As Russia’s war in
Ukraine enters its ninth month, Turkey has emerged as one of the conflict’s
most important external actors. With most global powers choosing sides, Ankara
has managed to preserve ties with both Moscow and Kyiv, positioning itself as a
key mediator in ending the conflict.
اضافة اعلان
But is peace really Turkey’s motivation, or is
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan more interested in getting as much leverage over
Russia as possible?
Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly
praised what he calls Turkish neutrality vis-à-vis the war. The irony, of
course, is that while Ankara has kept lines of communication open with both
sides, it is far from neutral. Turkey is supplying Ukraine with Bayraktar
drones and with TRLG-230 precision-guided missiles. In October, Turkish
shipyard RMK Marine even launched Ukraine’s first anti-submarine naval ship.
Moreover, Turkish drone maker bayraktar is expected
to complete a drone manufacturing plant in Ukraine in the next two years. Does
that mean that Erdogan, Putin’s “dear friend”, received guarantees from the
Kremlin that Russian forces will not attack the Turkish investment?
As self-defeating as that sounds for Russia, it
would not be the first time that the two leaders made such an arrangement. They
have a history of lucrative deals, from Syria and Libya to Armenia and
Azerbaijan.
Recently, Erdogan confirmed that he supported the
shipment of Russian grain to poor African countries. Coincidentally or not, the
countries that Russia will send its grain to for free — Mali, Djibouti, Sudan
and Somalia — are the very places where Turkey has been trying to increase its
influence. Thus, from Erdogan’s perspective, Putin’s “goodwill gesture” will
help Ankara achieve its own foreign policy aims.
Following the Crimean Bridge explosions in October,
which hindered Russia’s ability to resupply its forces in Crimea, the Kremlin
withdrew from the Black Sea grain agreement, accusing Ukraine of using the
“security corridor” to attack the Russian Black Sea fleet. However, one phone
call with Erdogan was enough for Putin to change his mind and agree to allow
Ukraine to export its grain via the Black Sea. As a result, Turkey can now buy
grain from both Ukraine and Russia at lower prices, which will greatly benefit
Turkey’s inflation-hit economy.
Indeed, the extension of the grain deal positioned
Turkey yet again as an important player in the conflict and suggested that
Erdogan has significant leverage over Putin. But why?
As a result of Moscow’s international isolation,
Turkey has become Russia’s major gateway to the world. Turkey remains the only
NATO member that has not imposed sanctions on Russia — giving Putin an economic
lifeline. It is not surprising, then, that the Kremlin has turned a blind eye
to Ankara’s actions in Ukraine and more recently, in Syria.
After Turkey launched air strikes in northern Syria
last week, Erdogan went out of his way to stress that he did not notify Putin
in advance, despite Russia having its own military presence in Syria. Erdogan
is well aware that Moscow is unable to help either the Kurdish-dominated
People’s Defense Units in northern Syria — Ankara’s major target — or Bashar Al
Assad’s Syrian Arab Army.
Similarly, after Turkey recently decided to tighten
rules on oil tankers that transit the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits, a move
that could restrict flows of Russian oil, Moscow yet again had to bury its head
in the sand.
Essentially, Turkey is buying Russian silence. In
2021, the volume of trade between Russia and Turkey reached almost $35 billion
and is expected to approach $60 billion this year, according to Russian
sources. Moreover, the Kremlin aims to increase its energy cooperation with
Ankara, and to turn Turkey into a regional gas hub.
Although Erdogan supports the gas idea, there is no
guarantee that the EU will give the green light for such a project. Doing so
would require construction of both the TurkStream 2 Gas Pipeline — first
proposed by Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller in 2019 — and of a new pipeline that
would pass through EU members Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary. If Russia remains
under Western sanctions, such an outcome is unrealistic.
Despite having significant leverage over Putin, it
is unlikely that Erdogan has the influence to end the Ukraine war. What he can
do is continue mediating to try and force Russia to leave the Zaporizhzhia
Nuclear Power Plant, and help Moscow and Kyiv reach agreements on grain and
ammonia shipments, prisoner exchanges, and even a ceasefire.
And yet, the biggest question of all is what is in
it for Erdogan? One possible answer is domestic support. With Turkey’s general
election scheduled for June 2023, Erdogan might be looking to strengthen his
record on foreign policy, using his leverage over Putin to convince Turks that
the Justice and Development Party is essential for Turkey’s long-term security
and economic growth.
Whatever the reason, the fact is that at this stage
in Turkey-Russia relations, only one leader is calling the shots. That puts
Erdogan in an enviable position. How he chooses to use this power could reshape
the region for years to come.
Nikola Mikovic is a political analyst in Serbia. His work focuses mostly on the foreign
policies of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine, with special attention on energy and
“pipeline politics”. Syndication Bureau.
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