In modern warfare, the battle does not necessarily begin with the first shot. It may have started long before that, preceded by confrontations in the information and cognitive domains, where narratives and perceptions compete before the details of an event are fully established. On phone screens, social media platforms and in the media, perceptions of the enemy and ally are shaped, responsibility is assigned, and interpretations of events are formed.
War, therefore, is no longer merely a struggle over territory; it has become a struggle over perception. Whoever can influence how people understand events possesses a degree of power to influence the course of the conflict.
Narratives are no longer merely reflections of battles; they have become tools of warfare themselves. In the digital environment, an image may precede an event, a narrative may spread before information is complete, and an impression may become firmly established before the truth reaches the public.
This is where Cognitive Warfare emerges. It goes beyond traditional propaganda and psychological warfare to influence how individuals, groups and decision-makers think, as well as their level of trust in institutions and sources. Such warfare does not necessarily rely on fabricated information. Some of its most effective tools may involve presenting accurate information within a misleading context, taking part of the truth out of context, reposting an old image, or using emotionally charged content that reaches recipients before they have the ability to verify and analyze it.
The danger of this form of conflict is increasing in the Middle East, where security, political and media crises overlap and the effects of regional events rapidly spill over into neighboring societies. With the widespread use of smartphones and social media platforms, citizens are now exposed to multiple narratives simultaneously. Some originate from official institutions and media outlets, others from individuals and influencers, while some come from unknown sources.
The problem, therefore, is not always a lack of information, but rather an abundance of information. The challenge becomes distinguishing between information and claims, news and interpretation, and authentic images and images placed within a false context.
In this environment, Jordan finds itself operating within a cognitive landscape directly connected to its regional surroundings. The Kingdom’s geopolitical position makes it highly susceptible to developments around it, while the rapid flow of information has made digital borders less significant than ever before.
An influence campaign may not need physical access to Jordanian territory; it may only need to reach a citizen’s phone. Consequently, any regional crisis can turn into a domestic information crisis if reliable and rapid channels for presenting and explaining facts are not available.
Unverified news, manipulated videos, old photographs and misleading headlines can influence public sentiment, fuel anxiety and polarization, and test the level of trust between society and its institutions.
In this context, the role of military media extends beyond simply reporting events to managing the information environment surrounding them. Accurate, clear and timely official information does not merely serve a news function; it is also a tool for crisis management, safeguarding public trust and limiting the space available for rumors and disinformation.
Conversely, the absence or delay of such information creates room for alternative narratives capable of exploiting fear and uncertainty. Speed and credibility consequently become components of national power, within a delicate balance between the public’s right to know and the requirements of security and operational considerations.
This responsibility is becoming even more significant with the rise of artificial intelligence, which has redefined the concept of verification by producing highly convincing synthetic content. It is no longer sufficient to ask whether content is genuine; it has become essential to examine its source, timing, context and independent verification evidence.
At the same time, artificial intelligence provides institutions with advanced tools for monitoring, analysis and early warning, strengthening their ability to anticipate cognitive threats, provided that its applications are subject to professional and ethical safeguards and that sensitive decisions remain within the scope of human judgment and oversight.
The most dangerous aspect of cognitive warfare, however, is that it targets trust as much as it targets information. A state may be able to confront a specific rumor, but it may face greater difficulty dealing with the cumulative effects of an environment that drives the public to doubt everything.
When the standard of verification collapses, the problem becomes deeper than any single piece of false information. The objective, therefore, should not be to convince citizens of a single narrative, but rather to equip them with critical-thinking and verification tools, making them less vulnerable to manipulation and polarization.
This highlights the need for a national framework for cognitive security in Jordan that moves from reaction to anticipation. Such a framework could be built around five interconnected functions:
1. Early monitoring of narratives and information trends.
2. Contextual analysis of why they spread and which audiences they target.
3. Proactive communication to provide reliable information before an information vacuum develops.
4. Rapid and consistent response when crises occur.
5. Performance evaluation and lessons learned.
This also requires strengthening media and digital literacy, developing institutional media, supporting professional journalism, and building partnerships among government institutions, universities, research centers and experts.
Cognitive security is not about controlling what citizens think. Rather, it is about protecting the environment in which thinking and decision-making take place.
A cognitively resilient society is one that can deal with conflicting information, examine its sources, understand its context and adjust its positions when new facts emerge, while retaining its ability to make decisions under pressure.
At the heart of this system is the role of His Majesty King Abdullah II ibn Al Hussein, the Supreme Commander of the Jordan Armed Forces-Arab Army, in consolidating trust in the state and its institutions and strengthening their ability to withstand evolving threats.
His Majesty recognized early on that the strength of a modern state is not measured solely by its military capabilities, but also by its ability to protect its security, preserve social cohesion, manage crises, and build trust between its institutions and citizens.
This has been reflected in His Majesty’s continued attention to developing the Jordan Armed Forces-Arab Army, enhancing its readiness, efficiency and ability to address various threats, including unconventional and hybrid threats.
Conclusion
The battlefield is no longer confined to land, air, sea and cyberspace; it has extended to the individual himself—to his perceptions, trust and ability to interpret events.
In the Jordanian context, the importance of cognitive security is heightened by the Kingdom’s geographical location and its exposure to multiple regional crises. It should therefore be regarded as an integral part of the national security and national resilience system.
If the armed forces protect the state’s borders, then an aware and cohesive society represents a fundamental pillar of national protection.
In today’s conflicts, the decisive battle may not be fought solely on the ground. It may instead be a battle over who possesses the most credible information, the most trusted institutions, and the society with the greatest capacity to think, verify and endure.
