-Wehdat's reality as it is, away from emotion, relationships, and favors, standing before the "mirror" of past years with all the financial, administrative, sporting, cultural, and social disappointments they carried.

He believes the coming phase requires electing the best and most capable of leading the club, not the one most able to mobilize votes or possessing the widest network of relationships.

Al-Hasanat suggests that those concerned with Al-Wehdat's interest should start now with intensive, targeted awareness campaigns directed at General Assembly members, whether through direct meetings or online, as any upcoming election approaches.

He stresses that the goal must be to establish a new electoral culture that rejects reliance on relationships, kinship, and favoritism, and rejects the notion of "whoever pays my membership," placing Al-Wehdat's interest above all other considerations, given that it is a sporting, cultural, and social institution with a history, titles, and fan base that demand management worthy of this legacy.

Al-Hasanat does not see the solution as merely replacing individuals, but as changing the criteria for choice, so that electoral programs, competence, management ability, and problem-solving capacity become the true standards for casting a vote.

He stresses that Al-Wehdat needs a management with a clear vision for advancing the club athletically, culturally, and socially, alongside establishing solid financial rules and maximizing investments and financial returns, in a way that ensures the club's stability and pulls it out of the cycle of debt and crises.

Al-Hasanat says: "The General Assembly that holds the power to choose the management also bears, at the same time, responsibility for the results of that choice. What's needed, therefore, is not for the General Assembly to stop at the question: what did the management do? But to pose another, more important question: what did we do when we went to the ballot boxes?"

Al-Hasanat stresses that if Al-Wehdat wants better management, the starting point is not after failure occurs or when looking for someone to blame, but at the ballot box itself when the vote shifts from a favor to a trust, from a relationship to a responsibility, and from "carried votes" to a genuine will that chooses whoever can carry Al-Wehdat toward the future.

Al-Hasanat notes that the management in any election cycle is not exempt from responsibility, but the General Assembly, too, is not far removed from responsibility for the outcome it helped produce through the ballot box.