The gentle
footsteps of normalization with the Assad regime have become considerably
faster since the devastating earthquakes at the start of this month. Bashar Al
Assad, for so long diplomatically confined to Damascus, first visited Oman. This week, there was a giant leap
as Egypt’s foreign minister
landed in Damascus for further post-earthquake
diplomacy. It is not exactly that too much water has passed under the bridge
between the two countries; more that simply too much politics has happened for
too long.
اضافة اعلان
The February
earthquakes that devastated parts of Turkey and Syria were something of a
turning point for relations between the Middle East and Damascus.
To get a sense of
how long Assad has been outside of the Middle Eastern fold, consider that his
phone call on February 7 — the day after the earthquakes — with Egypt’s
president Abdel Fattah El-Sisi was his first-ever conversation with El-Sisi.
Since Mohamed Morsi, Egypt’s short-lived Islamist president, formally cut
diplomatic ties with the Assad regime in 2013, the country has had two further
presidents, neither of whom had spoken to Assad. (For those wondering, Morsi's
successor was Adly Mansour, interim president before the 2014 election.)
From Syria to
Ukraine
This growing wave
of normalization so many years after the region froze out Assad over his
widespread crackdown on Arab Spring protests also has lessons for other parts
of the world. In particular, it has lessons for the Ukraine war, a year into
the invasion, as the West and major countries like China and India begin to
grapple with the reality that Ukraine might become a forever war.
The longer conflicts on this scale continue, the more likely it is that something happens which changes the calculations of politicians in countries in the region and beyond.
As policymakers and
analysts wrestle with the consequences and potential direction of the Ukrainian
conflict, they should look closely at what is happening with the Syrian regime
and its neighbors. That is because the normalization is really a reflection of
the length of time that the Syrian conflict has continued unresolved.
A conflict on the
scale of the Syrian war has vast external consequences. Mass movements of
people, disruption to trade, armed militias, to name just a few, have immense
knock-on impacts on the politics, economics, and social order of countries far
beyond the conflict. Because of the sheer scale of the war and the problems it
generates, it can be tempting to freeze the conflict, to deal only with the
externalities like refugees or border skirmishes, and leave the rest to a
future date.
But these conflicts
are forever at the mercy of events, both political and, as we have seen with
the earthquake, natural. The longer conflicts on this scale continue, the more
likely it is that something happens which changes the calculations of
politicians in countries in the region and beyond.
Ukraine: A forever
war?
This is exactly
what is likely to happen with the Ukraine conflict, which, a year on, is in
danger of becoming a forever war.
From Russia’s perspective, a forever, frozen war in Ukraine is a solution that Moscow can live with. The conflict in Crimea was essentially frozen for years until last year, and its 2008 invasion of Georgia similarly stuck.
Both sides appear
determined to escalate: The Russians are in the midst of the new offensive, and
the West is preparing to supply Ukraine with new weaponry including tanks and perhaps even
fighter jets. All of this means there is unlikely to be any way out of this
conflict soon. The possibility that either side might achieve a comprehensive
victory is slim; what both Kyiv and Moscow are seeking, as Putin himself
suggested in his anniversary speech, is the “strategic
defeat” of the other.
From Russia’s perspective,
a forever, frozen war in Ukraine is a solution that Moscow can live with. The
conflict in Crimea was essentially frozen for years until last year, and its
2008 invasion of Georgia similarly stuck.
These frozen
conflicts benefit the aggressor, because they remove the momentum from their
opponents and rely heavily on other political events to distract supporters.
Eventually, unexpected events show up, all of which pressure other countries to
find a solution, however imperfect.
The way to normalization
This is how the
march towards normalization began in Syria. Unexpected consequences gradually
began to appear: the immense stress that neighboring countries like Jordan and
Lebanon were subjected to; the combination of a worsening Turkish economy and a
social backlash against so many Syrian immigrants; the opportunity that Iran
seized to interfere further in Syria. All of these convinced Syria’s neighbors
that normalization was better than an endless, frozen conflict.
The worst thing for the rest of the world would be for Ukraine’s conflict to be frozen. All the momentum and Western support would fade away.
The same thing is
happening in Ukraine, where calculations have gradually shifted in a year of
conflict. And not solely against Russia. China is an example of how unexpected
events can change perceptions. A year ago, Beijing may have been content with a
lightning Russian victory or even a Ukrainian pushback that left Russia
weakened and more dependent on China. But now Beijing’s calculations have
shifted. So tenacious has Ukrainian resistance been that China is now concerned
what message a Russian loss may send to Taiwan. Might the Taiwanese look across
the strait and think that they, too, might have a chance against the much
larger and better armed People’s Liberation Army?
The worst thing for
the rest of the world would be for Ukraine’s conflict to be frozen. All the
momentum and Western support would fade away. As happened in Syria, politics
would continue elsewhere until something — a war, an earthquake, something
unexpected — pierced the ice. Then, just like earthquake diplomacy is causing a
rethink throughout the Middle East, the Ukraine conflict would need to be
rapidly and suddenly unfrozen.
Faisal Al Yafai is
currently writing a book on the Middle East and is a frequent
commentator on international TV news networks. He has worked for news outlets
such as The Guardian and the BBC, and reported on the Middle East, Eastern
Europe, Asia, and Africa. Twitter: @FaisalAlYafai. Copyright:
Syndication Bureau.
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