Not every royal visit is merely a stop on the foreign policy calendar. Some take place at a moment when the question is bigger than the visit itself: Where does Jordan want to be when the shape of the world changes?
اضافة اعلان
From this perspective, His Majesty King Abdullah II’s visit to China should not be viewed solely through the lens of agreements, investments and trade.
Rather, it should be seen as part of Jordan’s early reading of international transformations.
China is no longer merely an economic power or a trading market; it has become one of the forces reshaping the global economy, supply chains and technology, while its political presence in the Middle East continues to grow.
What has not been written about enough is that Jordan was not looking to China merely for a new market, but for a position within the emerging international order. That is an entirely different point.
The usual question is: What can Amman gain from Beijing? The more important question, however, is: What could Jordan become for Beijing?
Jordan is neither a huge market nor a country rich in natural resources, but it possesses other elements of strategic value: its location, stability, Arab and international relations, ability to connect with multiple markets, and a political role that extends beyond its geographic and economic size.
This is where one of Jordan’s most important strengths in its relationship with China lies.
Jordan’s real capital in this relationship is not financial capital, but geopolitical capital. Jordan can serve as a bridge between China and the Arab region, rather than merely being an importer of Chinese products.
This vision gained particular importance when Jordanian-Chinese relations were elevated to a strategic partnership in 2015, a step that reflected the nature of a relationship extending beyond trade to political, economic and strategic cooperation.
This is precisely where Jordan’s geographic position becomes important.
Aqaba, for example, is a foundation that must be better promoted. It is not merely a port; it could become a platform for manufacturing, assembly, storage and re-export, linking Chinese supply chains with Arab markets.
With its trade agreements and its location connecting the Gulf, Iraq and the Levant, Jordan can offer China something greater than the size of its domestic market.
The objective, therefore, should not be for the relationship to revolve around the question: What do we import from China? Instead, it should be based on a different question: What can we produce with China in Jordan? This is where the real opportunity lies.
What is needed is not merely to attract Chinese capital, but also technology, expertise and production chains. The most valuable investment is not one that builds a factory and ends there. It is one that leaves behind Jordanian skills, competitive companies, research centers and technical expertise that can be transferred to young people.
Education and technology should not be viewed as secondary areas in this relationship. Jordan needs to benefit from China’s experience in energy, water, transportation, industry, smart cities and artificial intelligence, so that cooperation becomes a means of transferring knowledge rather than simply purchasing technology.
Politically, Jordan’s opening to China does not mean distancing itself from its traditional allies. Rather, it means expanding its range of options. Medium-sized and smaller countries need as much room for maneuver as possible, particularly in a world moving toward a greater number of centers of power.
Given its location and role, Jordan can maintain balanced relations with international powers and benefit from its relationship with Beijing on regional issues, foremost among them the Palestinian cause and regional stability. For this reason, the value of the visit should not be measured by the number of agreements signed, but by what those agreements ultimately become.
An agreement is a beginning, not an outcome. An investment is a beginning, not an outcome. The real outcome is for the partnership to translate into factories, companies, research centers, universities and technology; for Jordanian exports to expand; for Aqaba to become a more active part of regional trade flows; and for Jordanian youth to gain the knowledge and skills that enable them to participate in the new economy.
The visit should therefore be viewed as a milestone in a long-term process, rather than as an isolated event. Jordanian-Chinese diplomatic relations began in 1977 and gradually developed until they reached the level of a strategic partnership, before continuing to expand into areas including energy, infrastructure, trade, education and technology.
Therefore, the broader reading of His Majesty the King’s visit to China is not that it was a visit in search of Chinese investment. It was a visit by a country with limited resources to a major global power, but at the same time, it was an attempt to redefine Jordan’s value in a changing world.
Jordan does not have a massive market that can impose itself, nor does it possess oil wealth that makes others seek it out. But it has its location, stability, people, political role, network of relationships, and above all, a leadership that stands out as one of the region’s most prominent.
If Jordan succeeds in turning these elements into economic and strategic value, China will not merely be a partner investing in Jordan. It will be a partner that sees genuine value in Jordan within the region’s economic and political dynamics.
This, in my view, is the idea that has not received enough attention in writing about the King’s visit to China: the visit was not merely Jordan’s attempt to reach China; it was an attempt to convince China that Jordan has an important place on the path the region and the world will take.
Jordan does not need to become big in order to be influential; sometimes, it is enough to know how to turn a small position into great value.
