Last month, as protests spread across Iran, the military’s Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was focused on another, less obvious, threat
to the regime: a potential peace deal between Azerbaijan and Armenia.
اضافة اعلان
As part of large-scale military exercises, the IRGC
practiced, reportedly for the first time, using temporary bridges to cross the
Aras River, which separates Iran from Azerbaijan and Armenia. The show of
military force, officially routine drills, was a symbolic message to Baku that
Tehran will not accept changes in this border region.
But why is Iran so concerned that a potential peace
agreement between the two archenemies might lead to such an outcome? And how
could tweaks on a map challenge Iranian power?
As part of the 2020 Russian-brokered ceasefire that
effectively ended the 44-day war between the two countries, which was fought
over the Nagorno-Karabakh region, Armenia agreed to the construction of a
transport link between western Azerbaijan and its Nakhchivan exclave, which is
surrounded by Armenian and Iranian territory, and shares a small border with
Turkey. The deal was meant to ensure unimpeded movement of citizens, vehicles,
and goods between the two Azerbaijani areas.
Control over transport links for this corridor would
be guaranteed by the Federal Security Service (FSB) of Russia, which is one
reason why the transit link remains a point of contention. Armenia fears that
the Nakhchivan corridor could impact its sovereignty, and in turn, affect its
border with Iran.
Azerbaijan, as the clear winner of the 44-day war,
is pushing for implementation of the Moscow deal and wants Armenia to build
road and rail links along its border with Iran, with no passport or customs
controls.
Tehran is aware that the Nakhchivan corridor would
connect mainland Azerbaijan not only with its exclave, but also with its ally,
Turkey, Iran’s regional rival.
Indeed, if the Nakhchivan corridor is built, it will
give Turkey a new land route to the South Caucasus, which the Turkish leadership
would likely use to strengthen its presence in the energy-rich region. Turkey
would even gain a faster route to Central Asian markets, a sizable geopolitical
victory for Ankara, giving it a transportation springboard to implement some of
its ambitious pan-Turkic goals.
Azerbaijan, despite being majority Shiite, has strong military ties with Israel, Iran’s archenemy. It is an open secret that the Israeli military would look to use Azerbaijan’s territory in the event of a major war with Iran.
All of these developments could weaken Iran’s
position in the region. Not only would the link end Azerbaijan’s dependence on
Iran for transit, it would also eliminate the Islamic Republic’s monopoly on
transit services in the South Caucasus. The transport corridor would also hand
control over the distribution of water resources in the Aras River basin to
Baku.
Security is the final reason why Iranian authorities
fear the Nakhchivan link: if built as proposed, it could be used by Iran’s foes
for military purposes.
Azerbaijan, despite being majority Shiite, has
strong military ties with Israel, Iran’s archenemy. It is an open secret that
the Israeli military would look to use Azerbaijan’s territory in the event of a
major war with Iran. The last thing Tehran wants is to see an
Azerbaijan-Armenia peace deal pave the way for Israel’s expanded presence.
Taken together, the Islamic Republic seems intent on
preventing construction of the transit corridor through Armenian territory.
Following Tehran’s military exercises in the Aras,
Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian opened the Islamic Republic’s
consulate general in Kapan, in southern Armenia’s Syunik province, a
strategically important area through which the Nakhchivan corridor would pass.
It was another signal to Azerbaijan that Iran sees itself as an unavoidable
actor in the South Caucasus. Iran is also considering selling weapons,
particularly Shahed-136 drones, to Armenia.
Tehran is not coy with its intentions. In a video
aired on state television a few days after its military exercises, the
Azeri-language broadcaster, Sahar TV, warned Azerbaijan that “anyone who looks
at Iran the wrong way must be destroyed”. While Iranian officials later sought
to downplay the rhetoric, emphasizing “friendly and brotherly relations”
between the two countries, it is hard not to view recent events as an
escalation.
Azerbaijan has been equally combative; recent
articles published in media close to the government supported the secession of
Iranian provinces where ethnic Azerbaijani make up a majority of the
population. Given this development, it is conceivable that the IRGC’s military
exercises near the Azerbaijani border — which were held amid protests in
Azeri-dominated parts of Iran — were actually meant for a domestic audience.
One thing is certain: current relations between
Azerbaijan and Iran are neither friendly nor brotherly. While Azerbaijan is a
secular country, Shiite faith seems to be the only thing that the two countries
share. Baku and Tehran have different allies, different priorities, and
different geopolitical goals. Thus, if Azerbaijan eventually succeeds in
building its section of the Russia-supported Nakhchivan corridor, Iran will be
the second biggest loser of the 2020 war.
Nikola Mikovic is a political analyst in Serbia. His work focuses mostly on the foreign
policies of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine, with special attention on energy and
“pipeline politics.” Syndication Bureau.
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