Many ask how Jordan can escalate its political rhetoric against Israel, while at the same time coordinating with Israel on various matters, from bridges to gas, through water?
اضافة اعلان
The reason for this question is that there are those who believe this escalatory political language doesn't reflect the true position, with some even going so far as to say this language serves a functional purpose, meant to rally and unite the Jordanian domestic front, in the face of the region's and Jordan's own set of crises and problems.
These people believe the relationship is good, and that a degree of coordination between the two countries still exists, particularly regarding aid deliveries into Gaza, extending to other files including the Syrian-Israeli file and providing common ground for understanding through Jordan.
This is sensitive talk, meant to suggest that Jordan isn't taking a genuine stance against Israel, and that all the escalatory political language is for domestic consumption within Jordan, or an attempt to influence the Israeli election equation, even partially, by stirring up aversion in Israel toward what Netanyahu has brought upon Israel in terms of reactions at various levels, the latest being what happened at the United Nations, or even within the context of settling Jordanian scores with Democrats ahead of the US midterm elections, in the context of embarrassing the Trump administration, which supports Israel without defined limits.
We are not here to either deny or justify, but it can be said that Jordan's relationship with Israel is extremely poor, with nothing more telling of this than Jordan's continued refusal to allow the Israeli ambassador's return to Amman, despite Tel Aviv's attempt to trade water solutions for the ambassador's return, just as Jordan will not send its own ambassador to Israel in the current or medium term, which can be considered evidence of the poor state of the relationship.
There may be logistical and security channels still active between the two sides, which Jordan benefits from on matters concerning it, but these have become less impactful recently, and it's no secret that security assessments in Israel differ from political assessments of the relationship with Jordan. This explains the contradiction seen in the indicators of the relationship between the two sides, while at the same time Jordan tries to confine its declared political position to the current Israeli government, this specific era in particular, amid Jordanian fears of extremist religious currents infiltrating Israel's military and security apparatuses, which would lead to an escalation in the crisis between Jordan and Israel, with detailed indicators analyzing the coming phase and where Israel is heading politically, and the possible changes to the structure of its security and military apparatuses.
Another factor shaping the simultaneity, or contradiction, between Jordan's escalatory language against Israel and the existence of certain coordination indicators, is tied to the American position as well, as there's the American factor, its pressure and influence on both sides, its intervention at certain junctures, and Jordan's acceptance of certain American wishes in the context of maximizing its geopolitical role with the Americans, as a hedge against increasingly aggressive Israeli actions, particularly the West Bank file, the Al-Aqsa Mosque file, and Israel's readiness to cut gas, electricity, and consequently water, to Jordan, and to increase harassment at the bridges.
This is an extremely complex equation that cannot be understood simply, as you see the indicator and its opposite, the signal and its reverse, and anyone trying to analyze it may get confused, operating on the assumption that signals must be consistent in a single direction, but we are facing a situation full of contradictions, and these contradictions are tied to a sensitive management of the situation and the nature of the relationship with Israel, and what Washington represents on one hand, and what Jordan ultimately fears regarding what may emerge from the occupation's policies and its projects in the coming period.
The most painful vulnerability here isn't tied to the question of the relationship's past, but to what the coming days will bring, and this explains Jordan's caution, and its blending of escalatory political language against Israel with technical responsiveness on specific matters, as if Jordan is walking a tightrope, until the endings of this path the region is traversing become clear, endings that remain open, with Jordan factoring in every possibility regarding them.
Jordan is threatened by Israel, and manages its position with extreme sensitivity.
