The region is changing dramatically today. What we are witnessing looks more like the beginning of a shift in the rules that have governed the Middle East since the end of World War II, when the United States became the external power with the greatest influence over regional security, and then took sole leadership of the world after the end of the Cold War.
اضافة اعلان
It is certainly too early to speak of the end of American power. The United States remains the military power most capable of global deployment, with a huge economy and a network of alliances that cannot be underestimated. But its influence is no longer enough to impose order, protect allies and end wars on its own terms.
The American-Iranian war offered a disappointing model. Enormous American military superiority did not translate into a decisive political outcome, while the war placed heavy pressure on American military capabilities and stockpiles. American analyses concluded that the Iran war exposed the limits of American power, and that Washington's Gulf allies are moving toward greater self-reliance and a diversification of their security partnerships.
The same picture appears in the Russian-Ukrainian war, as Europe is forced to think about building its own defense capability and bearing greater responsibility for its security. In Gaza, the United States, despite its exceptional influence over Israel, has not been able to impose a stable political settlement, and the issues of withdrawal, reconstruction and security arrangements remain unresolved.
For the countries of the region, they lived for decades building a large part of their security on the assumption of an American umbrella able to deter, protect and restore balance. But the experiences of recent years have revealed that this umbrella was not enough.
The "Mecca Pact" among Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan can be read as one of the early indicators of a different shape for regional security. Less than two months after the agreement was signed, it began moving from paper to practical testing, with agreement to activate collective deterrence measures and to provide agreed military forces and capabilities and deploy them in Saudi Arabia in the face of Houthi escalation.
It would be wrong to interpret this as a turn against the United States, as indications are that the American-Saudi strategic relationship remains strong. Nor is there enough evidence to assert that the Mecca Pact was formed with direct American approval, or that every transfer of Turkish or Pakistani military capabilities to Saudi Arabia necessarily requires American permission. But it is also hard to imagine building a security system of this size in a country militarily tied to Washington without coordinating with it, especially when it involves weapons systems and information sharing that may overlap with the American military structure.
Perhaps this is what makes the pact important. The United States is not leaving the Middle East in favor of another ally, but the form of the relationship is what is changing. Instead of a model in which America assumes the largest share of security responsibility, a model is taking shape that retains the American partnership but builds alongside it an independent regional capability able to act when Washington hesitates or when its interests differ from those of its allies.
For decades, the United States contributed to building a deep imbalance in the region's equilibrium, through a regional security system built on a strong American center and peripheries that depended on it. What is happening today may be the start of a correction of this imbalance, by reducing absolute dependence on it through multiple partnerships and opening channels with other powers, while keeping the relationship with Washington.
The new shape of the Middle East begins here. The irony is that the United States itself will be forced to accept this shift, because it is no longer able to manage a vast and turbulent world with the same tools and rules with which it managed the post-World War II era.
